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Abstract 
Transitional justice has tended to prioritise civil and political rights (CPR) violations over 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) violations and often left structural violence and root 
causes of violence un(der)addressed. This thesis advocates that when addressing violations of 
ESCR, the examination of structural violence and roots causes of violence is critical for 
transitional justice processes to provide a fully-fledged response to past wrongs. The Kurdish 
Question (rising from problems regarding the Kurdish identity and the protracted conflict 
between the Turkish state and a Kurdish separatist organisation) has long troubled Turkey. 
Although the Kurdish Question is mainly rooted in political and identity-based problems, the 
Turkish state discourse has framed it as a socioeconomic and terrorism problem. This makes the 
conflict and solution complex since even if the conflict is based on political problems, there 
remains a pressing need to deal with socioeconomic issues. Considering that transitional justice 
contexts are often complex (and they require complex solutions), this thesis advocates an 
approach to transitional justice which goes beyond pure legalism.  
This study examines transitional justice processes of East Timor and Peru to draw lessons from 
their experiences. East Timor and Peru provide important insights for Turkey as they also faced 
serious socioeconomic problems (violations of ESCR, and in particular forced displacement) 
during their transitional processes. This thesis argues that ESCR violations (especially forced 
displacement) and socioeconomic inequalities need to be addressed through a set of 
mechanisms which must be designed and implemented through a participatory, holistic, and 
grassroots approach. The local actors including victims and survivors must have a role in 
decision-making, design, management and implementation processes of transitional justice 
mechanisms to ensure that the response to past wrongs really answers the needs and demands 
of the affected people and communities. It must be noted that this thesis does not draw a 
roadmap for a future transitional justice process in Turkey as that needs to be done through a 
thorough consultation process with relevant actors. Given that the conflict is ongoing in Turkey 
and the country (unlike many transitional countries) has substantial resources (financial and 
institutional) to allocate to transitional justice efforts, Turkey is a significant case study for the 
field. The original contribution of this thesis to knowledge is addressing the Kurdish Question 
from a transitional justice point of view incorporating ESCR.  
 
 
 
4 
 
Contents 
Declaration .................................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 3 
Contents ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 7 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 8 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 8 
2. Background ........................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1. Research Questions...................................................................................................... 11 
2.2. Aims and Objectives of the study ................................................................................ 12 
2.3. Methodology ................................................................................................................ 12 
3. Justification of the case study ............................................................................................. 13 
3.1. Why Turkey? ................................................................................................................ 13 
3.2. Why East Timor and Peru? ........................................................................................... 14 
3.3. Significance (contribution) and focus of research ....................................................... 14 
4. Thesis outline ...................................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 1: Transitional Justice .................................................................................................... 17 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 17 
2. The Historical Background of Transitional Justice .............................................................. 18 
3. The Conceptualisation of Transitional Justice .................................................................... 20 
3.1. What is transitional justice for? ................................................................................... 20 
3.2. The criticisms of transitional justice ............................................................................ 28 
4. Transitional Justice Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 37 
4.1. Trials ............................................................................................................................. 38 
4.2. Truth Commissions ...................................................................................................... 41 
4.3. Reparations .................................................................................................................. 45 
4.4. Institutional Reforms ................................................................................................... 50 
4.5. Amnesties ..................................................................................................................... 54 
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 58 
Chapter 2: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ........................................................................ 59 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 59 
2. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights .................................................................................. 59 
2.1. ESCR in International Law ............................................................................................ 59 
2.2. The Neglect of ESCR ..................................................................................................... 61 
5 
 
2.3. Elements and obligations of ESCR ................................................................................ 70 
3. ESCR and Transitional Justice .............................................................................................. 74 
3.1. Contextualisation of the neglect of ESCR ..................................................................... 74 
3.2. Transitional justice mechanisms to address ESCR ....................................................... 78 
3.3. Limitations of transitional justice to address ESCR ...................................................... 81 
3.4. ESCR in the context of development and transitional justice nexus ........................... 83 
4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 94 
Chapter 3: The Kurdish Question ................................................................................................ 96 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 96 
2. Background of the problem ................................................................................................ 97 
2.1. The PKK insurgence .................................................................................................... 103 
2.2. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) period in the Kurdish Question ............... 105 
2.3. Economic marginalisation of the Kurdish region ....................................................... 109 
2.4. Relative deprivation of the Kurds .............................................................................. 115 
3. The human rights abuses and the significance of ESCR violations ................................... 118 
3.1. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ......................................................................... 120 
3.2. Forced migration ........................................................................................................ 123 
4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 134 
Chapter 4: Comparisons: East Timor and Peru ......................................................................... 136 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 136 
2. East Timor ......................................................................................................................... 136 
2.1. Historical background ................................................................................................ 136 
2.2. Transitional justice process ........................................................................................ 141 
2.3. ESCR and development .............................................................................................. 164 
3. Peru ................................................................................................................................... 179 
3.1. Historical background ................................................................................................ 179 
3.2. Transitional justice process ........................................................................................ 185 
3.3. ESCR and development .............................................................................................. 202 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 212 
Chapter 5: Transitional Justice Mechanisms to be Implemented in the Kurdish Question ..... 215 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 215 
2. An important decision: facing the past ............................................................................. 215 
2.1. Can Turkey pursue transitional justice? ..................................................................... 216 
2.2. Preparing people for the process ............................................................................... 217 
6 
 
2.3. Why should Turkey pursue transitional justice? ........................................................ 221 
3. Considering the local ......................................................................................................... 223 
3.1. What is actually local and why is locality critical for transitional justice? ................. 224 
3.2. What do locals want and how do they analyse the concepts of transitional justice?226 
3.3. Women and youth as locals ....................................................................................... 228 
3.4. Limitations of locality ................................................................................................. 229 
4. Adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach ............................................. 230 
5. Designing the mechanisms ............................................................................................... 233 
5.1. Trials ........................................................................................................................... 236 
5.2. Truth Commissions .................................................................................................... 239 
5.3. Reparations ................................................................................................................ 247 
5.4. Institutional Reforms ................................................................................................. 254 
5.5. Amnesties ................................................................................................................... 257 
6. Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................... 259 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 260 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 260 
2. Policy Recommendations .................................................................................................. 262 
3. Contribution ...................................................................................................................... 263 
4. Limitations of the study and future research ................................................................... 263 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ 265 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Acknowledgements 
Many people have provided me support and encouragement during my work on this project. I 
could not have completed this thesis without the guidance, encouragement and expertise of my 
supervisors Michael Kearney, Matthew Evans and earlier Tom Frost. They gave me precious 
advice and guidance throughout this project. For their inspiration and encouragement for this 
research, I want to thank Yilmaz Ensaroglu and Kerim Yildiz. I also want to thank my friends Betty 
Schulz, Dilek Soykuvvet, Gizem Gergin, Merve Esen and Nada AbouShama who have always been 
there for me during difficult times, and my friend Ebru Demir for all the inspiring conversations 
we had about my thesis and life. I am also grateful to Nur Ozyilmaz and Aysenur Ozyilmaz 
Alemdar who have become a family to me and always made me feel at home. I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude to my family: my parents, my brother and especially my sister who 
always provided me invaluable moral and emotional support my whole life and allowed me to 
pursue my dreams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Introduction 
 
 “We talk and talk from morning to night and then come home and we are still hungry…”1  
(Joao, Alieu - East Timor) 
 
1. Introduction 
Transitional justice, a relatively new concept, has become an essential paradigm in societies 
which transition from authoritarian/totalitarian regimes to democratic ones and from conflicts 
to peace.2 It aims to address grave human rights violations of the past and contribute to peace 
and reconciliation. This thesis looks at the possibility of pursuing transitional justice in response 
to the Kurdish Question3 in Turkey.  It does so by specifically looking at which transitional justice 
mechanisms can be adopted to address the violations and promotion of economic, social and 
cultural rights (ESCR) through a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach. It focuses on 
ESCR violations because these rights are often sidelined in transitional justice processes, even 
though they have significant importance to people as the quote above remarks. 
2. Background 
Transitional justice can simply be defined as a response to wrongdoings of the past.4 Transitional 
justice mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reforms, and amnesties) 
are designed to address widespread human rights violations which are often committed during 
conflicts and under repressive regimes. Transitional justice has tended to focus on addressing 
violations of civil and political rights (CPR), often leaving historical inequalities and violations of 
ESCR un(der)addressed.5 Yet, there has been an increasing demand from scholars and 
                                                          
1 Kent, L. (2004) Unfulfilled Expectations: Community Views on CAVR’s Community Reconciliation Process, 
The Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), p.25. 
2 Olsen, T. D., Payne, L. A. and Reiter, A. G. (2010) Transitional justice in balance: Comparing processes, 
weighing efficacy, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, pp.1-2. 
3 There are various terms in academia and public discourse to refer to the problems regarding the Kurdish 
identity and the protracted conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, 
PKK), a separatist organisation which was founded in 1978, and the Turkish state: the Kurdish Problem, 
the Kurdish Issue, the Eastern Problem, the Southeast Problem, the Terror Problem, etc. This thesis is 
going to use the “Kurdish Question” as the others often imply that the Kurds are ‘the problem’. Therefore, 
choosing an objective term seems reasonable. 
4 International Center for Transitional Justice (n.d.) What is transitional justice, Fact Sheet. Available at: 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf  
(access date: 27.08.2018) 
5 Arbour, L. (2007) Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, International Law and Politics, 
Vol.40, No.1, pp.1-27.; Laplante, L. J. (2008) Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and 
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practitioners for addressing violations of ESCR and root causes of violence in transitional 
processes. They suggest that socioeconomic problems, which are often among root causes of 
conflicts, need to be addressed for a successful transition, and if they remain un(der)addressed, 
it is difficult to ensure that peace and reconciliation will be sustainable.6  
Transitional justice has been criticised for being distant from affected communities and lacking 
participation. Numerous scholars assert that the field has been dominated by legalism and it is 
often applied through a top-down and one-size-fits-all approach.7 It is important to adopt an 
approach which responds to local needs and expectations. Local people should be integrated 
into decision-making, designing, management and implementation processes of transitional 
justice mechanisms. All transitional contexts have their own dynamics and realities. Therefore, 
transitional justice mechanisms need to be designed relevant to these contexts. It has also been 
argued that a holistic approach can be more useful in addressing complex problems of post-
authoritarian and post-conflict situations.8 Moreover, empowering victims and survivors, and 
ensuring a meaningful participation of locals can contribute to these processes to a great 
extent.9  
The Kurdish Question holds a long history and pressing footprint in Turkey, as ethnic groups in 
general, and the Kurdish people in particular, have been suppressed by the state since the 
                                                          
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, No.3, p.333. 
6 Schmid, E. and Nolan, A. (2014) ‘Do No Harm’? Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in 
Transitional Justice, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.8, No.3, p.363.; Arbour, Economic and 
Social Justice, pp.1-27.; Waldorf, L. (2012) Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs, Social & Legal Studies, Vol.21, No.2, pp.171-186.; Miller, Z. (2008) Effects of Invisibility: In Search 
of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.2, No.3, pp.266-
291.; Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building, pp.331-355. 
7 McEvoy, K. (2007) Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, Journal of 
Law and Society, Vol.34, No.4, pp.411-440.; McCargo, D. (2015) Transitional Justice and Its Discontents, 
Journal of Democracy, Vol.26, No.2, pp.5-20.; Gready, P. (2006) Analysis: Reconceptualising transitional 
justice: embedded and distanced justice, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.5, No.1, pp.3-21.; 
Vinjamuri, L. and Snyder, J. (2004) Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crimes 
Tribunals and Transitional Justice, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.7, No.1, pp.345-362.; Theidon, 
K. (2009) Editorial Note, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.3, No.3, p.296.; Arenhövel, M. 
(2008) Democratization and Transitional Justice, Democratisation, Vol.15, No.3, p.578.; Madlingozi, T. 
(2010) On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims, Journal of Human Rights 
Practice, Vol.2, No.2, p.225. 
8 Boraine, A. (2006) Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.60, 
No.1, pp.17-28. 
9 Lundy, P. (2009) Exploring Home-Grown Transitional Justice and Its Dilemmas: A Case Study of the 
Historical Enquiries Team, Northern Ireland, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.3, No.3, 
pp.321-340. 
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foundation of the Turkish Republic.10 This has caused several insurgencies and unrest in the 
country. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish acronym, PKK) was established in the 1980s, and 
bloody conflicts between the Turkish army and the PKK have marked the Republic's history since 
then. There have been gross human rights violations in the country (which particularly victimised 
the Kurdish people) including enforced disappearances, deaths in detention, burning villages 
and forcibly evacuating residents since the 1990s.11 Forced displacement has been one of the 
most wide-spread violations in the Kurdish Question.12 Moreover, the Kurdish region13 has been 
rife with socioeconomic problems such as poverty and unemployment, and it is the least 
developed part of Turkey.14 It is argued that the Kurdish region had been left out of the Turkish 
economy since the foundation of the Republic, and the marginalisation in economy and society 
has been exacerbated since the 1980s.15 The socioeconomic disparities between the Kurdish 
region and other regions makes socioeconomic issues central to the Kurdish Question. 
Therefore, to tackle the Kurdish Question successfully and sustainably, economic, social and 
cultural rights of the Kurds must be recognised as well as their civil and political rights.16  
The violations of ESCR and the underdevelopment of the Kurdish region have been a tricky 
subject in Turkey. Gardi stated: “Instead of addressing the rights of Kurdish minorities, Turkey's 
persistent focus on enforcing counter-terrorism policies against the PKK equates to a refusal to 
address the root causes of the conflict.”17 For quite a long time, political and identity-based 
demands of the Kurdish people have been ignored, and the Kurdish Question has been framed 
as a terrorism and an underdevelopment and poverty problem by the state.18 The true nature 
of the Kurdish Question must be acknowledged in a future transitional justice process, but this 
should not mean that socioeconomic dimensions of the problem will be side-lined. Even though 
                                                          
10 Gunes, C. and Zeydanlioglu, W. (2014) ‘Introduction: Turkey and the Kurds’ in Gunes, C. and 
Zeydanlioglu, W. (eds) The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New perspectives on violence, representation, and 
reconciliation, London and New York: Routledge, p.8. 
11 Ibid, pp.1-5. 
12 Ayata, B. and Yukseker, D. (2005) A belated awakening: National and international responses to the 
internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey, New Perspectives on Turkey, No.32, p.19. 
13 In this study, the Kurdish region refers to south-eastern and eastern regions in Turkey which are 
predominantly populated by Kurds.  
14 Somer, M. (2002) Ethnic Kurds, Endogenous Identities, and Turkey’s Democratization and Integration 
with Europe, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol.1, No.4, p.74.; Ensaroglu, Y. and Kurban, D. (2008) A 
Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the Government , 
Istanbul: TESEV Publications, p.20. 
15 White, P. (2007) Economic marginalization of Turkey's Kurds: the failed promise of modernization and 
reform, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.18, No.1, p.146. 
16 Yildiz, K. (2012) Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict: Pathways to Progress, Insight Turkey, Vol.14, No.4, p.170. 
17 Gardi, R. (2017) From Suppression to Secession: Kurds, Human Rights and the Right to Self-
Determination in Turkey, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol.24, No.1, p.74. 
18 Ensaroglu and Kurban, A Roadmap for a Solution, p.11. 
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the Kurdish Question is political, socioeconomic issues are also significant in this context. 
Ensaroglu and Kurban note “the Kurdish Question asserts itself as a complicated issue with 
ethnic, cultural, legal, political, social, economic, and psychological aspects.”19 Considering the 
Kurdish Question from a narrow legalistic perspective and identifying it as a civil and political 
rights problem is as problematic as considering it as exclusively an issue of terrorism and 
socioeconomic problems. Therefore, a holistic approach to the problem needs to be adopted 
both in theory and practice to address political, social, legal, cultural and economic issues. 
Turkey should pursue transitional justice mechanisms in a way which addresses both CPR and 
ESCR to end the conflict and achieve sustainable peace and reconciliation.  
When this research was started, there was a peace process in Turkey between the Turkish and 
the Kurdish sides of the conflict, but the peace process was ended in July 2015.20 Yet, the 
purpose of this study has been discovering the ways in which Turkey should conduct a 
transitional justice process which is suitable for addressing the problems in the Kurdish Question 
rather than examining the specific process which ended in 2015. Transitional justice, historically, 
has been adopted in post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, but it has also been pursued 
in ongoing conflicts to buttress the peace efforts.21 This study looks at the Kurdish Question from 
a post-conflict perspective and considers what pursuing transitional justice would look like in 
Turkey when the conflict is settled. 
2.1. Research Questions 
The central research question of this study is:  
• Why should Turkey pursue transitional justice and which mechanisms can be 
adopted to address the violations of ESCR in the Kurdish Question? 
The secondary questions are: 
• Why should transitional justice mechanisms be considered in the Kurdish 
Question? And how can they contribute to peace and reconciliation in Turkey? 
• What significance do ESCR violations have in the Kurdish Question? 
• Which transitional justice mechanisms should be considered to address ESCR 
violations, root causes of the conflict and structural violence and how? And why is it 
important to address them in a transitional process? 
                                                          
19 Ibid, p.11. 
20 Todorova, A. (2015) Turkish Security Discourses and Policies: The Kurdish Question, Information & 
Security: An International Journal, Vol.33, No.2, pp.113-117. 
21 Ambos, K. (2013) ‘Conflict (Ongoing) and Transitional Justice’ in Stan, L. and Nedelsky, N. (eds) 
Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice - Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.146-152. 
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• What is significant about adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots 
approach to transitional justice in Turkey?  
• What can Turkey learn from the experiences of East Timor22 and Peru? 
2.2. Aims and Objectives of the study 
This study aims to depict the significance of addressing socioeconomic issues in the Kurdish 
Question. Transitional justice generally neglects ESCR abuses, structural violence and root 
causes of conflicts and violence. It is similar in the Kurdish Question as socioeconomic aspects 
of the conflict are often side-lined even though addressing them is crucial for a full-fledged 
solution to the problems. It is argued that leaving root causes of conflicts, structural violence 
and ESCR violations un(der)addressed may be a threat to a sustainable peace and a successful 
transition. As noted above, forced displacement has been one of the most wide-spread human 
rights violations committed against the Kurds, and addressing ESCR violations is of great 
importance in a future transitional justice process. In addition, the study aims to show the 
importance of embracing a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach in a transitional 
justice process. By examining the experiences of East Timor and Peru, the study intends to 
illustrate key points which need to be taken into consideration when pursuing transitional 
justice. Lastly, in the light of transitional justice literature and lessons learnt from the transitional 
justice processes of East Timor and Peru, several policy recommendations are produced for the 
Turkish state, transitional justice actors (internal and external), NGOs and civil society. 
2.3. Methodology 
This research will be conducted through qualitative content analysis and comparative case study 
analysis. It will do so through theoretical and secondary data analyses. Theoretical analysis will 
cover conceptualisation of transitional justice, ESCR and the historical background of the Kurdish 
Question. The corpus of material includes scholarly articles, reports of prominent NGOs of the 
relevant countries and official documents of the transitional countries of concern. 
 Secondary data analysis will be conducted on two different grounds: 
• Data collection from government agencies, think tanks and human rights 
organisations in order to pin down violations of ESCR, root causes of the conflict and 
historical injustices. The reports which were published on the Kurdish Question will be 
examined. 
                                                          
22 The country is also known as Timor-Leste. 
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• Comparative analysis with the experiences of East Timor and Peru to examine 
what worked and what did not work in these processes. The experiences of these 
countries will be analysed through the existing literature on these countries.  
 
The reason for not conducting a field research and interviews is that there is a wide literature 
on these countries’ experiences. The human rights violations are well-documented in Turkey 
and it is not likely that a field research could collect further data than the existing studies. 
Moreover, the aim of this study is not suggesting a model or drawing a roadmap for the 
government to implement transitional justice mechanisms. Therefore, the study will not identify 
the needs and demands of the Kurdish people. These needs and demands should be determined 
by transitional justice practitioners through a broad consultation process with victims and 
affected communities (and other relevant actors). This thesis examines the ways in which 
transitional justice should be pursued in Turkey. This examination includes assessing different 
approaches to transitional justice, identifying various actors (who should be included in a 
transitional justice process) and analysing transitional justice mechanisms (how they can be 
designed and implemented, and how they can contribute to tackling the Kurdish Question). This 
study does this examination by making an in-depth analysis of the transitional processes in East 
Timor and Peru. It also explores other transitional justice processes around the world to see 
what worked and what did not. Likewise, the study does not recommend specific local practices 
to be adapted considering that these choices need to be made by the locals rather than external 
actors.   
3. Justification of the case study 
3.1. Why Turkey? 
Transitional states often face limitations when they pursue transitional justice. Lack of resources 
and limited institutional capacity often have a negative impact on their efforts. Turkey can be a 
significant case for the literature as it has a strong economy, a functioning democracy (despite 
its deficits)23 and settled institutions compared to many transitional states. Considering that a 
considerable majority of the transitional countries have relatively weak economies and 
democracies, Turkey has a great potential to provide insights to transitional justice literature. 
Moreover, socioeconomic issues are central to the Kurdish Question and exploring the ways in 
                                                          
23 Turkey’s democracy score is between four and five (ten refers to full democracy and zero refers to an 
authoritarian regime) according to the Economist’s data. Available at: 
https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/ (access date: 06.09.2018). 
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which these problems can be addressed in a future transitional justice process contributes to 
the development of the literature.  
3.2. Why East Timor and Peru? 
East Timor and Peru are chosen in this study for the comparative analysis. An in-depth analysis 
of the transitional processes of these counties will be made since their mechanisms are 
concerned with socioeconomic problems and ESCR violations.24 Moreover, both countries have 
significant forced displacement problems and adopted various measures to deal with these 
problems.25 Forced displacement is one of the most wide-spread human rights violations in the 
Kurdish Question, and there are many lessons that should be learnt by Turkey before it pursues 
transitional justice.  
3.3. Significance (contribution) and focus of research 
This research aims to make an original contribution to the field in several ways. First, the Kurdish 
Question has not been considered in transitional justice context in depth as a doctoral thesis. 
There are few studies on the subject and none of the existing studies specifically focused on 
ESCR violations and socioeconomic dimension of the Kurdish Question in the context of 
transitional justice.26 So, there remains an open question on the significance of addressing ESCR 
abuses and root causes of the conflict, and this is the first study of its kind to begin addressing 
this question. Whilst the existing literature has showed that transitional justice can be pursued 
                                                          
24 Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru – CVR (2014) Hatun Willakuy: 
Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – Peru, Lima.; The 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste - CAVR (2005) Chega! The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste: Executive Summary.; Van der 
Auweraert, P. (2012) Dealing with the 2006 Internal Displacement Crisis in Timor-Leste: Between 
Reparations and Humanitarian Policymaking, International Center for Transitional Justice.; Segura, R. B. 
(2012) Case Studies on Transitional Justice and Displacement: Reparations and Displacement in Peru, New 
York: International Center for Transitional Justice. 
25 Koefner, G. (2000) Displacement in East Timor, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.19, No.2, pp.77-88.; The 
CVR, Hatun Willakuy. 
26 Budak, Y. (2015) Dealing with the Past: Transitional Justice, Ongoing Conflict and the Kurdish Issue in 
Turkey, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.9, No.2, pp.219-238.; Sancar, M. (2010) Geçmişle 
Hesaplaşma: Unutma Kültüründen Hatırlama Kültürüne, Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.; Bakiner, O. (2013) Is 
Turkey Coming to Terms with Its Past? Politics of Memory and Majoritarian Conservatism, Nationalities 
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol.41, No.5, pp.691-708.; Jongerden, J. (2018) Looking 
beyond the state: Transitional justice and the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.41, 
No.4, pp.721-738.; Baser, B. (2017) Intricacies of Engaging Diasporas in Conflict Resolution and 
Transitional Justice: The Kurdish Diaspora and the Peace Process in Turkey, Civil Wars, Vol.19, No.4, 
pp.470-494.; Mihr, A. (2018) Regime Consolidation and Transitional Justice: A Comparative Study of 
Germany, Spain and Turkey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Izgoren, E. (2016) Transitional 
Justice and the Ongoing Kurdish Issue in Turkey from the Perspectives of the Wives of the Disappeared, 
Unpublished master’s thesis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.; Buyukyuksel, K. (2016) Opening the Books: 
Transitional Justice in the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict, Unpublished master’s thesis, Central European 
University, Budapest, Hungary. 
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to tackle the Kurdish Question, this study significantly develops this by both examining 
transitional justice mechanisms (which mechanisms can make what contribution) in the light of 
a comparative analysis and exploring the significance of addressing ESCR violations and 
socioeconomic issues when pursuing transitional justice. Second, Turkey is a significant example 
in terms of resources since it has more financial and institutional resources to allocate to a 
transitional justice process compared to most transitional states. Third, even though the Kurdish 
Question is inherently political, there have been serious socioeconomic problems including ESCR 
violations and underdevelopment of the region due to the oppression and conflict. Exploring 
socioeconomic issues in the context of a political problem offers new insights to transitional 
justice literature. Lastly, this study contributes to the field by developing both comparative 
literature on transitional justice and ESCR. 
4. Thesis outline 
The first chapter gives the historical background of transitional justice, conceptualises the field 
by examining memory, truth and reconciliation, and the relationship between them. It also 
elucidates two of the criticisms (which are closely linked to the main argument of the thesis) 
surrounding transitional justice: distanced justice27 (lack of local participation) and failure of 
addressing socioeconomic wrongs and root causes. While setting out the criticisms, it also 
suggests the ways in which these criticisms can be eliminated. Finally, the chapter explains 
transitional justice mechanisms: trials, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reforms and 
amnesties.  
The second chapter defines and conceptualises ESCR by describing elements and obligations 
resulting from ESCR. The chapter enquires into the reasons for the relative neglect of ESCR in 
international law by analysing prominent arguments. Then, the neglect of ESCR in transitional 
justice literature and practice is explored in this chapter, and the significance and limitations of 
addressing violations of ESCR in transitional contexts are analysed. The chapter also depicts how 
transitional processes can be enhanced by addressing and promoting ESCR. Lastly, the chapter 
depicts the linkages between development and transitional justice and highlights potential 
contributions that development and transitional justice can make to each other. 
The third chapter aims to explain the Kurdish Question by giving the historical background of 
the problem, the emergence and development of the conflict and the current government’s 
approach to the issue. It also explores the significance of socioeconomic issues (particularly 
                                                          
27 “Distanced justice” refers to the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in a way which does 
not achieve justice as victims would understand.   
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forced migration) in the Kurdish Question by analysing the arguments on the economic 
marginalisation of the Kurdish region and relative deprivation of the Kurds. Then, the chapter 
pins down both human rights abuses (particularly ESCR abuses) and their legacies in today’s 
context. It argues that the socioeconomic conditions of the region show the significance and 
necessity of addressing and promoting ESCR in a future transitional process in Turkey.  
The fourth chapter makes in-depth analyses of East Timor and Peru’s transitional processes to 
allow a comparison between them and the Kurdish Question. Although this comparison is made 
in the fifth chapter, the fourth chapter lays the foundation for the comparison. This chapter 
examines the historical backgrounds of the violence in both countries and describes their 
transitional processes thoroughly. Both East Timor and Peru adopted a wide range of 
mechanisms including trials, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reforms and 
amnesties. These mechanisms are examined in detail to see which mechanisms are applied in 
which ways and what kind of outcomes they produced. The criticisms about these mechanisms 
are pinned down to provide insights for Turkey. Finally, the chapter scrutinised how the 
historical injustices, ESCR abuses (and their consequences) and current socioeconomic problems 
(forced displacement, economy, education, health etc.) are dealt with in these countries.  
The fifth and the last chapter makes the comparison between Turkey and these two countries 
to find the ways in which a transitional justice process can be implemented efficiently. This 
comparison allows the study to depict rights and wrongs of other countries’ experiences to find 
the best solution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The chapter considers five transitional 
justice mechanisms (trial, truth commission, reparation, institutional reform and amnesty) to be 
implemented in tackling the Kurdish Question. It does so by depicting which mechanisms can 
make what contribution to achieve peace and reconciliation in Turkey. Although it considers 
human rights violations generally, its focus is on ESCR violations, particularly on forced 
displacement. It also explores what is aimed at by the application of each mechanism and what 
abuses are going to be addressed by them. Finally, the chapter depicts the significance of 
adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach to enhance the transitional process. 
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Chapter 1: Transitional Justice 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to give the historical background of transitional justice by showing how it 
evolved in time; conceptualise the field by asking “what is transitional justice for?”, “what are 
the criticisms concerning it?” and “how can transitional justice be enhanced in the light of the 
criticisms?”; introduce mechanisms of transitional justice; and finally summarise the chapter and 
express the final thoughts. These thoughts concern adopting a holistic (implementing 
mechanisms jointly), participatory and grassroots approach, pursuing transitional justice in a 
realistic and context-specific manner, and expanding the field to include socioeconomic issues 
to have a complete and successful transitional justice process. By conceptualising the field, this 
chapter lays the foundation for analysing why Turkey should pursue transitional justice, and it 
opens the discussion about including ESCR in transitional justice processes.  
Transitional justice is a concept which is being applied in transitional countries which shift from 
authoritarian/totalitarian regimes to democracies or from conflicts/civil wars to peace. Since 
repressive regimes and armed conflicts are identified with massive human rights violations, 
transitional countries bear a heavy burden: wrongdoings of the past. Nascent democracies and 
post-conflict societies must make a decision about this burden. Two important questions related 
to this decision are stated as: “whether to remember or forget the abuses−the issue of 
acknowledgment−and whether to impose sanctions on the individuals who are co-responsible 
for these abuses−the issue of accountability”.28 Answering these questions is critical for 
transitional countries as the answers shape transitional periods.  
There are various definitions of transitional justice in the literature. It was defined as “a response 
to systematic or widespread violations of human rights”29 by the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ); “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes”30 by Teitel; and “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”31 by the United Nations (UN). While 
                                                          
28 Huyse, L. (1995) Justice after transition: on the choices successor elites make in dealing with the past, 
Law & Social Inquiry, Vol.20, No.1, p.52. 
29 ICTJ, What is transitional justice, Fact Sheet. 
30 Teitel, R. G. (2003) Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.16, p.69. 
31 The United Nations (2004) The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, p.4. 
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Teitel described transitional justice as a legal response, the ICTJ and the UN did not specify the 
response as a legal one. This difference is related to the argument about the domination of 
legalism in transitional justice literature which will be explained in the section 3.2.  
Transitional justice is a relatively new concept in the field of justice and the debates surrounding 
its use, both in theory and practice, continue to enrich the field. Yet, the application of 
transitional justice mechanisms has expanded since the 1970s, and it has become an essential 
paradigm in the 21st century.32 It is claimed that if gross human rights violations which took place 
in the past are not addressed, they may lead to serious problems in the future, and transitional 
justice can be used as an effective tool to face the past and to achieve reconciliation.33 These 
assumptions of transitional justice are generally accepted but they are not without critiques. 
The validity of these assumptions continues to be debated in the literature which will be detailed 
below. 
2. The Historical Background of Transitional Justice 
Even though the term “transitional justice” was coined in the 1980s, there have been many 
precedents throughout history. Elster says: “Democratic transitional justice is almost as old as 
democracy itself.”34 Elster explains that Athens had two transitional periods in 411 B.C. and in 
404-403 B.C. when democracy was ceased twice by oligarchies. After both periods of oligarchies, 
democracy was restored, and Athens had been through two transitional periods.35 However, 
Teitel states that the origins of modern transitional justice date back to post-World War I 
period.36 Teitel points out post-World War I period national trials and identifies them in the 
context of transitional justice.37 Yet, when Teitel describes three phases of transitional justice, 
she does not include post-World War I period. Teitel’s view is more persuasive since transitional 
justice has been identified as a separate field after World War II. Since then, history has 
witnessed many transitions in different parts of the world. According to Teitel, the genealogy of 
transitional justice consists of three phases and it gives the historical evolution of the field.38  
                                                          
32 Olsen et al., Transitional justice in balance, pp.1-2. 
33 Andrieu, K. (2010) Transitional Justice: A New Discipline in Human Rights, Online Encyclopedia of Mass 
Violence, pp.1-37. Available at: http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/transitional-justice-new-discipline-human-rights (access date: 21.01.2018).; 
Bar-Tal, D. (2000) From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological 
Analysis, Political Psychology, Vol.21, No.2, pp.351-365. 
34 Elster, J. (2004) Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.3. 
35 Ibid, p.3. 
36 Teitel, Transitional justice genealogy, p.70. 
37 Ibid, p.72. 
38 Ibid, p.70. 
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Phase I refers to the period from World War II (1945) until the end of Cold War (1989) and is 
associated with international trials (and sanctions), particularly the Nuremberg Trials. After 
World War I, the prosecutions were held at national level, but this did not prevent future wars. 
Therefore, the response to war crimes was different in the post-World War II period as 
international prosecutions were employed instead of national ones.39 Phase II refers to the 
period between 1989-2000, and democratisation and political fragmentation marked the 
significance of this phase.40 Transitions in Eastern Europe, Central America and Africa shaped 
the form of transitional justice in Phase II. The responses to wrongdoings of predecessor regimes 
differed from Phase I. There was a shift from retributive justice to restorative justice.41 While 
retributive justice focuses on punishing perpetrators, restorative justice aims to repair damages 
of crimes.42 Unlike Phase I, most states did not prefer international trials and they sought 
alternative justice methods such as truth commissions and amnesties. Transitional states tended 
to focus more on achieving peace and reconciliation rather than holding accountable old 
regimes.43 This shift enabled states to put more emphasis on promoting forgiveness, preserving 
peace and healing affected societies instead of only focusing on justice and establishing rule of 
law.44 Phase III is defined as the steady-state phase of transitional justice which emerged in the 
beginning of the 21st century in which transitional justice has become a standard rather than an 
exception.45  Compared to Phases I and II, the circumstances have changed in this phase. 
Whereas there were extraordinary conditions such as post-World War or a wave of 
democratisation in previous phases, there have been long-lasting conflicts, small wars and 
political fragmentations in Phase III.46 These conditions influenced the normalisation and 
expansion of transitional justice in the 21st century. Several scholars add a fourth 
phase/generation to Teitel’s genealogy considering the developments in transitional justice. The 
fourth phase/generation is characterised by the debates on the balance of local and global, and 
the extension of the field to include socioeconomic issues (such as social justice, economic 
crimes, ESCR abuses, root causes of violence and structural violence).47 
                                                          
39 Ibid, pp.72-73. 
40 Ibid, p.71. 
41 Ibid, p.77. 
42 Daly, K., Hayes, H. and Marchetti, E. (2006) ‘New Visions of Justice’ in Goldsmith, A., Israel, M. and Daly, 
K. (eds.) Crime and Justice: A Guide to Criminology (3rd ed.), Sydney: Lawbook Company, pp.439-464. 
43 Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, p.77. 
44 Ibid, p.82. 
45 Ibid, p.71. 
46 Ibid, p.90. 
47 Sharp, D. (2013) Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional 
Justice, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.26, pp.149-178.; Mcauliffe, P. (2017) Reflections of the nexus 
between justice and peacebuilding, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.11, No.2, pp.245-260.; 
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It should be noted that the history of transitional justice can be described in alternative ways. 
For instance, McAuliffe remarks that “it is more productive to think of transitional justice not in 
terms of a simplified evolutionary narrative of long-term improvement and progress but rather 
in terms of conjunctures, i.e. discrete periods of opportunity or crisis when certain general 
conditions in different parts of the world coincided to either encourage or check its 
enlargement.”48 He describes four stages of transitional justice advocacy: the first stage is 
“peace versus justice” which refers to a phase which was dominated by the arguments about 
whether or not transitional states should face with the past; the second stage is “truth versus 
justice” in which arguments were concentrated on how to face with the past since it is admitted 
that facing with the past is necessary; the third stage is “beyond truth versus justice” which 
suggested that the combination of various transitional justice mechanisms should be adopted 
in a holistic manner, and finally, the fourth stage is the period of “a post-euphoria era of doubt” 
in which it is questioned that whether or not the promises of transitional justice are legitimate 
and achievable.49 
3. The Conceptualisation of Transitional Justice 
3.1. What is transitional justice for? 
Even though states decide on whether to remember and face, or to forget the past, there is a 
growing belief that remembering the past is necessary for societies to move on. Leebaw states 
that “the idea that a durable peace requires countries to address past violence is now widely 
held and promoted by influential leaders and institutions under the broad heading of 
‘transitional justice.’”50 Likewise, Minow points out that “failures of collective memory stoke 
fires of resentment and revenge.”51 Hayner has similar views and she writes “quiet the ghosts of 
the past, and they will haunt you forever.”52 Bell describes the relationship between memory 
and violence in his piece and states that “the past plays an unprecedented role in shaping the 
present”.53 These statements suggest that if the wrongdoings of the past remain unaddressed, 
                                                          
Nesiah, V. (2016) Transitional Justice Practice: Looking Back, Moving Forward, Impunity Watch Research 
Report, Utrecht: Impunity Watch. 
48 Mcauliffe, P. (2013) From Molehills to Mountains (and Myths?): A Critical History of Transitional Justice 
Advocacy, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol.13, No.2, p.88. 
49 Mcauliffe, From Molehills to Mountains, pp.85-166. 
50 Leebaw, B. A. (2008) The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.30, 
No.1, p.96. 
51 Minow, M. (2002) ‘Breaking the cycles of hatred’ in Minow, M. and Rosenblum, N. (ed) Breaking the 
cycles of hatred: memory, law, and repair, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p.28. 
52 Hayner, P. (2011) Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, New 
York: Routledge, p.23. 
53 Bell, D. (2009) Introduction: Violence and Memory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.38, 
No.2, p.346. 
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the resentment and desires for revenge might trigger new conflicts and jeopardise nascent 
democracies. It is also asserted that truth has a therapeutic effect on individuals and societies. 
These assertions are debated in the field and they should be analysed in depth in relation to 
memory, truth and reconciliation. Understanding these concepts is crucial to analyse whether 
Turkey should face with its past and pursue transitional justice which is argued in the fifth 
chapter’s section 2 in detail. In addition, delving into these concepts will contribute to 
understanding how memory, truth and reconciliation are conceptualised in the context of the 
Kurdish Question. 
3.1.a. Memory 
Until recently, memory had been underestimated in academia. It was not considered as a 
reliable source for writing history, but this tendency has changed a lot.54 The study and literature 
of memory is getting greater prominence in social sciences in the last decades.55 Since 
transitional justice asserts that we need to face wrongdoings of the past to achieve reconciliation 
and protect our future from renewed violence, memory becomes prominent in the field. 
Confronting the past requires revealing the truth about the past after both political violence and 
armed conflict.  
Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes tend to distort narratives of the past and hide the truth 
through media, judiciary and other public institutions.56 States often set one official history 
which is narrated from their point of view. However, there are various memories and truths 
regarding past human rights violations in post-conflict and post-authoritarian/totalitarian 
societies according to perpetrators, victims57 and onlookers.58  What has happened is often 
distorted or hidden during these regimes and violent conflicts. Therefore, memories of victims 
and survivors could be the only source for the truth. It is important to challenge official histories 
(which often set only one official record) and recover alternative memories (which are often 
oppressed and silenced).59 It is important to reveal the truth because “in certain situations 
                                                          
54 Friedländer, S. (1979) When Memory Comes, translated by Helen R. Lane, New York: Farrar, Strauss, 
and Giroux, quoted in Assmann, A. (2006) History, Memory, and the Genre of Testimony, Poetics Today, 
Vol.27, No.2, p.262. 
55 Bell, Introduction: Violence and Memory, p.345. 
56 Hamber, B. and Wilson, R. A. (2010) Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-
conflict societies, Journal of Human Rights, Vol.1, No.1, p.36. 
57 The terminology regarding individuals who were subjected to human rights violations is contentious. 
Although they are often defined as “victims” in the literature, some of them find this problematic and 
describe themselves as “survivors”. This research will use “victim” for the sake of simplicity.  
58 Alidu, S., Webb, D. and Fairbairn, G. J. (2009) “Truths” and “Re‐Imaging” in the Reconciliation Process, 
Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, Vol.21, No.2, p.136. 
59 Escudero, R. (2014) Road to Impunity: The Absence of Transitional Justice Programs in Spain, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol.36, No.1, p.140. 
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chauvinist, hegemonic nationalist ideologies, which are often based on historical distortions and 
denials of past crimes, can be used by political entrepreneurs to incite violence.”60 To prevent 
these entrepreneurs from using history to generate violence, true account of history should be 
set through the memories.  
Forgetting the past used to be a common trend in new regimes and post-conflict societies to 
establish a new future. The painful memories of the past used to be buried by adopting a 
pragmatic approach.61 Opponents of facing the past think: digging into the violent past may 
jeopardise peace and the future of new democratic regimes. They assert that achieving political 
consolidation and stability requires silencing the past.62 Mendeloff also says that forgetting the 
past might even be contributory for reconciliation and gives the example of Spain.63 He asserts 
that Spain has been through a successful transition by silencing its past. In Spain, after the Franco 
regime, the parties decided on forgetting the past and moving forward without facing the past 
wrongs, and they adopted a pact of forgetting.64 Likewise, in Lebanon, silencing the past was 
supported by wide populations. People thought that digging into the past would cause new 
conflicts.65 This view has been effective in many countries until recently. However, this trend 
tends to change, and recently transitional states do more to face wrongdoings of the past.66 For 
instance, there have been calls in Spanish society to confront and recover the past to redress 
the past violations.67 A movement consisting of NGOs, victim organisations and citizens emerged 
to raise the demands of uncovering the wrongdoings of the Franco regime.68 Therefore, the 
government responded to these demands by enacting the Historical Memory Act in 2007.69 
Similar efforts to reveal the truths about past violations can be seen in Lebanon70, in Cyprus71, 
                                                          
60 Mendeloff, D. (2004) Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm, 
International Studies Review, Vol.6, No.3, p.369. 
61 Kovras, I. (2013) Explaining Prolonged Silences in Transitional Justice: The Disappeared in Cyprus and 
Spain, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.46, No.6, pp.730-756.; Walzer, M. (1997) Judgment days. (50th 
anniversary of the Nuremberg war crime trials) (The Hard Questions), The New Republic, Vol.217, No.24, 
pp.13-14. 
62 Kovras, Explaining Prolonged Silences, p.747. 
63 Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, p.367. 
64 Davis, M. (2005) Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol.27, No.3, pp.859-864.; Escudero, Road to Impunity, p.125. 
65 Jaquemet, I. (2009) Fighting Amnesia: Ways to Uncover the Truth about Lebanon’s Missing, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.3, No.1, p.74. 
66 Goti, J. M. (2010) Editorial Note: A Turbulent Past and the Problem with Memory, International Journal 
of Transitional Justice, Vol.4, No.2, p.153. 
67 Golob, S. R. (2008) Volver: the Return of/to Transitional Justice Politics in Spain, Journal of Spanish 
Cultural Studies, Vol.9, No.2, pp.133-134. 
68 Escudero, Road to Impunity, p.137. 
69 Ibid, p.126. 
70 Jaquemet, Fighting Amnesia, p.70.  
71 Kovras, Explaining Prolonged Silences, p.731. 
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in Turkey72 and in many other countries. It must be noted that each country has its own 
dynamics, and the same mechanisms might not give the same results in every society when 
applied. However, transitional justice discourse might be promising in terms of redressing the 
oppressive regimes’ violations. 
3.1.b. Truth 
Truth has a significant role in transitional justice as facing the past requires revealing truth. 
Truth-telling may play important roles in transitional societies in various ways including healing 
victims, promoting reconciliation and deterring future crimes. Perhaps, the most prominent 
(and most challenged) assumption regarding truth-telling is its therapeutic effects on victims 
and societies. Proponents assert that truth-telling helps victims’ healing in two ways: truth-
telling “provides a sense of justice” and “helps to heal psychological trauma”.73 Forgetting the 
past and ignorance towards victims’ suffering might make victims feel that they are powerless, 
they lack dignity and self-confidence.74 It is assumed that acknowledging wrongdoings of the 
past may help relieve victims’ suffering by contributing to the restoration of their dignity.75 For 
instance, South Africa adopted “Revealing is healing” as a slogan to promote the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).76 Yet, the assertions about the healing and cathartic effect of 
revealing the truth are open to discussion and there is little scientific evidence supporting these 
assertions.77 Truth-telling processes of transitional justice such as trials or truth commissions 
might not give the best results of catharsis or they may even cause re-traumatisation.78 
Remembering, itself, might not contribute to closure of trauma.79 There are several studies 
which show that a majority of victims, who had been part of truth-telling mechanisms, were not 
                                                          
72 Bakiner, Is Turkey coming to terms, p.691. 
73 Mendeloff, D. (2009) Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-
Conflict Justice, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.31, No.3, p.599. 
74 Rauchfuss, K. and Schmolze, B. (2008) Justice heals: The impact of impunity and the fight against it on 
the recovery of severe human rights violations’ survivors, Torture, Vol.18, No.1, p.42.; Daly, E. and Sarkin, 
J. (2007) Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, p.142. 
75 Posel, D. (2002) ‘The TRC Report: What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth?’ in Posel, D. and Simpson, 
G. (eds) Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, pp.150-155. 
76 Posel, D. and Simpson, G. (2002) ‘Introduction - The Power of Truth: South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’ in Context in Posel, D. and Simpson, G. (eds) Commissioning the Past: 
Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press, p.12.  
77 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice, pp.4-5. 
78 Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, pp.364-365.; de Ridder, T. (1997) The Trauma of Testifying: 
Deponents’ Difficult Healing Process, Track Two, Vol.6, No.3&4, pp.30-34.; Brouneus, K. (2008) Truth-
Telling as Talking Cure? Insecurity and Retraumatization in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts, Security Dialogue, 
Vol.39, No.1, p.57. 
79 Hamber and Wilson, Symbolic closure through memory, p.37. 
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satisfied or were disappointed by the processes.80 Yet, Mendeloff notes that these studies have 
limitations, particularly regarding their scale (except Backer’s study).81 Backer’s study depicts 
interesting results as a majority of victims described their experience in the TRC as upsetting, 
yet they admitted that “they gained something positive” and “almost 70 percent indicated that 
if they had known in advance what it would be like to submit a statement, they still would have 
done it.”82 Another study, conducted in former Yugoslavia with 1400 victims, depicts that there 
is no impact, positive or negative, of truth and reconciliation efforts on the psychologies of the 
victims. The research suggests that “psychological interventions” are required to overcome 
psychological problems of the victims.83  
There are more studies on the subject, and overall, these studies give a complicated idea about 
the impact of truth-telling on victims.84 In fact, the outcomes of these studies require deeper 
analysis and interpretation before drawing conclusions. Why were the victims unsatisfied with 
the truth-telling experiences? For instance, in Brouneus’s research, the details of the testifying 
experiences showed that victims were not provided a healthy and safe environment in which to 
testify85 which is critical for healing86 and has a potential to produce positive outcomes.87 In 
South Africa, victims were not ready to forgive the perpetrators who walked free after telling 
the truth (even if their version of truth was not accepted by the victims).88 So, it is important 
what is uncovered, how it is uncovered and in which circumstances it is uncovered. Beyond its 
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therapeutic impact, uncovering the truth has a significant importance in enforced disappearance 
cases, as relatives of the disappeared persons experience a constant suffering, and learning the 
truth about their lost relatives is considered as the only way for them to recover.89 Moreover, it 
is also pointed out that even if truth has no healing effect on individuals or does not contribute 
to reconciliation in a society, we simply owe the victims to remember and acknowledge their 
suffering.90  
Truth also helps in setting an accurate account of the past which is important for deterring future 
crimes. Bhargava wrote: “Without a proper engagement with the past and the 
institutionalization of remembrance, societies are condemned to repeat, re-enact, and relive 
the horror.”91 As mentioned in the previous section 3.1.a, states tend to establish an official 
version of history (and truth) from their perspective. However, there are often multiple 
narratives and they should be embraced through a holistic approach. It is asserted that different 
narratives can strengthen each other, and a shared history can be formed.92 A fair record of the 
violent past may have a deterrence impact in transitional societies. However, the deterrence 
impact is debated as there is no easy way to prove this assertion, and there is no way to assure 
the prevention of future violence.93 In addition, it is discussed in the literature that it might not 
be possible or necessary to forge a historical account on which everybody is agreed. Critics of 
setting a true account of history argue that there might be different opinions about what had 
happened in the past, and setting only one official account of history can be problematic in a 
democratic society.94 It is noted that “‘truth’ on most important issues is not objective and not 
nearly as neutral as we would like it to be.”95 In addition, it is claimed that truth-telling 
mechanisms of transitional justice may not produce a true and complete account of history since 
they are selective on past violations (they tend to exclude sexual violence and socioeconomic 
issues).96 In fact, analysing the root causes of the violence is important and can be done through 
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truth-telling mechanisms. Although they are often excluded, addressing and tackling root causes 
can contribute to reconciliation and prevention of the future violence.97 
3.1.c. Reconciliation 
Transitional justice literature often assumes that truth-telling promotes individual healing, and 
this will lead to societal (and national) healing and reconciliation. There are various (sometimes 
conflicting) definitions and perceptions98 in the literature but reconciliation is “coming together” 
in its simplest definition.99 Hamber and Kelly’s definition is quite comprehensive: reconciliation 
is “[a] process that establishes peace and prevents violence from continuing or re-merging by 
addressing the root causes and the consequences of conflict.”100 However, it must be borne in 
mind that its meaning differs in different societies. Likewise, its application takes different forms 
according to the context.101 It is noted that “trauma is not only an individual process but a social 
and political phenomenon that affects society as a whole.”102 It is argued that silence about the 
violent past causes trauma to pass on to next generations and this may pose a threat in the 
future.103 So, trauma is related to individuals, societies and even future generations. It is asserted 
that acknowledging sufferings of people and restoring their dignity helps societies achieve 
reconciliation and ensure that wrongdoings of the past will not take place in the future.104  
The relationship between reconciliation and truth is complex and different interpretations of 
truth and reconciliation lead to different conclusions.105 As argued in the previous sections 3.1.a-
b some argue that truth is necessary for healing and reconciliation, while others oppose the 
idea. For instance, Mendeloff is critical of the whole idea of achieving reconciliation through 
facing the past. He writes that there is no empirical data on the assumption that “reconciliation 
requires truth-telling”. There are many states in which divided parties coexist without a truth-
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telling process, and in some examples, such as South Africa and Central America, truth-telling 
processes did not end up achieving reconciliation.106 Moreover, some argued that truth may 
threaten reconciliation. In post-Soviet countries, the truth was not revealed as publishing the 
personal files of people could be dangerous for the society.107 Likewise, truth may trigger the 
demands for justice and if these demands are not responded to, reconciliation may be 
impeded.108 In addition, the public and elites do not often easily admit the truth.109 If truth 
challenges the existing political and economic powers of the elites, they may not acknowledge 
the truth.  
Moreover, how societies and individuals consider reconciliation is also critical in transitional 
states. For instance,  people may prefer to forget the past for reconciliation and societal healing 
as happened in Lebanon, Sierra Leone and Mozambique.110 In some contexts, even victims may 
want to forgive and forget rather than remembering the past as it can be more successful than 
“court or commission-sponsored remembering.”111 Samii’s research shows that a majority of 
people in Burundi were reluctant to pursue transitional justice due to several reasons such as 
the fear of renewed conflict and political power struggles.112 What is important here is the 
demand of victims and societies. In Sierra Leone, individuals and some communities decided to 
pursue their own reconciliation path through forgiving, forgetting and resistance to the official 
reconciliation process which was implemented by external actors without consulting affected 
populations.113 Renner noted: “the hegemonic understanding of reconciliation as healing 
through public truth-telling tends to privilege symbolic restitution practices over other kinds of 
restitution, in particular financial help for post-conflict societies.”114 Therefore, governments 
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and external actors must avoid imposing a reconciliation process on transitional societies which 
is exclusively defined from their perspective.115 The perceptions and demands of people should 
be the determining factor for designing reconciliation measures. Though, it must be kept in mind 
that the decision of people may change in time as some countries, such as Cyprus, Lebanon and 
Spain, witnessed growing demands of facing with the past after choosing to forget.116 
To conclude, the relationship between truth and reconciliation continues to be debated and 
there is no satisfying empirical evidence for either side. In fact, Brouneus says that there is no 
empirical evidence on the relationship between truth and reconciliation.117 Perhaps, the 
difficulty lies in proving such intangible claims. Is it even possible to measure the effects of truth-
telling on reconciliation? The same difficulty can be observed at the individual level as human 
beings respond to violence in different ways. Perhaps it will take years to see the impacts both 
on individuals and societies. As stated earlier, even though truth-telling has no contribution to 
individual healing or national reconciliation, we have a duty to remember. Therefore, instead of 
opposing the whole idea of truth and reconciliation, ways must be sought to enhance them. In 
addition, the understandings of these concepts (memory, truth and reconciliation) vary in 
different contexts, and each context should be understood well to design transitional processes. 
3.2. The criticisms of transitional justice 
The criticisms surrounding transitional justice are vast in literature and practice. Analysing all 
the criticisms regarding the theory and implementation of transitional justice is beyond the 
scope of this research. The wide array of the critiques of transitional justice include the 
promotion of Western-style liberal democracy and economy, the problem of neutrality and 
selectivity, the argument about distanced justice (dominance of legalism and local ownership), 
the failure of addressing socioeconomic wrongs (and root causes) and the exclusion of gender 
aspects.118 Distanced justice and failure of addressing socioeconomic wrongs will be focused 
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upon in this section as they are significantly linked to the main argument of the thesis, 
particularly to the significance of addressing socioeconomic rights and the importance of 
adopting a grassroot approach in transitional contexts. 
3.2.a. Distanced justice (lack of local participation) 
Transitional justice is critiqued for being distanced from affected people and communities, and 
this critique is linked to the domination of legalism and adoption of top-down practices which 
will be analysed in this section. Gready, McEvoy and McCargo criticise transitional justice for 
being dominated by legalism.119 Legalism was defined as an “ethical attitude that holds moral 
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights 
determined by rules” by Shklar.120 Legal rights and following the rules are considered to be more 
important than “expediency or the public interest or the social good” in legalism.121 In their 
critiques, McEvoy and McCargo refer to Shklar’s work which challenges the putative superiority 
of law. Shklar opposes the assertions that law is “neutral and objective”, completely divorced 
from politics and social contexts, and has a higher status than politics and other disciplines.122 
McCargo remarks: “Solutions to complex political problems need to be more creative, 
sometimes deploying legal mechanisms, but never in purely legalistic ways.”123 Yet, in 
transitional justice processes, “lawyers, policy makers, and state officials” have become the 
main actors. What is considered as transitional justice is often distant from affected people and 
communities, and it is far from meeting the needs of victims and societies.124 The argument goes 
beyond the dominance of legalism. It has been argued that the more transitional justice is 
applied around the world, the more it becomes professionalised. Transitional justice has become 
an industry with experts, academic centres, conferences and standardised programs. Through 
embracing a one-size-fits-all approach, local contexts are often side-lined.125  
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The UN and other main actors which designate transitional justice processes mostly focus on 
accountability, democracy and “rule of law” in transitional states.126 They are important, but 
they need to be complemented with other disciplines and perspectives to achieve the goals of 
transitional justice.127 Nagy writes: “A technocratic focus on ‘the law’ abstracts from lived 
realities.”128 McEvoy argues that transitional justice tends to be seen as state-centric and top-
down; there is a growing trust in the state, its institutions and state-like institutions in 
transitional justice praxis, and the investments often go to these institutions. However, 
strengthening state institutions to achieve transitional justice’s goals must be challenged. States 
and state-like institutions often fail to address the problems of affected societies as they fail to 
engage in civil society and people to properly identify their needs.129  
Elites of transitional states and donors play an important role in transitional processes. Many of 
the post-conflict and post-authoritarian states are weak in the context of economy, institutions 
and human capital, and they need external support for the transitional mechanisms.130 Limited 
resources of transitional states make them vulnerable to donors. Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s 
study depicts that transitional processes are often funded by donors as most transitional 
societies are not able to finance these processes.131 This is related to a wider argument about 
the motivations of donors. In general, local practitioners of human rights and development 
criticise donors for not letting them have ownership of the processes.132 Various scholars 
claimed that foreign aid and investment is motivated by political and other interests of the 
donors, while others asserted donors are motivated by altruism and humanitarian concerns.133 
Moreover, external actors still need the involvement of recipient states, and it is noted that 
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international actors tend to convince only elites who are going to implement these measures to 
their societies. The interests of both sides are closely linked, and these interests do not often 
correspond to the needs of the affected people and communities.134 For instance, international 
criminal justice mechanisms are often considered as distant, inaccessible and unfamiliar by local 
people.135 Yet, there has been a growing tendency among donors to support “human rights” and 
“legal and judicial development” in transitional states.136 The Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sierra Leone and Rwanda can be examples of these arguments. Even though a huge amount of 
money has been invested in their transitions, these efforts failed to make considerable 
contributions to the lives of people.137 International tribunals were often criticised for serving 
the interests of the international community more than victims’ and survivors’ interests.138 
Although international tribunals often fail to make meaningful contributions to transitional 
societies, donors prefer to support these retributive methods rather than restorative local and 
community-based programs.139 This does not mean that the involvement of international actors 
and donors cannot make any meaningful contribution to transitional processes. External actors 
have a capacity to contribute to the processes by providing resources, know-how, and a fair, 
objective and balanced realm in which understandings of conflict can be explored without being 
instigated by conflict parties.140 However, this must not prevent people participating in the 
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decision-making or implementing processes since they will be the ones who will be most 
affected by these mechanisms. 
As transitional justice has been dominated by a legalist approach, international law had an 
important impact on it. International law has been criticised for being Euro-centric by several 
academics.141 Since transitional justice mechanisms are being applied to mostly non-European 
societies, the Eurocentric nature of these mechanisms decreases the possibility of them to be 
adopted and embraced by the locals. If these mechanisms fail to include local actors into both 
decision-making and implementation processes, they are likely to face resistance from these 
societies.142 For instance, in Sierra Leone, people resisted to the truth-telling process as they 
believed that the forgive and forget approach would be more beneficial for reconciliation. 
Therefore, some communities made a collective decision not to participate in truth-telling 
processes.143     
Transitional processes are often shaped and conducted by non-local actors who tend to ignore 
local contexts and local people who are affected most but who do not often have authority in 
designation and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms.144 It is stated that “[a]ctions 
that are complex, and in part communal, require responses that are equally complex, and in part 
communal.”145 To achieve success in transitional justice processes, local context and realities 
need to be analysed and comprehended thoroughly.146 Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach in 
transitional justice is being challenged and local participation is being promoted in transitional 
societies.147 In fact, the UN Secretary General published a guidance note on transitional justice 
which repudiates one-size-fits-all approaches and promotes “analysis of national needs and 
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capacities, drawing upon national expertise to the greatest extent possible.”148 However, 
although the significance of the local contexts and their participation is recognised, international 
norms and actors still subordinate local realities. Transitional justice mechanisms which were 
shaped by international norms and practices are often imposed on transitional societies which 
are, in a way, obliged to accept them to receive financial support.149  
International actors need to be more conscious about the way they support transitional 
societies; local people and their needs should be determinant factors in these processes. 
Theidon emphasises that “the local is the realm of solution, the global the realm of imposition 
and domination.”150 Bottom-up and participatory approaches need to be adopted to eliminate 
criticisms about “distanced justice”. These approaches will enable practitioners to understand 
the local contexts and help them to find the best measures for that society.151 Moreover, 
examining and engaging in different local contexts may allow new forms of justice to emerge. 
Even though they may challenge the standard forms of justice, they should be considered in the 
context of transitional justice.152 
Participation merits a further discussion in transitional justice. Lundy and McGovern write: 
“Participatory action can be summed up as a process that facilitates the permanent ability to 
identify and analyse problems, formulate and plan solutions, mobilise resources and implement 
them, to gain control over the processes that affect peoples’ lives.”153 Participation empowers 
local actors to achieve their own development by defining their problems and finding their own 
solutions.154 McEvoy and McGregor remark that democratic participation should be promoted 
at all levels of the transitional justice which tend to be elite-driven.155 It is argued that letting 
local actors participate only in implementation processes is insufficient. “For a fully participatory 
process (we will argue) they should also take part at every stage in the process, including 
conception, design, decision-making and management.”156 The UN also acknowledged the need 
for participation of local actors and began to promote it in transitional justice processes to 
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understand the local realities better.157 This is not to say that international actors must be 
excluded from these processes. As mentioned above, they should also participate in these 
processes by assisting local actors.  
It must be noted that bottom-up approaches should not be adopted unquestioningly because 
they may also entail risks to transitional processes. These risks might be the lack of capacity and 
expertise to deliver justice or reproducing societal injustices which existed before the 
transition.158 It must be remembered that societies may have unjust hierarchies or social 
inequalities in terms of race, religion and gender. “While participation has the potential to 
challenge patterns of dominance, it may also be the means through which existing power 
relations are entrenched and reproduced.”159 These potential risks, however, should not 
trivialise the importance of these approaches. Grassroots approaches to transitional justice 
need to be supervised and regulated to eliminate potential risks of them. “Distanced justice” 
criticism is important for Turkey as well to avoid pursuing transitional justice in a manner which 
is distant from people. The fifth chapter’s sections 4 and 5 emphasise the importance of locality 
and adopting a participatory and grassroots approach to ensure that Turkey’s future transitional 
justice process will not be distant from people and communities. 
3.2.b. Failure of addressing socioeconomic wrongs and root causes 
The second main criticism of transitional justice is about its failure in addressing violations of 
ESCR. As noted earlier, transitional justice has concentrated on redressing CPR abuses and 
promoting accountability. Therefore, ESCR abuses and root causes of conflicts and political 
repression have often been overlooked in transitional processes.160 Accordingly, the criticisms 
about this failure are being raised by both scholars and practitioners recently. There has been a 
growing demand for transitional justice to address socioeconomic issues.161 The reasons for the 
neglect of ESCR in transitional justice is linked to a wider phenomenon in international law. 
Woefully, ESCR have been neglected and given a secondary status vis-a-vis CPR in international 
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law. The second chapter is going to make an in-depth analysis of the issue, but a brief analysis 
of the problem will be provided in this section.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not differentiate human rights and 
makes no hierarchy among them162 but ESCR have been considered as less important rights 
compared to CPR, and ESCR abuses have been seen as “less serious” in comparison to CPR 
abuses.163 Arbour writes: “contrary to common perceptions, there is no legal, judicial, or 
empirical basis for the comparative neglect of economic, social, and cultural rights in 
mainstream justice, including transitional justice.”164 Likewise, the Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General, which depicts the UN’s approach to transitional justice, emphasises the 
importance of addressing “the root causes of conflict or repressive rule” and “violations of all 
rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights.”165 So, the significance of addressing ESCR 
violations and root causes in transitional contexts needs to be analysed to understand the issue 
better.  
Firstly, “root causes” must be described. According to the UN, root causes of the conflict can be 
“socio-economic inequities and inequalities, systematic ethnic discrimination, denial of human 
rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other 
resource allocation.”166 There might be other root causes in different contexts. These examples 
can also be root causes of violence under repressive regimes. Transitional justice has been 
criticised for focusing exclusively on consequences of conflicts and political repression rather 
than looking at the root causes. The critiques propose that the field must include not only the 
results but also the causes of the conflicts and political repression.167 Likewise, Laplante suggests 
that truth commissions should not only look at the past abuses, but also scrutinise why these 
abuses took place in the first place. She notes that socioeconomic issues might be the root 
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causes of the conflicts in the broad sense.168 Moreover, failure in addressing root causes may 
jeopardise the future as well. Andrieu wrote: “Not taking into account the socio-economic roots 
of conflict means supporting structural violence, and planting the seeds of future conflicts.”169 
In that vein, truth commissions of Guatemala and Peru asserted that poverty and exclusion 
might generate violence and conflicts.170 These claims suggest that if structural violence171 and 
socioeconomic injustices are not addressed and no improvement is achieved in people’s 
everyday lives, redressing the past is incomplete and sustainable peace is in jeopardy. 
Differentiating structural violence from economic violence is worth a more extended discussion 
than can be had here. Yet, it should be noted that economic violence “refers to violations of 
economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural resources.”172 So, although 
structural violence and economic violence may overlap in some cases (such as violating ESCR of 
an ethnic group discriminately), they are different concepts. 
Root causes of conflicts also linked to violations of ESCR. ESCR abuses, such as forced 
displacements, destroying homes and villages, and demolition of food resources, have been 
used as tools of war by repressive regimes in many countries.173 These are also wrongdoings of 
predecessor regimes in the same way as CPR violations and they need to be redressed. In fact, 
transitional justice has been criticised for being selective even on violations of CPR. Let alone 
addressing violations of ESCR, transitional justice mechanisms often discriminate some 
violations of CPR. For instance, torture or sexual violence cases have often been ignored by these 
mechanisms as the main focus is on more “serious crimes” like killings and disappearances.174 
Galanter points out that impacts of conflicts should not be limited to only immediate 
damages.175 Most of the time immediate injuries such as mass killings or enforced disappearance 
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cases are on the forefront whereas loss of property, forced removals or other structural 
injustices are not. However, these violations and inequalities also harm people and create 
victims. Violence in the form of structural injustices put people in a constant deprivation, and 
their sufferings continue on a daily basis.176 Lundy and McGovern raise similar criticisms. They 
argue that transitional justice only focuses on direct injustices such as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, and it fails to address structural injustices which are often among the root 
causes of the conflict.177 It is argued that social justice must be a part of redressing the past.178 
There are different definitions and perceptions of social justice in the literature.179 In transitional 
justice context, Andrieu describes it as “settling the economic, political and social injustices that 
may have created the conflict and defining the basis of a just, stable society”.180 If structural 
injustices are not tackled, they are going to continue to haunt people’s lives. 
 In various countries such as South Africa, Chile and Guatemala, there were vehement street 
protests after their transitional processes due to the socioeconomic inequalities and structural 
injustices. Even though transitional justice mechanisms operated in these countries, they failed 
to redress socioeconomic wrongdoings. Then, unaddressed problems led to unrest in these 
countries because of poverty, exclusion and inequality.181 To eliminate these risks and achieve 
sustainable peace, a holistic approach must be adopted. And this holistic approach should 
embrace economic, political and social structural reforms.182 These examples are significant to 
prove the importance of addressing socioeconomic problems in transitional processes. 
Transitional justice should bring justice in different ways, and social justice must be an aspect of 
this, especially for Turkey. Peruvian and East Timorese people also demanded justice in 
socioeconomic terms which is explained in the fourth chapter in detail.  
4. Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
There are various mechanisms of transitional justice such as trials, truth commissions, 
amnesties, purges, exiles and reparations183 which will be described in this section. Transitional 
justice mechanisms are specified differently by various scholars. Olsen, Payne and Reiter analyse 
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five mechanisms in their study: trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations and lustration. 
However, they claim that writing new constitutions, setting up memorials and museums, and 
reforming the judiciary and security sector can also be considered as transitional justice 
mechanisms.184 Binningsbo, Loyle, Gates and Elster specify six mechanisms in their study: trials, 
truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, purges and exiles.185 Thoms, Ron and Paris include 
trials, truth commissions and vetting in their study but also remark that reparations, conflict 
resolution, memorialisation, history education, and legal and institutional reforms are also 
important transitional justice mechanisms.186 Different interpretations lead to different 
classifications by scholars. For instance, Thoms and his fellow scholars consider lustrations, 
purges and security sector reforms as forms of institutional reforms in their aforementioned 
study.187 Memorialisation and apologies are considered as a form of reparation by Gray. He also 
classifies structural and legal reforms as reparations.188  These considerations will be elucidated 
below in the related sections. In this study, five transitional justice mechanisms will be analysed: 
trials, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reforms and amnesties. Exploring these 
mechanisms will help in answering the main research question of the thesis (Why should Turkey 
pursue transitional justice and which mechanisms can be adopted to address the violations of 
ESCR in the Kurdish Question?) and laying the foundation for the fifth chapter’s section 6 which 
focuses on designing the mechanisms for a future transitional process in Turkey. 
4.1. Trials 
As transitional justice is about facing and redressing the past wrongdoings, accountability for 
the past crimes comes to the forefront in this context. Trials have been adopted by many states 
in transitional justice history. According to Powers and Proctor’s study, 32 countries had 78 trials 
between 1983 and 2006.189 Sikkink and Walling’s study identifies 49 countries and territories 
which held at least one trial in their transitions between 1979 and 2004.190 Another study depicts 
that between 1970 and 2007 38 countries held 81 trials.191 These trials include domestic trials, 
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international trials and hybrid trials. Hybrid trials are combination of both national and 
international instruments of justice in a country.  
It is important to establish a moral order in new regimes. Teitel explains that trials help in 
consolidating new regimes and rule of law by demarcating it from predecessor regimes. 
Violations of old regimes are delegitimised by trials.192 Andrieu describes the aims of trials as 
“issuing a detailed narrative of past atrocities, documenting the history for future generations, 
acting as a deterrent for the future, giving victims a voice, strengthening the rule of law, and 
promoting reconciliation on the ground.”193 It is claimed that new regimes have a moral duty to 
prosecute perpetrators. Successor regimes owe this to victims and survivors of predecessor 
regimes.194  
Although trials are attached much significance by their proponents, they are not without their 
detractors. Trials are criticised for being backward looking, ineffective and selective.195 They 
often fail to address economic crimes and structural violence.196 They may also risk the stability 
of nascent democracies and peaceful environment in transitional contexts. Agents of 
predecessor regimes might still have power and they can use this power to trigger new conflicts. 
Critics of trials claim that stability and peace must be prioritised over accountability. In some 
cases, new human rights abuses are committed during trials and they turn into a means for 
vengeance.197 Trials are also criticised for concentrating on perpetrators instead of victims. 
Sufferings and needs of victims are often not properly taken into account at the legal 
proceedings.198 Arendt critiqued that perpetrators’ acts were on trial at Nuremberg rather than 
the sufferings of the Jewish people.199 Furthermore, some victims were re-traumatised because 
of the legal proceedings. Trials may have damaging effects on victims, when their stories are 
questioned through vehement cross-examinations.200 Many victims are disappointed after the 
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criminal proceedings, and they experienced anger, resentment and betrayal because of light 
sentences and pardons.201   
A dichotomy between victims and perpetrators can be problematic as people can be both 
victims and perpetrators in different contexts.202 Vaclav Havel stated: “None of us is just its 
victim; we are all responsible for it”203 in reference to the Czechoslovakian situation where 
people were adapted to the totalitarian system and contributed to its continuation. So, instead 
of dichotomising people into victims and perpetrators and punishing the latter, a different 
approach needs to be adopted to repair the harms. Moreover, it is often not possible to 
prosecute all perpetrators in transitional processes since there are large numbers of 
perpetrators. Elster notes selectivity of perpetrators could be justified due to the limited 
capacity of the judicial system in new regimes.204 Yet, selecting a few perpetrators to prosecute 
is questioned by various scholars.205 Trials were also criticised regarding their effectiveness to 
fight impunity. Even though proponents claim that trials must be held to fight impunity, it is 
doubtful that the perpetrators will be prosecuted properly and get severe penalties. Teitel 
points out that criminal proceedings often end with light sentences or no penalties. And in many 
cases, penalties were followed by pardons.206 After all, only few perpetrators are punished in 
most cases. Therefore, spending huge amounts of material and personnel resources to try a few 
perpetrators is also criticised.207 Another criticism of trials is about trials being distant from 
people on the ground. This point was argued in the “distanced justice” part above. In short, 
victims are often not able to attend trials, especially international tribunals. So, they might not 
get a sense of justice as they are distanced from trials.208 Sieff and Vinjamuri remark that trials 
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must be decentralised to serve the victims and society more efficiently.209 If these trials are 
decentralised, they could answer the needs of post-conflict societies. Gready suggests that in 
addition to decentralisation of trials, alternative justice mechanisms, which are indigenous and 
unconventional, may need to be adopted and implemented by the participation of local 
people.210 
There are contradicting assessments on trials. According to the research done by Kim and 
Sikkink, trials foster human rights protection in transitional countries.211 On the contrary, 
findings of Snyder and Vinjamuri suggest that trials do not deter future conflicts, they may even 
lead to new ones.212 Even though there are shortcomings of trials, they have a potential to 
contribute to transitional process in several ways. Minow points out that international tribunals 
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia produced reliable documentation and condemnation of 
past abuses.213 Likewise, Teitel notes that even though trials are not effective in their 
judgements they have a symbolic meaning in terms of promoting rule of law.214  
4.2. Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are one of the prominent mechanisms of transitional justice.215 Between 
1970 and 2007, 53 truth commissions were established in 37 countries.216 Truth commissions 
are defined by Hayner as: 
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their 
experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; 
and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.217 
Truth commissions are not conventional instruments of legal systems and they are different 
from trials as their main focus is on victims rather than perpetrators, and they have broader 
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aims than trials.218 As discussed above in the “truth” section, they aim to contribute to the 
healing of victims and society by providing a space for victims and survivors to tell their stories. 
Truth commissions also issue reports when they complete their tasks. They make 
recommendations to new regimes and these recommendations include reparations to victims, 
institutional reforms and amnesties. In addition, they generate cumulative factual records of 
past violations and these records could be used in criminal proceedings.219 Even though truth 
does not lead to prosecutions, revealing it may bring shame to perpetrators which could also be 
considered as a punishment in itself.220 Although their impacts are contested, it was asserted 
that the truth commissions of Argentina, Chile, Morocco, El Salvador and South Africa made 
considerable contributions to their societies as they led to reparations, institutional reforms and 
prosecutions, and raised awareness in public.221 Kim and Sikkink’s research findings suggest that 
truth commissions foster human rights protection.222 It is also claimed that they deter further 
abuses through recommending reforms.223 In addition, they are more cost-effective compared 
to trials.224 
The formation of truth commissions is significant for their success. Establishing authority 
(national government, the UN etc.), independence of commission, composition of 
commissioners, designation of mandate and authority, legal powers and resources have 
significant impacts on their achievements.  Commissioners play a significant role as the 
appointment of commissioners, their backgrounds (such as ethnic, professional and political), 
and commissioners’ approach (legal or social science) are influential on the success and 
acceptance of truth commissions.225 Size of the staff is among the determinants of success. 
Although there are many factors to influence the success of a commission, a greater number of 
staff increases the likelihood of success.226  Likewise, the management of a truth commission is 
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crucial for achieving its aims.227 The nature of their mandate and the terms of reference have 
huge impacts on truth commissions’ operation and achievements.228 Lack of adequate financial 
resources is a common challenge for many truth commissions as the budget of a truth 
commission has an important impact on its success.229 Legal powers (for subpoena, investigation 
and granting amnesty) of truth commissions are also critical for their success and impact. Yet, 
they often lack these powers, except a few examples such as the South African TRC.230  
Truth commissions face serious challenges during their operation including “weak legal 
institutions, limited resources, dependence on cooperation from officials who served the 
previous regime, missing data, and political environments that limit their mandates and 
options.”231 Truth commissions are expected to fulfil wide range of duties, they need “extensive 
research, advanced methods for data collection and processing, and a complex information 
management system leading to analysis and interpretation of the findings” to achieve them.232 
Hayner noted: “A commission may need social workers or psychologists, computer and 
information-systems specialists, data coding and data entry staff, logistical coordinators, and 
interpreters.”233 Financial resources, adequate staff and effective administration are crucial for 
their success. 
There are various critiques of truth commissions. It is argued that asking victims to forgive can 
be problematic if there is no convincing evidence that shows truth-telling will lead to healing 
and reconciliation.234 Being forced to forgive may cause new traumas. Even if forgiveness may 
have some benefits,235 it is questionable to ask victims to forego their right to justice. Hamber 
notes that victims and survivors cannot be expected to forgive perpetrators.236 Victims may have 
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different expectations from transitional processes, and some of them may not want to forgive. 
In addition, truth commissions are critiqued for being toothless.237 They often have no sanctions 
or penalties and some perpetrators attend truth commissions only to avoid prosecution and 
punishment. So, they may lead to impunity. They are also criticised for aiming to establish one 
official truth. Establishing one version of truth is problematic and it may marginalise other 
groups in the society.238 One official narrative of the past may silence different narratives and 
states might manipulate and abuse it.  
As argued in section 3.2.b, truth commissions are challenged for ignoring violations of ESCR. It 
was remarked that violations of ESCR must be included in their mandates, and structural 
injustices need to be eliminated to prevent future crimes. Describing the circumstances and 
patterns which allowed abuses is crucial to fix the problems to prevent future abuses.  
The effectiveness of truth commissions is challenged regarding their follow-up processes. 
Although they make useful recommendations, implementation processes are often arduous.239 
Implementation of the recommendations and taking concrete measures are significant for 
victims. Truth commissions raise hope among victims, and when implementation of 
recommendations fail or lag, this leads to disappointment. Moreover, it must be borne in mind 
that truth commissions are not a panacea. People tend to have unrealistic expectations from 
truth commissions that are beyond these commissions’ capacity. After all, political will of the 
governments is determinant in their implementation.240 When establishing a truth commission, 
the mandate and tasks should be clear to avoid such disappointments. 
An important point needs to be noted. Truth commissions have various limitations such as time, 
resources and legislative powers. There is little evidence that they achieve their objectives, but 
the alternative to truth commissions is often doing nothing.241 So, even though they do not meet 
the expectations, they can still contribute to transitional processes.242 In addition, lack of 
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evidence about their success might not mean that they are not successful. Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
says it is not clear how to distinguish a truth commission’s impact and success. Besides, there 
are many factors which affect a truth commission’s functioning and outcomes. Even completing 
their tasks such as publishing a final report could be considered as success.243 Likewise, Daly and 
Sarkin write that although they are criticised, truth commissions have a lot to offer for 
reconciliation as they can support victims to make sense of the past.244 Although empirical 
evidence is lacking on the impacts of truth commissions, they are considered as useful “or at 
least not harmful” by the research done so far.245 To conclude, truth commissions have a 
significant role among other transitional justice mechanisms as they have an opportunity to 
promote other mechanisms. They can recommend prosecutions, reparations, institutional 
reforms and amnesties to governments.246 
4.3. Reparations 
Although reparations are less-studied compared to other mechanisms247 they have a critical role 
in transitional societies. Waldorf notes that reparations are “the most victim-centred 
transitional justice mechanism”.248 A prevalent definition of reparations is: “a monetary and/or 
nonmonetary attempt to address as well as compensate victims for damage(s) experienced 
during politically violent activity.”249 Reparations contribute to reconciliation processes by 
offering victims and survivors a sense of justice and satisfaction as they are “crystallization of 
recognition”.250 States have a duty to provide reparation and remedy for the victims of gross 
human rights violations under international law.251 The UN’s guidelines and principles remark 
that states need to provide victims reparations in these forms: “restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.”252 Reparations can also be 
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classified as “financial and non-financial reparations, individual and collective reparations and 
judicial and non-judicial reparations.”253 They can be financial such as monetary payments or 
non-financial as in public apologies. Reparations may take the form of individual reparations 
such as housing, physical and mental health treatments and medications, or collective 
(communal) reparations such as providing sewage systems, potable water supplies or teaching 
personnel for schools.254 Even though individual reparations are necessary in transitional 
contexts, collective reparations may have greater impacts by remedying structural injustices 
which may be among root causes of conflicts.255 Most of the reparations are non-judicial but 
there might also be judicial reparations if a country’s judicial system allows courts to do so.  
Although most violations are irreparable, reparations still depict the willingness of states to 
redress the past. Hamber and Wilson notes that reparations might generate a “symbolic closure” 
psychologically.256 A survey study in Nepal reveals that the majority of the victims prioritise 
reparations rather than trials.257 Since reparations have a potential to affect individuals directly 
and tangibly, they can make changes in people’s lives.258 Yet, reparations are considered as the 
most expensive transitional justice mechanism as they require high monetary resources.259 
Financing reparation programs poses serious challenges to transitional states. Therefore, they 
often do not grant reparations to victims.260 A study depicts that “wealthy, democratic countries 
are more likely to award reparations than are poorer, nondemocratic countries.”261 For instance, 
due to the scarce resources, only the most affected victims benefited from reparations in Sierra 
Leone.262 Moreover, implementation of collective reparations (which aims to remedy the 
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collective harm263) could be purported as development projects, and this entails both risks and 
benefits in transitional contexts. Although collective reparations could contribute to 
development in transitional societies, they may also be criticised for allowing states “to slap a 
‘reparations’ label on a development project and get off cheaply.”264 In addition to financial 
constraints, eligibility and proportionality are complex and difficult issues regarding reparations. 
Deciding who is going to receive what type of reparation is difficult since there are a vast number 
of victims and crimes.265 Moreover, victims may have different needs and expectations and 
satisfying them is often difficult. Analysing local contexts and demands is crucial in applying 
reparations as in other transitional justice mechanisms.266 Needs and expectations of victims 
must be examined thoroughly before a reparation program is implemented. 
There are also concerns about reparations. If they are not accompanied with a form of 
acknowledgement or accountability measures, victims and survivors may feel that their silence 
is bought.267 In fact, reparations are supposed to show that states not only reveal but also 
acknowledge their wrongs and want to repair them.268 Rosenblum writes: “From the standpoint 
of repair, perhaps the most important ofﬁcial action, taken in addition to reparations or standing 
alone, is apology.”269 In some cases, victims or survivors do not accept reparations. Verdeja 
notes that victims often call for apologies.270 For instance, Asian “comfort women” refused 
reparations because reparations were not accompanied by an acknowledgement or an apology 
of the Japanese Government.271 Minow remarks that “reparations without apologies seem 
inauthentic, and apologies without reparations seem cheap.”272  
Apologies are non-monetary, moral reparations. Hazan explains that apologies are vital in 
transitional contexts since states’ acknowledgement of past crimes is important for victims and 
societies. Apologies convey a necessary message: past violations were unjust, and they will not 
                                                          
263 Rosenfeld, F. (2010) Collective reparation for victims of armed conflict, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol.92, No.879, pp.731-746. 
264 Roht-Arriaza, Reparations in the aftermath of repression, pp.129-131. 
265 Mobekk, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform, p.65.; De Greiff, Introduction - Repairing the 
Past, p.6.; Roht-Arriaza, Reparations in the aftermath of repression, p.126.; Vandeginste, Reparation, 
pp.156-157. 
266 Vandeginste, Reparation, pp.158. 
267 Andrieu, Transitional Justice: A New Discipline, p.16.; Lipscomb, L. (2010) Beyond the Truth: Can 
Reparations Move Peace and Justice Forward in Timor-Leste, Asia - Pacific Issues, No.93, p.9. 
268 Huyse, Justice after transition, p.53. 
269 Rosenblum, Justice and the Experience of Injustice, p.98. 
270 Verdeja, E. (2010) Official Apologies in the Aftermath of a Political Violence, Metaphilosophy, Vol.41, 
No.4, p.565. 
271 Rosenblum, Justice and the Experience of Injustice, p.98. 
272 Minow, Breaking the cycles of hatred, p.23. 
48 
 
occur in the future.273 Espindola points out: “An apology, even in the simplest of senses, involves 
recognition that the victim was not treated appropriately, and that at the very least she deserves 
redress in the form of an acknowledgment of the wrong done.”274 After German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt’s apology at the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970, apologies have tended to increase over the 
years.275 Apologies are considered to be supporting rule of law and fostering civic trust in public 
institutions.276 They also contribute to reconciliation and help victims in restoring their dignity. 
The moral value of victims can be recognised by apologies. Apologies reaffirm publicly that 
victims are worthy individuals. Espindola even claims that the main function of an apology is 
depicting respect to the victims.277 However, if the apology is not authentic and sincere, it will 
not achieve its assumed goals. In order for apologies to have an effect on victims, the 
perpetrators need to admit that what they have done was wrong and there is no excuse or 
justification of the act.278 
James identified several requirements for an authentic political apology:   
1) is recorded officially in writing; 2) names the wrongs in question; 3) accepts 
responsibility; 4) states regret; 5) promises non-repetition; 6) does not demand 
forgiveness; 7) is not hypocritical or arbitrary; and 8) undertakes—through 
measures of publicity, ceremony, and concrete reparation—to both morally engage 
those in whose name apology is made and to assure the wronged group that the 
apology is sincere.279 
Apologies are criticised for being a cheap response to gross human rights violations. They might 
be considered as a way to get away from responsibilities by simply expressing an apology.280 
However, apologies do not have to be the only response to past violations as they alone may 
not meet needs of victims. Just like other transitional justice mechanisms, they must be 
complemented with other mechanisms (such as material reparations, institutional reforms and 
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trials).281 It must be noted that even though apologies do not necessarily achieve their goals, 
they at least open a discussion about the past. 
Memorialisation is considered as an important way to move forward in transitional states. It has 
been requested by people from different societies and contexts.282 They are necessary because 
“memorials recognise the suffering of a demarcated group of people and promise redress 
through representation and remembrance.”283 The main objective of memorialisation is 
supporting victims to cope with their painful memories but there are also broader objectives 
such as deterring future abuses, establishing peace and democracy.284 Acknowledging the past 
wrongs and remembering them is crucial for victims. It is claimed that memorials help them to 
restore their dignity as their suffering is recognised and not forgotten.285 These claims about 
memorialisation sounds sensible in common sense. However, as it is necessary for other 
transitional justice mechanisms, further research is required to assess the impacts of 
memorialisation. Woefully, there is little empirical evidence and research which depict how 
memorialisation contributes to transitional justice processes.286 In addition, memorialisation 
should not be expected to “achieve reconciliation, violence prevention or respect for human 
rights” by itself, it can only contribute to these aims.287 They must be accompanied by other 
transitional justice mechanisms. 
There are also risks about memorialisation. As in other mechanisms, they need to fit into the 
context and realities rather than being implemented through a top-down process.288 They can 
be manipulated by new regimes (or other actors) to impose particular ideologies onto 
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societies.289 For instance, reconciliation seems to be hindered by war memorials in Vukovar, in 
the former Yugoslavia, as these memorials were selective on narratives. When they promote 
the sufferings of Croats, memorials silence, sometimes even trivialise the sufferings of Serbs.290 
Clark notes that memorials in Vukovar obstruct reconciliation because there is too much 
memory.291 These kinds of memorials prevent people moving forward. That is why societies 
need “to learn to remember the past in a balanced and inclusive way that brings communities 
together and helps people to move on with their lives.”292 
To conclude, reparations have a significant potential to contribute to transitional processes. 
Reparations should not be identified with material reparations exclusively. Moral and symbolic 
reparations such as apologies and memorialisation also have a significant potential to contribute 
to peace and reconciliation. This is important in the Kurdish Question since the identity and 
culture of the Kurdish people have been oppressed and recognizing their sufferings and 
restoring their dignity could contribute to peace and reconciliation in Turkey. Therefore, 
financial constraints should not be an excuse for not implementing reparations. Even symbolic 
reparations may play a critical role in Turkey. 
4.4. Institutional Reforms 
Institutional reforms are key components of transitional justice processes.293 They are aimed at 
preventing future violations by reforming state structures which previously allowed 
perpetrators to commit heinous crimes.294 Corrupt institutions which abetted human rights 
violations need to be transformed to reinstil trust in them.295 The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report states: “States should ensure: vetting; an 
independent and impartial judiciary; civilian control of the military and other enforcement 
personnel; complaint procedures; and the training of relevant State personnel in human rights 
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and humanitarian law.”296 The UN emphasises the importance of adopting a context-specific 
approach in designing and implementing institutional reforms.297 Fernando remarks that the 
UDHR (Article 8) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Article 2) 
could be considered as the legal basis for the responsibility of states for the prevention of future 
human rights abuses.298 
Truth commissions have a significant role in institutional reforms as they help in diagnosing 
malfunctioning institutions which allowed abuses to take place. Thus, these institutions can be 
reformed, and people who were involved in past abuses can be removed to prevent future 
abuses.299 In the transitional justice literature, researches have mostly focused on vetting, 
security sector reform (SSR) and legislative reform, and other types of institutional reforms are 
often left under-researched.300 Before explaining vetting, a point needs to be clarified. Vetting, 
purge and lustration are in use in the transitional justice literature (sometimes 
synonymously),301 but it is important to depict distinctions among them. Lustration has been 
implemented in some Eastern European countries specifically to expel some public officials who 
were affiliated with the prior regime.302 Lustration policies have occasionally been adopted by 
other states (Belgium, France, and The Netherlands).303 Apart from Eastern European countries, 
vetting has been implemented as a transitional justice mechanism which refers to removing 
people from public employment if they violated human rights. Unlike lustration, vetting only 
expels individuals, if they personally have a human rights abuses record.304 Purges, on the other 
hand, can be defined as removing individuals from public offices with or without trials.305 These 
terms may seem to be only slightly different from each other, but those differences are 
important. Vetting can be considered as the most appropriate form since it only removes 
individuals who committed crimes and it does so by a legal or an administrative process.  
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Vetting is a central component of institutional reforms in transitional states.306 Fifty-four vetting 
processes have been implemented worldwide between 1970 and 2004.307 Vetting policies are 
implemented to reform state institutions to prevent future abuses and to promote democracy. 
Reforming public institutions will not be complete without vetting programs because presence 
of abusive public employees would prevent restoring civic trust in those institutions.308 
Removing abusers from their positions and preventing the employment of them are critical for 
reforming public institutions. Thus, people can see that public institutions will not tolerate future 
abuses and they will consider these institutions as trustworthy and legitimate.309 Moreover, they 
may contribute to “fill the impunity gap by ensuring that those who are responsible for past 
abuses but are not criminally prosecuted are at least excluded from public service.”310 Vetting 
must be complemented with other institutional reform measures to assure that human rights 
violations will not occur again.311 Vetting alone cannot promise that violations will not take place 
in the future.  
As with other transitional justice mechanisms, institutional reforms are criticised on various 
grounds. Lustration policies have been criticised since people could be expelled according to 
their political affiliations, even though they did not commit any human rights violations.312 
Cohen describes it as “a collective witch-hunt rather than the pursuit of individual responsibility 
through some variant of the criminal law.”313 In addition, people who were subjected to 
lustration often did not have a chance to defend themselves and refute the claims about them. 
This is also problematic because these processes also carry the risk of violating rights of removed 
people.314 To avoid such risks, people who are subject to lustration or vetting processes must be 
given a right to defend themselves. Another criticism against vetting, lustration and purge 
processes are about politicisation of the processes. Huyse claims that these policies might be 
politicised by states.315 Sometimes these policies are implemented to defeat political rivals. That 
is why these operations must be conducted on objective grounds, and rights of the accused need 
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to be protected during vetting processes.316 Moreover, lack of human resources can be an 
obstacle to vetting process. Recruiting and training new staff for vetted positions requires time 
and resources which may be difficult to be undertaken in transitional states.317 That is why the 
context of the transitional state must be analysed well, and vetting programs must be designed 
and implemented carefully.  
SSR is a concept which aims to enhance democracy and to prevent future abuses by reforming 
an abusive or non-functional security sector. Its objectives are described as: “i) Establishment of 
effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system. ii) Improved delivery 
of security and justice services. iii) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform 
process. iv) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.”318 Even though SSR could be 
considered as a form of institutional reform, it is also being applied as a broader concept and as 
a distinct phenomenon in peacebuilding processes. SSR is significant in transitional states 
because security personnel (which includes military, police, secret police, intelligence agencies) 
are supposed to protect citizens. However, they often commit egregious crimes during 
authoritarian regimes and conflicts.319 So, reforming this sector is crucial to end systematic 
abuses and ensure that security personnel will protect the citizens’ rights rather than violating 
them. Victims will also be transformed into “rights-bearing citizens” through SSR programs.320  
SSR must be accompanied with vetting of abusive members to ensure that the ethos of abusive 
institutions will be changed, and trust will be reinstilled in them.321 Moreover, the context of the 
country in which SSR is going to be implemented is crucial.322 Since each country has different 
social, political and economic realities, analysing the context is critical for the success. Wulf 
explains that transitional societies provide a promising environment for the application of SSR 
compared to more stable ones.323 As these societies are often eager to change, application of 
SSR programs can make an important contribution to transition processes. However, SSR 
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programs also have limitations like other transitional justice mechanisms. Absence of political 
will and financial limitations influence the implementation and success of SSR programs.324  
Mayer-Rieckh classifies two types of institutional reform measures other than vetting and SSR: 
the first one aims to transform individual members of public institutions and the second one 
aims to transform institutional and sectoral structures. The former can be practised by providing 
human rights and professional standards training to public officials to assure that they will not 
violate human rights.325 The latter can be practised by (a) providing accountability to ensure that 
if public officials commit crimes, they will be held accountable for their acts; (b) securing 
operational independence of public officials to ensure that governments or partisan political 
groups are not going to intervene in their mandates; (c) assuring representation to prevent 
group domination at public institutions and allowing different groups to have adequate 
positions; (d) guaranteeing responsiveness to make public officials serve people rather than the 
state or a partisan group.326 It must be noted that when these two types of institutional reforms 
target security personnel and institutions, they share the same goal with SSR initiatives. 
Considering that the state officials and institutions have a responsibility in human rights 
violations which are committed against the Kurdish people, institutional reforms may play a 
critical role in Turkey. This is elaborated in the fifth chapter’s section 6.4 in detail.  
4.5. Amnesties 
The peace versus justice dilemma has been argued in transitional justice since the emergence 
of the field. Freeman states that transitional justice scholars and practitioners have considered 
amnesty as an impediment to accountability and justice. Amnesties have been treated inimically 
in transitional justice literature.327 Since 1999, the UN has been in a strong opposition to 
amnesties.328 A similar approach has been adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and other international actors, and amnesties for international crimes (particularly for war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) are often not welcomed in transitional 
processes.329 Yet, the stance of international actors and scholars did not really reduce their 
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importance and implementation.330 Even if amnesties are viewed in an antagonistic way in 
transitional justice literature, their application has risen since the 1980s.331 A vast number of 
amnesties (424) have been adopted in the world between 1970 and 2004.332 Amnesty can be 
defined as:  
an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to remove the prospect 
and consequences of criminal liability for designated individuals or classes of 
persons in respect of designated types of offenses irrespective of whether the 
persons concerned have been tried for such offenses in a court of law.333 
Proponents of amnesties assert that they have a crucial role in achieving peace and stability in 
the aftermath of a conflict or political repression. It is asserted that amnesties are “an important 
necessity to allow a society to move forward, even if they potentially breach the obligation to 
investigate, prosecute and, if applicable, punish.”334 Advocates claim that members of conflicting 
parties who committed human rights violations will probably not lay down their arms if they 
know that they are going to be prosecuted. In the context of repressive regimes, the old regime 
is unlikely to hand over their power to the new regime if there is no amnesty.335 Freeman 
explains that amnesties can enable transitions to start and provide a safe environment for other 
transitional justice mechanisms.336 Amnesties may also help reveal the truth if they are 
conditioned on “a full disclosure of all crimes.”337 It should be understood that they can be 
implemented by the old regime as a last move to protect themselves or by the new regime to 
secure stability and peace.338 Therefore, they should not be considered in “monolithic and 
absolutist terms” as they vary a lot.339 They need to be analysed individually according to the 
context in which they are applied. 
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Amnesties are often criticised for denying justice and leading to impunity by opponents, but 
they have been considered in a more positive way by several scholars in recent years.340 
Mallinder states that “individualized, conditional amnesties in conjunction with other 
transitional justice mechanisms can, if well designed, actually contribute to guaranteeing each 
of the victims’ rights.”341 If they are designed cautiously, they have a potential to prevent future 
violations.342 So, rather than opposing all amnesties, scholars and practitioners must search the 
ways in which amnesties foster reconciliation and peace. For instance, prosecuting most 
responsible perpetrators and granting amnesty to low-level perpetrators could be feasible when 
these amnesties are complemented by other transitional justice mechanisms which protect 
victims’ rights. Amnesties can be applied conditionally which may require perpetrators to pay 
reparations to victims, to reveal the truth or to acknowledge the wrongdoing.343 Amnesties are 
criticised for leading to amnesia, but this perception needs to be changed since amnesty does 
not necessarily mean amnesia anymore.344 Mallinder writes: “the traditional conception of 
amnesty as ‘amnesia’ is becoming increasingly outdated. Instead, states are finding innovative 
ways to address past crimes without burying the truth or enforcing widespread prosecutions.”345 
The most significant criticism of amnesty is pertaining to impunity. It should be acknowledged 
that blanket amnesties were adopted in the past in the name of reconciliation and stability of 
the new regime, even though there were demands from victims and human rights organisations 
for accountability.346 These amnesties allowed perpetrators to avoid prosecutions. However, 
these blanket amnesties have been challenged recently and the scope of amnesties tend to be 
much more limited to prevent perpetrators from shielding themselves.347 Danieli claims that 
impunity may prevent individuals’ healing and closure, and cause new traumas.348 However, as 
mentioned earlier, even though trials are established, few perpetrators are prosecuted in most 
cases. McEvoy and Mallinder note that this generates many “false innocents”.349 So, granting 
amnesties to low-level perpetrators, at least, shows that their crimes are acknowledged. 
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Moreover, prosecutions should not be considered as the only way of justice, as there are other 
ways to achieve justice as in restorative or traditional justice mechanisms. Amnesties could be 
applied accordingly with these justice mechanisms and they could meet demands of victims and 
societies.350 Another criticism against amnesties is about recidivism. It is asserted that trials have 
a deterrent impact in preventing future abuses. However, McEvoy and Mallinder assert that 
amnesties can make a greater impact on deterring crimes in specific contexts. Amnesties can 
help in convincing conflicting sides to surrender and to disarm.351 When amnesties contribute to 
the termination of a conflict or to the transformation into a democratic regime, they actually 
help in the prevention of future violations. So, this criticism could be eliminated through 
conditioning amnesties to non-recidivism provisions.352  
Even though proponents suggest that trials may trigger new atrocities and amnesties secure 
stability, amnesties need to be designed and implemented carefully. Otherwise, they may not 
prevent future violations as happened in Sierra Leone and in Haiti where further atrocities took 
place after amnesties.353 States should not grant amnesty without democratic support.354 A 
South African mother whose son had been tortured and killed said: “They are asking forgiveness 
from the government, they did nothing to the government, what they did, they did to us.”355 
When granting amnesties states must find the ways in which the needs of the victims will be 
met. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that as in other transitional justice mechanisms, 
“effective political backing and strong institutions” are critical for the success of amnesties.356 In 
order to eliminate risks and to design an amnesty which contributes to reconciliation and peace, 
there are necessary criteria suggested by Mallinder: (a) public support, (b) an honest aim for 
reconciliation and peace, (c) being limited in scope, (d) being conditional, (e) being accompanied 
by reparations.357 Freeman writes: “Amnesty is an issue that will not go away.”358 Therefore, we 
need to find the ways in which they give the best results.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the historical background of transitional justice is explained, the field is 
conceptualised, and transitional justice mechanisms are described. These are done so through 
an analytical and critical approach to explore the ways in which transitional justice processes 
could be enhanced. Before concluding the chapter, some important points will be remarked. 
Firstly, transitional justice mechanisms must be implemented complementarily to have a full-
fledged and successful transitional process. This holistic approach has been supported by many 
scholars.359 As depicted in this chapter, material reparations can be seen as blood money if they 
are granted without recognition or an apology, or truth-telling can lead to disappointment of 
victims if they receive no reparation. Amnesties could be considered as an escape for the 
perpetrators if they are not complemented by other justice mechanisms. Therefore, 
complementarity is critical for transitional justice mechanisms. In addition, these mechanisms 
are often designed ambitiously and make promises beyond their capacity. So, transitional justice 
mechanisms should be designed and applied in a realistic manner to prevent disappointment 
among victims.  
Another critical point is that all transitional societies have different historical, political, social and 
economic conditions and they require context-specific solutions.360  Transitional justice 
mechanisms should not be applied through a one-size-fits-all approach. Likewise, adopting a 
grassroots approach in the transitional justice process can help in finding the best mechanisms 
to implement in a particular society. Understanding the context can be achieved by opening the 
channels for participation of local actors which may also empower them. The importance of 
choosing the right approaches is elaborated in the fifth chapter’s section 5 in detail. Finally, 
transitional justice must be expanded to address violations of ESCR to achieve sustainable peace 
and stability.  
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Chapter 2: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1. Introduction 
The first chapter outlined two main criticisms surrounding transitional justice: the “distanced 
justice” and failure of addressing socioeconomic wrongs. Whereas the former criticism has an 
indirect connection, the latter has a direct link with the second chapter. The failure of addressing 
ESCR is associated with development which is also a key thing to remember when considering 
the whole argument of the thesis. Examining ESCR and development in the context of 
transitional justice is critical for answering the research question of the thesis: Which transitional 
justice mechanisms can be used to address the violations and promotion of ESCR in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey, and how? 
To date, violations of CPR have received most of the attention in transitional justice processes, 
and violations of ESCR have often been left un(der)addressed. However, there have been calls 
from academics and practitioners to include violations of ESCR in transitional justice 
processes.361 These arguments and counterarguments have been elaborated in the first chapter. 
The second chapter will begin with defining ESCR in the context of international law and 
continue analysing the neglect towards ESCR by exploring the misconceptions about them. Then, 
elements and obligations of ESCR will be elaborated. Finally, the significance of addressing ESCR 
violations in transitional justice will be delineated, and the chapter will be concluded by 
discussing how ESCR abuses can be addressed in transitional processes, and development can 
be integrated in transitional justice. These analyses will show the significance of incorporating 
ESCR in transitional justice and contribute to laying the foundation for proving that Turkey needs 
to address violations of ESCR in a future transitional justice process.  
2. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
2.1. ESCR in International Law 
There are various definitions of ESCR. According to the OHCHR, they are defined as “those 
human rights relating to the workplace, social security, family life, participation in cultural life, 
and access to housing, food, water, health care and education.”362 Workers’ rights, the right to 
social security and social protection, the right to housing, the right to food and water, the right 
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to health, the right to education and cultural rights are some examples of ESCR.363 These rights 
have been expressed in various international and regional treaties.364 Minkler depicts their 
importance by stating “ES rights enable each and every individual to claim sufficient resources 
to live a dignified life no matter what a country’s average income or income distribution might 
be.”365 So, ESCR are necessary for people to maintain a dignified life as a human being.  
CPR and ESCR are recognised in the 1948 UDHR which considered them as “equal and inalienable 
rights”.366 Yet, two separate covenants were adopted rather than one single covenant due to 
various ideological and political reasons.367 Even though there has been no distinction, 
separation or hierarchy among human rights in the UDHR, historically, ESCR have been 
neglected both in theory and practice as they have been given a secondary status vis a vis CPR. 
Due consideration has not been given to ESCR, and this negligence could be observed today.368 
Even if it is still inadequate and much weaker compared to CPR, a growing attention is being 
given to ESCR in national and international laws and hopefully this will also affect the 
implementation of these rights.369 In 1993, the equal importance of all human rights has been 
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reasserted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.370 The Vienna Declaration 
stated: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis.”371 Yet, this reaffirmation has not improved the 
implementation of ESCR considerably. To ensure that ESCR are receiving adequate attention just 
as CPR, the crux of the problem needs to be scrutinised.  
2.2. The Neglect of ESCR 
Historically, CPR and ESCR have been interpreted and implemented differently. It is asserted 
that the separation of ESCR and CPR goes back to the Cold War. Ssenyojo notes “the real driving 
force behind the distinction was based not on legal or empirical rationality but rather on Cold 
War politics.”372 During the Cold War, there were two power blocs in the world, the Western 
and the Eastern blocs. While the former prioritised CPR, the latter bloc acted as an advocate of 
ESCR.373 The UN General Assembly aimed at including both ESCR and CPR in a single covenant 
and formed a draft between 1949 and 1951. However, this approach changed in 1952 because 
of Cold War politics. The decision was made under the influence of the Western-dominated 
Commission and that resulted in two separate covenants.374 Yet, some scholars do not agree 
with this historical explanation and claim that the Western countries have not been against the 
protection of ESCR.375 Moreover, although CPR are often considered as more important than 
ESCR, there have been calls from different actors to acknowledge the priority of ESCR over CPR. 
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It is claimed that if a person lacks the “most basic needs” for survival, s/he would be unable to 
enjoy CPR.376  
Recognition and implementation of ESCR have been and still are weak compared to CPR.377 
Chapman remarks that “little attention and few resources” have been paid to achieving and 
protecting ESCR.378 Nevertheless, the neglect of ESCR is being criticised more, and positive steps 
are being taken towards the realisation of ESCR at domestic and international levels.379 Some 
prominent human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty 
International (AI), have not considered ESCR as important as CPR historically,380 but this has 
tended to change recently as these organisations started to focus on promotion and protection 
of ESCR as well.381 Although, exploring the reasons for the initial neglect of these organisations 
towards ESCR and for the change which happened recently is beyond the scope of this section, 
it should be noted that they have a true potential to contribute to the promotion and protection 
of ESCR.382 
2.2.a. Arguments for the neglect 
Human rights are categorised into three group of rights (which correspond to the three notions 
of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity) by a Czech jurist, Karel Vasak, in 1977 
and this categorisation has been widely accepted in international law, both in theory and 
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practice since then. CPR are the first, ESCR are the second, and group rights are considered as 
the third generation of human rights.383 In view of this classification, CPR are viewed as negative 
rights which oblige states not to interfere individuals’ enjoyment of these rights; ESCR are 
considered as positive rights which require states to take action; group rights are regarded as 
collective rights which can be exercised not by individuals, only as groups with a combination of 
states and institutions.384 This classification is questioned by numerous scholars.385 It is asserted 
that considering ESCR as second generation of human rights might be understood as there is a 
hierarchy among human rights. So, some could claim that they should only be of concern after 
the achievement of CPR.386 Furthermore, it is noted that separating the emergence of human 
rights into phases chronologically is problematic. They did not arise in three distinct phases and 
did not evolve sequentially.387 Although it is not easy to determine why Vasak’s concept was 
accepted so broadly despite the vagueness of its basis, Jensen contemplated that it may have 
been widely accepted because it justified the idea that there is a division between CPR and 
ESCR.388 
Critical arguments are more plausible as classification of human rights is problematic. The UDHR 
did not classify or separate human rights. More importantly, enjoyment of each human right 
depends on enjoyment of the others.389 For instance, the right to life cannot be enjoyed if people 
are dying from famines. It is noted that most of the time, famines (which amount to death) take 
place because of intentioned policies of states.390 Therefore, CPR have a significant influence on 
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the enjoyment of ESCR. Political pressure is often needed to prompt states to act for eliminating 
poverty. CPR are significant to produce this pressure.391 So, human rights are interdependent, 
and ignoring ESCR violations may well prevent individuals from enjoying other human rights. 
Moreover, violations of CPR and ESCR may produce the exact same results. Schmid remarked: 
“The extremist policies of the Khmer Rouge resulted in the worst fabricated famine in recent 
history. The first Khmer Rouge trial at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
has been criticised for focusing on executions and detention in the notorious Camp S-21, to the 
exclusion of starvation or other abuses related to ESCR.”392 In this case, both type of actions 
(execution and starvation) should have been addressed at the Court because the results were 
the same.  
ESCR have often been considered as too ambiguous compared to CPR, but this approach has 
been criticised by many.393 It must be borne in mind that for almost 70 years, CPR have been 
studied and implemented. However, ESCR did not get a similar level of attention and 
implementation.394 Alston states that human rights organisations and individuals (judges, 
human rights lawyers, academicians etc.) have been contemplating the definition and 
implementation of CPR for years.395 If the same amount of attention had been given to ESCR, 
there could be a vast literature and a settled practice on ESCR as well. It is also claimed that 
addressing and monitoring ESCR are difficult since they are too vague and establishing fixed and 
universal standards for ESCR would not work since all states have different contexts and 
resources.396 It is asserted that the benchmarks need to be different, and this may affect their 
justiciability.397 However, some ESCR are clearer than CPR. For instance, not to evict people 
arbitrarily from their homes or not to ban any group of people from attending schools are quite 
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clear and can be applied universally.398 Besides, some CPR are ambiguous too.399 Many CPR also 
require interpretation such as freedom of speech or freedom from torture. For instance, the 
limits of freedom of speech have been argued in the context of hate speech, racism and religion 
as there are different views about what constitutes a breach of this right.400 In short, vagueness 
should not be an excuse for failing to realise and implement ESCR.  
ESCR are often considered as ideals and aspirations rather than actual justiciable rights like CPR. 
Denying CPR is seen as a violation but denying people’s ESCR is often considered as “social 
injustice”.401 Yet, denials of ESCR may constitute grave human rights violations.402 Forced 
eviction is considered as a crime against humanity, whereas starvation constitutes a war crime 
under the Rome Statute.403  Famines and forced displacement culminated in far more deaths in 
East Timor compared to killings.404 There are numerous examples (in Ukraine, Sudan, North 
Korea, Ethiopia) in which famine and forced displacement amounted to gross human rights 
violations.405 Why should ESCR (the right to housing, the right to food and the right to health 
etc.) be considered as aspirations and ideals when their violations result in death and 
destruction? Yet, denial of ESCR are often seen as structural violence whilst denial of CPR is 
considered as discrete abuse.406 Unlike CPR violations, ESCR violations are considered as indirect 
abuses. Especially in post-conflict contexts, ESCR violations are associated with wider social 
injustices. There is a common belief that ESCR cannot be violated by direct actions and do not 
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constitute serious crimes.407 Many transitional justice scholars hold similar views, although they 
do not necessarily claim that ESCR violations are exclusively indirect.408 They often regard ESCR 
violations as structural injustice and root causes. This is not to say that these perceptions are 
wrong. However, it is crucial to accept that ESCR may also be violated directly and constitute 
gross human rights violations. If a state forcibly evicts people from their homes, this is a direct 
and discrete abuse of ESCR.409 Moreover, even though ESCR have often been recognised as 
collective rights, they may also appear as individual rights as in the case of forced displacements. 
In such cases, individuals are denied their right to adequate housing and that kind of right 
becomes an individual right.410 As depicted in the fourth and fifth chapters, forced displacement 
has been widespread in Turkey, Peru and East Timor. So, considering ESCR violations as discrete 
and direct abuses is critical for integrating these rights in transitional justice processes. 
It is often presumed that ESCR do not entail strict and judicially enforceable obligations like CPR, 
and they are not justiciable rights.411 While CPR are considered as “legal” rights, ESCR are seen 
as “programmatic” rights. It is explained that the “ESCR are not justiciable” argument does not 
have a basis in the covenants or in the nature of ESCR.412 Article 8 of the UDHR foresees “an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals” for human rights violations.413 As the 
UDHR does not make a distinction between rights, ESCR violations can also be adjudicated in 
courts. Recognising that some ESCR abuses are direct and discrete violations is critical for their 
justiciability. Considering ESCR violations as social injustice may be interpreted as them being 
the result of misguided policies or just unfortunate conditions. However, these abuses could be 
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results of human agency/actions.414 That means there is a responsibility of an agent who must 
be sanctioned. Moreover, objecting to the justiciability of ESCR undermines “the capacity of the 
courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.”415 Daci 
remarks that ESCR “would be just illusory if they wouldn’t be justiciable.”416 Even in the time of 
war, ESCR cannot be suspended under the Geneva Conventions.417 The enforceability of human 
rights is critical because violations need to be redressed. Although there are other ways 
(administrative, financial, social etc.) to promote and protect ESCR, judicial enforcement is 
fundamental for the realisation of these rights.418 There are numerous cases in which violations 
of ESCR were brought in front of courts.419 So, ESCR are justiciable rights and the violations of 
ESCR can be brought to courts. 
States are obliged to realise ESCR progressively as it is assumed that their implementation 
requires resources.420 While states are required “to respect and to ensure” CPR, they only need 
to “take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization” of ESCR.421 It is assumed ESCR are “equality-promoting” 
positive rights which require states to take action to realise them, whereas CPR are ”freedom-
protecting” negative rights which oblige states with inaction as states only need to restrain 
themselves from interfering in individuals’ rights.422 Yet, this approach is challenged by several 
scholars.423 It was explained that ESCR, like CPR, entail both positive and negative actions of 
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states.424 For instance, not to displace people from their homes and not to contaminate water 
resources are negative obligations of states regarding ESCR.425 On the other hand, some CPR 
oblige states to act.426 For instance, the ICCPR describes necessary prison conditions in the 10th 
Article including separation of juveniles from adults and separation of accused and convicted 
individuals.427 It should be comprehended that states need to take positive actions (such as 
building prisons) to comply with the ICCPR’s articles.428 Moreover, there is a common belief that 
only violations of CPR constitute serious crimes, and ESCR violations are not as serious as CPR.429 
However, several scholars object to this view and state that ESCR violations may also constitute 
most serious human rights violations.430 
It is argued that ESCR are costly, and many states do not have enough resources to meet 
requirements of these rights immediately.431 However, ESCR are not necessarily costly. Some 
ESCR do not require resources such as not forcibly displacing people, whereas some others 
require resources as in primary education under international law.432 Besides, some CPR are 
costly too. Contrary to common belief, they are not cost-free.433 For instance, to ensure the right 
to freedom from torture, states need to establish a well-functioning security and justice system 
with various institutions such as courts, prisons etc. Security forces and these institutions need 
to be monitored to prevent violations. Establishing these systems with monitoring mechanisms 
is also costly.434 Some scholars argue that progressive realisation also applies to CPR as 
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protection of these rights often cannot be achieved overnight in many countries.435 
Furthermore, “the key issue is not the amounts spent, but rather how they are spent.”436 A state 
with vast resources may allocate little to meet ESCR whereas another state with relatively fewer 
resources may make a better effort to meet ESCR.437 For instance, Kerala, a poor Indian state, 
allocates an exceptional amount of its scarce resources to education and health services.438 
Likewise, the Brazilian Government’s social initiative Bolsa Familia is a remarkable practice to 
realise people’s ESCR. The government grants monthly payments to poor families for “keeping 
their children in school and taking them for regular health checks”. Similar initiatives have been 
applied in almost 20 countries (including Turkey, Morocco, Chile, South Africa) after the success 
of Bolsa Familia.439 So, the costs argument should not restrain states and the international 
community from promoting and advocating for ESCR. So, Turkey should not neglect redressing 
and realising ESCR (particularly the right to housing, the right to food and the right to health 
which are often violated during forced displacement) by claiming the cost argument because 
realising and redressing CPR also require resources. 
States often utilise the “to the maximum of its available resources” standard as an escape clause 
for their inaction.440 Yet, this understanding is criticised because states must take all possible 
steps to meet ESCR obligations expeditiously.441 The Limburg Principles explicitly emphasise that 
all states are under “an obligation to begin immediately to take steps towards full realization” 
of ESCR.442 Progressive realisation cannot be considered as an excuse for not conforming to the 
Covenant’s obligations. The Limburg Principles states that: “In determining whether adequate 
measures have been taken for the realization of the rights recognised in the Covenant attention 
shall be paid to equitable and effective use of and access to the available resources.”443 States 
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are required to allocate their resources effectively to achieve the realisation of ESCR; they need 
to prioritise the implementation of ESCR over discretionary services when they plan their 
budgets.444 
There are several obligations which need to be fulfilled immediately such as elimination of 
discrimination, non-retrogressive measures, minimum core obligations of ESCR and trade union 
rights. Failure to meet these obligations lead to violations of ESCR.445 For instance, the 
elimination of discrimination does not require resources and needs to be fulfilled 
immediately.446 Preventing discrimination against minorities’ access to health or education 
services must be ensured immediately because it is not subject to material resources. 
Furthermore, material resources are not necessary for some other ESCR. For instance, the right 
to join trade unions or the right to strike do not oblige states to spend significant resources, and 
they must be implemented immediately.447 In short, achieving ESCR at their fullest extent may 
take time, but lack of enough resources should not justify failure of taking necessary steps, and 
states must ensure some ESCR immediately. The discrimination argument is critical for the 
Kurdish Question as many Kurds believe that they are discriminated against by the Turkish state 
which is explained in the third chapter in detail. Even if this is not the case, these perceptions 
must be taken into account and their socioeconomic rights must be realised in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
2.3. Elements and obligations of ESCR 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the fundamental treaty for ESCR, in 1966.448 The monitoring treaty 
body of the ICESCR is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)449 which 
was formed to observe states’ progress in implementing and promoting ESCR.450 It consists of 
independent experts to assess the regular reports of the state parties.451 The CESCR reviews 
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state reports and adopt “concluding observations” for those certain reports. However, these 
observations are not legally-binding.452 In addition, many states fail in submitting reports; yet, 
the committee does not have power to give an effective response to non-submission.453 
Likewise, the CESCR has limited power to oblige states to comply with the ICESCR. It does not 
have authority to impose sanctions on violators. Even though it is not adequate for the 
protection of ESCR, the Committee can expose violators to the international community.454 Since 
the supervisory mechanism was not strong enough to protect ESCR, a complaint mechanism has 
been adopted to empower the Committee and people whose rights guaranteed under the 
Covenant had been violated.455 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 2008. An individual complaint procedure has been recognised 
by the OP-ICESCR, and the CESCR is authorised to receive complaints and to address the 
violations of ESCR.456 Both groups and individuals can apply to the Committee as victims of ESCR 
violations. State obligations and minimum core obligations will be explained in this section to 
understand ESCR better so that the importance of including ESCR in transitional justice processes 
can be understood better too. 
2.3.a. State obligations 
Obligations of states are sometimes classified into three: to respect, to protect and to fulfil.457 
In addition to these three obligations, non-discrimination could be considered as the 
comprehensive obligation of all states parties.458 Obligations are important as the development 
of institutions, policies and strategies, which are necessary for protecting ESCR, can be achieved 
by identifying them.459 The first obligation of states is to respect ESCR. States must refrain from 
interfering with people’s enjoyment of ESCR.460 The obligation includes not enacting laws and 
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implementing policies, and abolishing the existing ones, which do not comply with ESCR.461 For 
instance, states must ensure that there is no discrimination based on race, religion or 
socioeconomic status regarding provision of education and healthcare.462 
The second obligation is to protect ESCR as states must protect people’s ESCR from other actors’ 
interference. These actors can be “individuals, groups, corporations” and other third-parties.463 
States must prevent these actors from violating people’s ESCR by taking necessary precautions. 
These may include legal measures, policies and regulations.464 States do not provide anything to 
realise ESCR under this obligation, they need to secure that “individuals are not arbitrarily 
deprived of the enjoyment of their rights.”465 For instance, taking necessary measures to prevent 
the usage of unhealthy ingredients in foodstuffs is critical to achieve the right to food.466 
Likewise, states need to regulate private health and education institutions to protect the rights 
of individuals.467  
The third obligation of states is to fulfil ESCR. States must take necessary measures (such as 
“legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional”) to achieve ESCR fully.468 Although 
the full realisation of ESCR can be ensured in a long-term process, states need to take all 
necessary steps by allocating “all appropriate means” expeditiously to make progress.469  It is 
explained that this obligation requires states to facilitate, promote and provide. Facilitating 
means empowering and supporting individuals and groups to enjoy their ESCR by introducing 
constructive measures such as enacting necessary laws or adopting policies. Promoting requires 
states to enable people to realise their rights. This can be achieved by education and raising 
awareness. Lastly, providing requires states “to ‘provide’ ESCR when individuals or groups are 
unable, on grounds reasonably considered to be beyond their control, to realise these rights 
themselves.”470 The last obligation is particularly important for the marginalised and vulnerable 
groups such as poor people, asylum seekers, disabled persons, minorities, women and 
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children.471 For instance, in case of a natural disaster, states would be expected to provide food 
and shelter to victims, if they are unable to meet these needs themselves. 
2.3.b. The minimum core obligations 
The minimum core obligations of states are critical for ESCR as they are not subject to 
progressive realisation and resource constraints, and they need to be ensured immediately.472 
The CESCR remarked in its third general comment that “a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent 
upon every State party.”473 It is argued that minimum core obligations of ESCR should be 
considered as non-derogable, and states must comply with them in any circumstances. So, 
failure in meeting the minimum core obligations of ESCR would constitute a violation.474 For 
instance, if a considerable number of people lack the basic level of food, health care and shelter 
for their survival in a state, this is a violation of the covenant unless it is evident that “every 
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations”.475 The Maastricht Guidelines also remark that 
states cannot justify failing to meet the minimum core of ESCR by giving lack of resources as an 
excuse.476 Moreover, meeting the core obligations should not be considered as an end in 
achieving ESCR, and states need to progress in implementing ESCR to achieve full realisation.477 
Lastly, setting the standards for the minimum core obligations of each ESCR is arduous. The 
minimum core obligations are not identified by the CESCR, but it is argued that this could be 
done through courts and institutions such as the CESCR experts committee.478 For instance, as 
mentioned above, more East Timorese died from hunger and illness compared to killings and 
executions. This shows that minimum core obligations were not ensured in East Timor during 
war. So, a future transitional justice process in Turkey must look at whether the state ensured 
minimum core obligations of ESCR in the context of the Kurdish Question. 
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3. ESCR and Transitional Justice 
3.1. Contextualisation of the neglect of ESCR  
The first chapter briefly explained that ESCR have been overlooked in transitional justice 
literature and practice. As illuminated in the first chapter, the field has been influenced by 
international law and legalism. ESCR and CPR have been treated differently, and the former has 
often been neglected in transitional justice theory and practice.479 Szoke-Burke wrote that: 
“Transitional justice mechanisms can no longer turn a blind eye to the violation of ESRs.”480 In 
fact, there has been a growing demand from both scholars and practitioners for the inclusion of 
ESCR in transitional justice, and there is a tendency for a change.481 This chapter started 
exploring ESCR and misconceptions about them. This section is going to depict how ESCR 
violations482 have been overlooked in transitional justice and explain the significance of including 
them in the field. This will also contribute to the main argument of this research which suggests 
that Turkey should address violations of socioeconomic rights in a future transitional justice 
process to tackle the Kurdish Question. 
3.1.a. Misconceptions of ESCR in transitional justice framework 
The reasons for focusing on CPR violations were derived from the misconceptions about ESCR 
which were broken down in the previous sections. Transitional justice has mainly focused on 
direct, physical and serious human rights abuses which had immediate damages.483 Since ESCR 
are considered as vague and aspirational rights which entail only positive obligations, they were 
often left un(der)addressed in transitional justice. However, it has been depicted that ESCR also 
entail negative obligations (to respect), and their violations can be direct, serious and physical 
which may produce immediate damages.484 Hecht and Michalowski state that violations of ESCR 
can be as serious as CPR violations. They asserted that “unjust systems kill far more infants 
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through malnutrition and the unavailability of water than they kill adults with bullets and 
bombs.”485  
There are many examples of forced evictions and famines (produced by intentional policies) 
which are striking examples of serious ESCR violations.486 As explained earlier, ESCR violations 
can amount to international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.487 The example of East Timor is striking as 84,200 out of 102,800 conflict-related 
deaths resulted from hunger and illness.488 Skogly wrote: “If malicious state leaders know that 
they may be brought to trial for massacring people, they may choose to starve them to death, 
or inflict illness on them instead.”489 In short, violations of ESCR fall within the scope of 
transitional justice, and there is no rationale for ignoring them in transitional processes. 
3.1.b. The importance of addressing root causes 
Socioeconomic issues have often been regarded as “context” when they are included in 
transitional processes. They have been looked at to understand violence rather than an 
independent matter of fact.490 This should not be understood as considering them as context or 
root causes of conflict is wrong. Looking at root causes of conflict and violence is vital for 
transitional justice processes.491 Mani remarked that there is a “responsibility to identify 
underlying practices of social injustice, marginalization and exploitation that were responsible 
either directly or indirectly for the violent conflict or crisis” and seeking remedies for these 
underlying causes is critical in transitional contexts.492 Yet, it should be understood that ESCR 
are not only root causes, background or context of violence.493 As stated earlier, ESCR violations 
can be discrete and direct with immediate damages. It is important to clarify this as “presenting 
socioeconomic root causes of conflict as historical context leaves policy change to the discretion 
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of political leaders, while presenting them as rights violations makes redress and reform a 
political imperative.”494 Sharp explains two ways of addressing the violations of ESCR in the 
context of transitional justice: a thin approach which suggests that only ESCR violations which 
were committed during the conflict should be addressed, and a thick approach suggests that not 
only the ones which took place during the conflict, but also a wider range of structural injustices 
that existed before the conflict should be addressed in transitional contexts.495 For instance, 
victims of forced evictions may demand compensation as a remedy (a thin approach), while an 
ethnic or religious group which was marginalised and excluded systematically may ask for the 
elimination of discrimination as a remedy (a thick approach). So, both discrete ESCR violations 
and structural violence must be addressed as they are both important for transitional countries.  
Furthermore, it is noted that conflicts often take place in poor countries, and they lead to 
destruction in these societies in terms of human capital, infrastructure and institutions.496 
Likewise, socioeconomic problems and ESCR violations are common under authoritarian 
regimes.497 Considering that legacies of violence would exacerbate the pre-existing 
socioeconomic injustices, the vital importance of social justice in transitional contexts could be 
understood. Victims and survivors expect to feel justice and see improvements in their daily lives 
after transitions. It is often remarked that without some sort of social justice, transitional justice 
efforts would be incomplete and futile for people.498 In addition, addressing ESCR abuses and 
eliminating root causes of violence is important to achieve a sustainable peace.499  
The connection between poverty and conflict has been contentious in academia. Some scholars 
assert that poverty, exclusion and inequality trigger conflicts; others say there is no relationship 
between them.500 Furthermore, some scholars assert that even if poverty, exclusion and 
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inequality do not directly cause, they contribute to the emergence of conflicts501 (they may raise 
the likelihood of conflict).502 For example, El Salvador, Yemen, Tunisia and Egypt have witnessed 
wide-spread violence which was rooted in socioeconomic problems such as unemployment and 
poverty.503 Likewise, violent revolts have occurred in various transitional countries (Peru, Chile, 
South Africa and Guatemala) due to socioeconomic injustices. So, if root causes of conflicts are 
not eliminated and socioeconomic grievances are not tackled in transitional societies, it is 
difficult to assume that the peace will be sustainable. These problems may lead to another 
conflict in the future. Yet, it is not always simple to prove causes of a conflict as there are 
numerous causes of conflicts. Therefore, analysing the context may be helpful for the argument. 
Rather than seeking to reach universal conclusions, analysing contexts and drawing specific 
conclusions for those cases could be more sensible.  
Excluding socioeconomic dimensions of violence leads to an incomplete account of history. 
Various scholars agree that addressing CPR violations exclusively prevents understanding the 
nature of past conflicts and violence properly.504 Conflicts have multiple interrelated dimensions 
(political, economic, social, cultural etc.) and addressing only CPR violations reduces them into 
one dimension. These dimensions need to be analysed and addressed holistically.505 Incomplete 
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narratives may prevent a full-fledged redress for past human rights violations and non-repetition 
of these crimes. To redress past violations comprehensively ESCR violations and root causes of 
violence need to be included in transitional processes. Lastly, being realistic about addressing 
ESCR in transitional societies is important as it should not be seen as a panacea which can solve 
all socioeconomic problems. Inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice mechanisms can only 
contribute to the elimination of socioeconomic problems.506 States must tackle socioeconomic 
problems through long-term policies and development programs. Yet, transitional justice can 
contribute to these efforts by diagnosing these problems and their reasons. In addition, 
transitional justice mechanisms can play an important role to buttress these efforts which will 
be explored in the following sections. 
3.2. Transitional justice mechanisms to address ESCR 
ESCR violations and root causes of violence need to be addressed through transitional justice 
mechanisms and there is a need for an analysis to decide how these mechanisms can contribute 
to this task. Truth commissions, trials, reparations and institutional reforms will be examined in 
this section. Historically, truth commissions often failed to address ESCR violations.507 There are 
several exceptions to this as truth commissions of Guatemala, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Peru 
have addressed socioeconomic issues.508 Yet, even if truth commissions looked at 
socioeconomic issues and structural violence, they often considered these problems as 
background and context rather than rights violations as it happened in South Africa, Guatemala 
and Peru.509 In East Timor, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor 
(Portuguese acronym, CAVR) held public hearings on ESCR violations and had a chapter in its 
final report concerning famine and forced displacement.510 More importantly, the CAVR 
described ESCR violations and development issues as violations of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to adequate food, the right to housing, the right to education and 
the right to health.511 In Peru, on the other hand, the truth commission considered structural 
violence and ESCR violations mostly as historical background and root causes of the conflict but 
did not necessarily describe them as violations of rights.512 It must be noted that there is an 
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increasing tendency among truth commissions to address socioeconomic issues since inclusion 
of ESCR in transitional processes began being promoted.513 
Since truth commissions receive testimonies from victims and survivors, they are able to shed 
light on reasons for and dynamics of conflicts and political violence. So, they have a potential to 
reveal socioeconomic injustices, structural violence and ESCR abuses. Moreover, truth 
commissions can make recommendations regarding socioeconomic issues to solve these 
problems.514 It is claimed that even if states do not implement recommendations of truth 
commissions regarding ESCR and they do not turn into practice, they would still help in various 
ways such as raising awareness about these rights in civil society and contributing to the 
prevention of future violations of ESCR.515  
As mentioned earlier, justiciability of ESCR has been debated and historically ESCR violations 
have not been adjudicated satisfyingly. It is pointed out that: “Human rights courts can, in 
principle, adjudicate violations of economic, social and cultural rights, provided that their 
constitutive instruments refer to these rights.”516 In fact, some courts (including the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) 
have ruled on violations of the right to housing and right to food.517 Considering that some ESCR 
violations constitute international crimes, tribunals (international, hybrid or national) could 
adjudicate these crimes in transitional contexts. This would also contribute to the non-repetition 
of crimes, as in adjudicating CPR violations. 
Conflicts have severe impacts on people’s socioeconomic conditions and these impacts do not 
fade away after the end of conflict. Muvingi wrote that: “populations emerging from violence 
are traumatised and their needs go beyond trials and truth telling. The psychosocial needs of 
affected populations are not receiving anywhere near the same level of attention as the 
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punishment of perpetrators.”518 As the impacts of conflicts and political violence continue to 
affect people’s lives, people in transitional societies might prioritise meeting their basic needs 
over prosecuting the perpetrators.519 Although ESCR violations have not been remedied through 
reparations in transitional contexts historically, there are some examples of collective and 
individual reparations granted for these abuses. Reparations regarding the right to housing, right 
to health and right to education were granted in Peru, East Timor, Chile and Morocco.520 In fact, 
reparations have a considerable potential to address socioeconomic issues in transitional 
societies. Although they cannot solve socioeconomic problems alone, they may help in 
remedying these problems which could be both causes and consequences of conflicts.521 
Particularly, collective reparations can contribute to elimination of structural injustices.522 
Institutional reforms, vetting in particular, may play an important role in addressing ESCR 
violations and root causes of violence.523 As explained in the first chapter, institutional reforms 
prevent re-occurrence of violations, and this is also true for ESCR abuses. Eliminating ESCR 
violators from public offices and reforming malfunctioning institutions which had allowed 
violations to take place can contribute to protect ESCR. Moreover, Szoke-Burke remarked that 
“vetting processes can improve the government’s ability to fulfil ESRs by excluding public and 
private actors whose practices eroded public funds, damaged socioeconomic infrastructure and 
services”.524 In short, institutional reforms are mainly forward-looking mechanisms focusing on 
non-repetition of violence, and they could help addressing and protecting ESCR. 
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Finally, it must be kept in mind that addressing socioeconomic issues does not mean that these 
issues will be tackled or redressed completely. In many countries, addressing violations of CPR 
through transitional justice mechanisms did not solve these issues. People still might be 
unsatisfied after these processes.525 The reasons for this resentment might arise from the 
process itself such as light sentences after trials, or they might arise from the lack of 
commitment of new regimes to take necessary steps after these processes.526 Being realistic is 
important to prevent raising false hopes among people and then disappointing them. 
3.3. Limitations of transitional justice to address ESCR 
Although there have been calls to include ESCR in transitional justice, some scholars raised 
concerns about this inclusion.527 Waldorf asserts that transitional justice is short-term and 
legalistic in nature and addressing violations of ESCR should not be included in its framework.528 
It is argued that tackling socioeconomic problems requires long-term remedies which must be 
achieved by states through development programs rather than transitional justice 
mechanisms.529 Yet inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice is not only about structural violence, 
there are also countless direct violations of socioeconomic rights such as forced displacements, 
destruction of food resources or demolishment of homes and villages. Moreover, the argument 
that transitional justice is “legalistic in nature” is not convincing for excluding ESCR from 
transitional justice because ESCR are also enforceable and justiciable rights as explained above.  
On the other hand, Mani describes a dilemma of transitional justice: it needs to be expanded to 
include violations of ESCR but “it is well known that the mandates of existing TJ mechanisms are 
already overcharged, their responsibilities too heavy, public expectations too unrealistic and 
finances already too lean.”530 Likewise, Waldorf asserts that transitional justice has already been 
overwhelmed with a narrow mandate, and widening its mandate may pose “a danger of raising 
already inflated expectations of what transitional justice mechanisms can accomplish.”531 The 
“overburdening” argument is problematic because there is no legal or moral reason for 
transitional justice efforts to prioritise CPR over ESCR. Why should redressing CPR violations be 
                                                          
525 Hamber et al., Telling It Like It Is, pp.18-42.; Brouneus, Truth-Telling as Talking Cure, pp.55-76.; Byrne, 
Benefit or Burden, pp.237–256.; Backer et al., The Human Face of Justice. 
526 Mendeloff, Trauma and Vengeance, p.620.; Kent, Interrogating the "Gap", pp.1031-1032. 
527 Waldorf, Anticipating the Past, pp.179-180.; McAuliffe, P. (2014) Rhetoric and Realpolitik: Interrogating 
the Relationship between Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Justice, 2012/13 Finnish Year Book of 
International Law, Vol.23, pp.239-307.; Evans, Structural Violence, pp.5-15.; Mani, Editorial Dilemmas of 
Expanding Transitional Justice, p.255.; De Greiff, Articulating the Links, p.40. 
528 Waldorf, Anticipating the Past, p.179. 
529 Szoke-Burke, Not Only Context, p.474.; De Greiff, Articulating the Links, pp.29-31; Waldorf, Anticipating 
the Past, p.179. 
530 Mani, Editorial Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, p.255. 
531 Waldorf, Anticipating the Past, pp.179-180. 
82 
 
more appropriate and worthy of concern than ESCR violations in transitional processes? Why 
does redressing families of victims of extrajudicial killings not overburden transitional justice but 
redressing families of victims of famine does? In both cases, victims die as a result of acts of 
warring parties in different ways. So, the death of a person by violating his/her right to food or 
by killing should be of equal concern, and transitional justice must be concerned with both ESCR 
and CPR abuses.  
McAuliffe raise similar concerns and claims that eliminating structural violence and achieving 
socioeconomic justice by transforming unjust socioeconomic structures of transitional societies 
are not really realistic considering the dynamics in transitional countries where redistribution of 
economic power is not likely to happen easily. He asserts that transitional justice is not likely to 
have that capacity to make such drastic changes in socioeconomic structures, and assumptions 
that transitional justice can make such changes is too “ambitious”.532 He also warns that 
“transitional justice’s greatest impact will generally be in the area of civil and political rights. 
There is a danger that the socio-economic critique of transitional justice risks stigmatising 
advances in this area as unduly modest or even as impediments to greater reform.”533 De Greiff 
and Evans also stress similar concerns and question the capability of transitional justice 
mechanisms in terms of their expertise, ability and their funding.534 As argued in the beginning 
of this chapter, socioeconomic rights are also human rights and addressing them in transitional 
justice processes does not necessarily require specific expertise and funding. For instance, if a 
minority group’s access to education is banned by the state, this is a violation of the right to 
education and non-discrimination principle. Why should lifting this ban require specific expertise 
and vast resources? Likewise, ESCR abuses are not more complex or vague than CPR abuses.  
 Schmid and Nolan ask: “why remedying the destruction of people’s homes in armed conflict 
should be inherently more complex than redressing disappearances or other civil and political 
rights abuses.”535 So, transitional justice practitioners may well concern with ESCR violations as 
they do for CPR violations. 
Furthermore, resource constraints are also debated as most of the transitional countries lack 
enough resources and depend on international community and donors. It was remarked that 
donors have prioritised CPR over ESCR as they claimed that “freedom comes first” in the so-
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called the “food versus freedom” argument.536 ESCR should not be reduced to “food” since their 
violations can amount to most serious crimes as explained above. Killing thousands of people by 
violating their right to food through produced famines should not be considered less serious 
than a violation of the right to freedom from torture.  So, the “freedom comes first” claim is not 
convincing or reasonable at all.  
It has been claimed that addressing socioeconomic issues and expanding these mechanisms’ 
mandates would produce additional difficulties and undermine the success of these 
processes.537 However, establishing international tribunals or truth commissions require as 
many resources as redressing some socioeconomic wrongdoings both in terms of funding and 
expertise. Lastly, transitional justice can be designed in a realistic manner to address 
socioeconomic issues. For instance, transitional justice mechanisms can promise to contribute 
to social justice rather than achieving socioeconomic justice. This is also the case for addressing 
CPR violations. Transitional justice mechanisms do not often have the capacity to address all 
CPR violations, or they do not promise to eliminate impunity entirely. Therefore, transitional 
justice mechanisms can be adopted to contribute to the elimination of structural injustices and 
addressing ESCR violations. 
3.4. ESCR in the context of development and transitional justice nexus 
Addressing socioeconomic problems in transitional justice is closely linked to development. This 
section will conceptualise the relationship between transitional justice and development and 
explore the ways to connect these two fields. Post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies are 
often rife with socioeconomic problems including “poverty, damaged infrastructure, and low 
levels of governance and social capital.”538 Likewise, a majority of developing countries have 
experienced conflict.539 Although transitional justice and development are separate fields, they 
often operate in the same societies and settings540 and share the same goal: “improving human 
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lives and societies.”541 While development focuses on the future to achieve it, transitional justice 
concentrates mostly on the past to redress wrongdoings, even though it should also focus on 
the future to build a peaceful and stable society.542 Development and transitional justice have a 
potential to be mutually supportive to transform societies during transition.543 Therefore, the 
relationship between development and transitional justice needs to be analysed. This will 
contribute to understanding how socioeconomic issues can be dealt with in Turkey’s context, 
and how transitional justice and development can cooperate with each other to tackle these 
problems. Before examining this relationship, looking at the linkages between development and 
human rights would be useful. 
3.4.a. Human rights and development 
Development is a broad field and conceptualising it is beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet, 
even briefly, it needs to be explained here. There are various definitions of development in the 
field: while some mainly focus on economic dimensions of development, others cover broader 
concepts to define it.544 A clear-cut definition is proposed by Kingsbury: “the study of 
development is concerned with how ‘developing countries’ can improve their living standards 
and eliminate absolute poverty.”545 As the definition suggests, achieving development in 
developing countries546 is about enhancing people’s lives. There have been numerous theories 
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and understandings since the emergence of the modern concept of development.547 Although 
earlier conceptions mostly focused on economic growth, new understandings of development 
concern broader issues, such as poverty, inequalities and environment, instead of generating 
economic growth only.548 Broader aims and new understandings of development are formulated 
in both theory and practice because it has been understood that identifying development as a 
solely economic phenomenon is incomplete (focusing exclusively on economic growth did not 
necessarily enhance well-being of most people).549 Amartya Sen’s work made a huge 
contribution to this new concept. His approach shifted the objective and focus of development 
from economic growth to well-being.550 In his seminal book Development as Freedom he defined 
development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.”551 He considers 
economic growth and income as means for development, not ends in themselves. Achieving 
development is beyond producing economic growth and increasing incomes; individuals also 
need “political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic 
education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives.”552 Therefore, the relationship 
between human rights and human development is important. Moreover, the linkages between 
law and development at the institutional level is also being argued both in practice and 
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academia.553 Yet, comprehensively exploring these complex arguments is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
Development and human rights used to be considered as two separate fields, although their 
emanation coincided with each other after the World War II.554 Development has transformed 
from a growth-oriented paradigm to human development, and a convergence between human 
rights and development has become crucial as they have a potential to strengthen each other.555 
The importance of linking human rights and development has been emphasised for a long period 
of time, yet, this emphasis had not turned into practice until the mid-1990s.556 In 1968, the first 
World Conference on Human Rights declared: “the achievement of lasting progress in the 
implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and 
international policies of economic and social development”.557 Similarly, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) published a human development report in 2000 which 
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remarked the importance of adopting a human rights approach to development, emphasising 
that human development and human rights have “a common vision and a common purpose—
to secure the freedom, well-being and dignity of all people everywhere.”558 Furthermore, the 
Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986.559 
This declaration was based on a view that individuals and collectives have a right to 
development, and underdevelopment is a violation of human rights.560 Yet, the very existence 
of the right, its conceptualisation and justiciability have been debated both in theory and 
practice since then.561 It must be noted that the right to development is different from rights-
based approaches to development although they both suggest distinct ways to link human rights 
and development.562 A rights-based approach was defined as: 
a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively 
based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to 
promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyse inequalities which lie at 
the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust 
distributions of power that impede development progress.563 
So, while the right to development links human development and human rights by considering 
development as a human right, a rights-based approach does so by advocating for adoption of 
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human rights principles and norms when designing development programs and plans.564 
Therefore, various international, national and grassroots development actors (such as the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Bank, UNDP, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Oxfam, The Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), CARE and the Department for International Development (DFID)) 
integrated human rights into their development agendas.565  
Exploring the linkages between human rights and development deserves a more extended 
analysis than can be done here. Whether and how they affect and complement each other has 
been debated both in theory and practice.566 Crudely put, human rights principles and norms 
such as equity, non-discrimination, empowerment, accountability and transparency could be 
useful for development research and practice.567 On the other hand, development may reinforce 
human rights as it has a long tradition of analysing and investigating development progress and 
projects. These methods could be useful for human rights analysis and policy choices.568 
Moreover, human development can reinforce human rights by analysing the conditions and 
improving the society in which these rights are going to be realised.569 This would also help in 
designing a realistic and attainable transitional justice process because unkept promises often 
lead to disappointments in transitional societies. 
As mentioned above, economic, political and social freedoms are closely linked to each other.570  
It is asserted that there is a correlation between development and human rights protection.571 
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A low level of income is often associated with low levels of protection of CPR, and vice versa.572 
Similarly, individuals with greater capabilities (in terms of education, wealth, etc.) are more likely 
to protect their human rights which is often not the case for people in poverty.573 In fact, this 
correlation is also evident at the institutional level because human rights have become an 
indicator of development.574 Human rights will not be fully ensured in a society which is rife with 
socioeconomic inequalities and poverty; conversely, human development is not likely to be 
successful in a country where there is no accountability, transparency and rule of law.575 
3.4.b. Transitional justice and development 
Although transitional justice and development used to be disconnected, there is a growing 
attention towards the linkages between them recently.576 Before exploring whether and how 
transitional justice and development should be linked, it must be noted that broader 
understandings of the two fields are going to be taken into consideration in this study. Since 
ESCR are closely related to development goals, broader understandings of transitional justice 
which seek to address ESCR abuses are more relevant to development.577 Likewise, broader 
understandings of development are relevant to transitional justice rather than the conventional 
one which mainly focuses on economic growth. While transitional justice has common concerns 
with the former, it does not directly concern generating economic growth.578 Economic growth 
is important for transitional states, but it is not directly related to transitional justice’s goals. 
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As explained earlier, many post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies are rife with 
socioeconomic problems and structural injustices (such as poverty, inequality, discrimination 
and marginalisation), and leaving these problems and injustices un(der)addressed pose a risk to 
sustainable peace.579 Transitional justice mechanisms need to address ESCR violations and 
eliminate socioeconomic problems and structural injustices (including poverty, discrimination, 
marginalisation) which are also concerns of development.580 If socioeconomic problems are not 
tackled, they negatively affect development efforts as well. If peace is not ensured 
“development gains are eroded, under threat, or impossible to achieve with equity for society 
at large.” 581 Therefore, prevention of future violence and ensuring safety and security are of 
great importance to both fields.  
Even if a state does not violate ESCR intentionally (as in forced displacements), conflicts and 
political violence still negatively affect well-being of people, damage institutions and hinder 
development progress.582 It is stated that “massive and systematic violations may cause poverty, 
deepen inequality, weaken institutions, destroy infrastructure, impoverish governance, increase 
insecurity, deplete social capital, and so on.”583 Although development and transitional justice 
often neglect them, they need to tackle these problems (particularly structural inequalities) to 
prevent recurrence of violence.584 Both communities deal with similar problems from different 
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perspectives but if these two fields can be coordinated, better results can be produced.585 
Moreover, analysing the root causes of developmental problems can provide insights to the 
advantage of both processes as these causes may overlap to some extent.586 Like transitional 
justice, development should also concern root causes of violence and development problems; it 
needs to concern the transformation of the structures which enabled violence.587 Development 
needs to analyse root causes and refrain from furthering existing inequalities to prevent future 
violence.588 Although preventing future violence is not a main concern of development, it must 
avoid deepening root causes of conflict because a future conflict would undermine development 
efforts. Therefore, there is a growing tendency in development donors to put an emphasis on 
the promotion of rule of law and transitional justice sensitive development projects.589 
Exploring how transitional justice and development can reinforce each other is important to 
better understand the linkages between them. Conflict and political violence often lead to “a 
generalized weakening of agency, trust, and social capital, not only for victims but for society as 
a whole.”590 Levels of trust diminish both in state institutions and among people in transitional 
societies, and this affects the social coordination and development progress.591 There is a 
significant correlation between level of trust and economic growth and development.592 
Transitional justice concerns the reintegration of poor, excluded and marginalised people into 
their societies and reassurance of their agency.593 It also aims at restoring trust in people who 
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lost their trust in state institutions which have critical importance for development efforts.594 
Therefore, transitional justice can contribute to development by empowering people 
(particularly victims), reinstilling trust both in institutions and among people, increasing social 
capital, fostering civil society and promoting rule of law.595 As shown in the third chapter, this is 
also significant for Turkey as there is a low level of trust among victims towards the state, and 
this needs to be tackled for eliminating socioeconomic problems and enhancing development.   
All transitional justice mechanisms have a potential to reinforce development efforts indirectly 
but reparations (both individual and collective) have a great potential to directly contribute to 
development.596 Collective reparations (provision of health care, education etc.) are akin to 
development programs, and there is a tendency to see reparations and development programs 
as substitutes for each other.597 Although they may resemble each other and offer similar 
benefits, they are different. Unlike development programs, reparations require the recognition 
of victims and the acknowledgement of responsibility for the past human rights violations.598 
Rather than replacing one another, development and transitional justice communities should 
cooperate in the design and implementation of reparations.599 
Furthermore, development can reinforce transitional justice in various ways. Firstly, 
development can contribute to transitional justice efforts by depicting what is attainable in 
those circumstances as it may have a better grasp of the conditions (financial and institutional) 
of the transitional society.600 Likewise, development can provide “funding and technical 
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expertise and assistance.”601 It was remarked that “successful transitions often depend on 
progress in development.”602 So, achieving development and improvement in people’s lives 
could be an important indicator for transitional justice.603 Unlike transitional justice, 
development is a long-term struggle, and integrating transitional justice with development could 
“ensure a continued commitment and focus on transitional justice over time.”604 Finally, 
progress in broader concepts of development could be useful in eliminating socioeconomic 
problems and structural inequalities which would also contribute to prevention of conflict and 
political violence.605 
The first chapter’s section 3.2.a illustrated that participation and local ownership is important in 
transitional justice and a grassroots approach can be more promising than top-down practices. 
Development has been concerned with participation and consultation matters for a long time, 
and it can contribute to transitional justice by sharing its expertise.606 Grassroots and 
participatory development has accumulated a considerable expertise both in theory and 
practice as it has been promoted and implemented for several decades.607 So, grassroots and 
participatory development approaches could reinforce transitional justice efforts by sharing 
their expertise.608 A grassroots development model can be promising as it can address needs of 
people on the ground and focus on redistribution and sustainability. Meaningful participation of 
locals can help to design and implement effective solutions to socioeconomic problems.609   
There is a growing literature on the interrelationship between transitional justice and 
development, but this has not turned into practice considerably.610  Although “potential 
synergies” of these fields often come into focus, there are also tensions, trade-offs and 
                                                          
601 Duthie, Toward a Development-sensitive Approach, pp.296-302.; ICTJ Briefing: Transitional Justice and 
Development, p.2. 
602 ICTJ Briefing: Transitional Justice and Development, p.2. 
603 De Greiff, Articulating the Links, p.30. 
604 Sancho, Development Trends, p.13. 
605 Mani, Beyond Retribution, pp.129-130.; Alexander, A Scoping Study, pp.48-50.; Vinck and Pham, 
Ownership and Participation, p.410. 
606 ICTJ Briefing: Transitional Justice and Development, p.5.; Duthie, Introduction, pp.20-22. 
607 The World Bank (1996) The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Washington DC: World Bank.; Willis, 
K. (2005) Theories and Practices of Development, London: Routledge, pp.93-114.; McInerney-Lankford 
and Sano, Human Rights Indicators in Development, p.36. 
608 Lundy and McGovern, The Role of Community, p.110.; Duthie, Introduction, p.20. 
609 Sharp, Addressing Economic Violence, p.799.; Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building, p.353.; 
McChesney, Promoting and Defending ESCR, p.22.; Szoke-Burke, Not Only Context, pp.487-489.; Roht-
Arriaza and Orlovksy, A Complementary Relationship, pp.184-191.; Roht-Arriaza, Reparations and ESCR, 
p.120.; Hordijk, M. A, (2009) Peru’s Participatory Budgeting: Configurations of Power, Opportunities for 
Change, The Open Urban Studies Journal, Vol.2, p.43.; Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building, 
pp.342-354.; Darrow and Tomas, Power, Capture, and Conflict, p.506.  
610 Sancho, Development Trends, pp.2-3. 
94 
 
competition between the two fields for limited resources in transitional societies.611 As 
development concerns “generic collective” rather than individuals, a tension may occur 
between development programs and demands of victims who expect to be recognised and 
redressed.612 Moreover, this tension can also be observed between victims and other citizens, 
as the latter may prioritise development projects on education, health and employment over 
transitional justice mechanisms.613 Furthermore, some scholars consider transitional justice as 
an impediment to development for various reasons such as diverting away necessary resources 
from development programs, punishing skilled labour for crimes and daunting investments.614 
Yet, these claims are not supported by empirical evidence, and the arguments, for and against, 
mostly depend on theoretical analyses.615 So, their impacts on each other and the distinctions 
between two fields need to be explored.616 To conclude, there is a true potential for the 
cooperation of these two fields. So, rather than ignoring this potential due to aforementioned 
tensions, ways must be sought to eliminate these tensions so that these two fields can 
contribute to peace and reconciliation efforts.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided the conceptualisation of ESCR in international law and an analysis of the 
arguments surrounding the neglect of these rights. Then, ESCR are scrutinised in the context of 
transitional justice. Finally, the connection between transitional justice and development is 
explained. The analysis concerning ESCR depicted that there is no legal or empirical basis to 
justify the neglect of ESCR in international law and transitional justice. The importance of 
addressing ESCR violations and structural injustices in transitional contexts is also elaborated. 
To achieve sustainable piece, remedying the causes of violence is necessary. It is noted that even 
though there is a growing tendency to address economic violations in transitional justice 
processes, it remains a blind spot in the field.617 As explained in the first chapter, transitional 
justice has been dominated by legalism and influenced by international law. Therefore, both 
theory and practice of transitional justice has been framed from a narrow legalistic and state-
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centric perspective. Yet, transitional contexts are complex, and these processes require a variety 
of disciplines and expertise such as history, economics, education, development, religion and 
psychology. Recently, the field is becoming more interdisciplinary.618 Therefore, connecting 
transitional justice and development can make an important contribution to achieve the well-
being of transitional societies. However, it is really important to distinguish the provinces in 
which both fields operate and identify how these two fields can reinforce each other in an 
efficient way.  
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Chapter 3: The Kurdish Question 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part gives the historical background of the Kurdish 
Question to understand what the causes of the conflict are. It argues that even though the 
Kurdish Question is inherently political, socioeconomic problems and ESCR violations are both 
among root causes and consequences of the conflict. The second part deals with the human 
rights abuses in general and ESCR abuses in particular. This part explains that forced 
displacement has been one of the most significant and wide-spread human rights violations in 
the Kurdish Question. Forced displacement caused numerous human rights violations, 
particularly ESCR violations (including of the right to housing, the right to adequate standard of 
living and the right to education) in Turkey. The Kurdish internally displaced persons (IDPs)619 
have wide-ranging socioeconomic problems such as poverty, unemployment and poor housing 
due to ESCR violations. The forced migration will be explored in detail in this chapter’s section 
3.2, but it should be noted that forced migration creates numerous problems and puts people 
in precarious situations. IDPs lack international legal protection as they are not refugees. There 
is no binding international instrument for the protection of IDPs. The Guiding Principles on 
International Displacement was presented to the UN in 1998, and the principles aim to address 
the needs of the IDPs and to protect their human rights.620 Yet, this document is not binding, 
and there is no separate agency to enforce these principles. Due to these shortcomings, the 
implementation of the principles has not been successful and the IDPs are still in need of an 
efficient protection.621 This is also the case in Turkey and the Kurdish IDPs are in need of 
protection and redress for the abuses they have been subjected to. 
The governments have taken some steps to address the problems arising from past wrongs, but 
they have been limited. By providing the historical background and detailing human rights 
violations through a socioeconomic lens, the chapter emphasises the importance of tackling 
socioeconomic problems in the Kurdish Question and suggests that the government must 
pursue transitional justice and address both CPR ad ESCR violations.  
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2. Background of the problem 
As stated earlier, the Kurdish Question is an identity-based political problem, but socioeconomic 
matters are central to it. By exploring the historical development of the problem, the root causes 
of the conflict can be understood well. Understanding the root causes of the conflict is critical 
for considering transitional justice in the context of the Kurdish Question.  
The Kurdish people never had their own independent state in history and they had lived under 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire for the past five hundred years.622 Today 
the largest percentage of their population live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.623 Although 
population censuses do not classify ethnicity of the population in Turkey, the Kurds are the 
largest minority in the country.624 Under the Ottoman rule, the Kurds had autonomous emirates 
which were independent in internal affairs since the 16th century.625 The Ottoman Empire was 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural and it provided a space for different ethnic groups to coexist 
together.626 The Ottoman Empire joined the First World War and it was defeated. Then, the 
Turkish War of Independence took place and the new Turkish Republic was established in 
1923.627 The founders of Turkey promised Kurds before the foundation of the Republic that their 
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ethnic and cultural rights would be recognised by the new state.628 However, the promised 
multi-ethnic state never emerged, the new Republic was a Turkish nation-state as the founders 
aimed to establish a modern and homogenous state similar to the Western ones.629 
The founders of the Republic considered ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity as a problem 
which could lead to instability and could be an obstacle to progress as these groups could revolt 
for independence.630 They declared that all the citizens of the Republic were “Turkish” and all 
other ethnic groups had to deny their ethnic identities.631 They banned education and 
publication in other languages, shut all the traditional Kurdish schools, changed the Kurdish 
names of cities and villages to Turkish ones, and eradicated “Kurdistan” (which was the name of 
the Kurdish region) from maps and official documents.632 The names of nearly 15,000 places (35-
36%) were changed between 1940 and 2000. Although there have been various reasons for 
changing the names such as preventing confusion, one of the main reasons was replacing non-
Turkish names with Turkish ones.633 These policies also targeted other ethnic groups (such as 
Circassians, Laz, Chechens, Arabs and Bosnians), yet, the relationships these ethnic groups had 
with the state have not been violent.634 The new regime was harsh in repressing the Kurdish 
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identity, particularly language. Some Kurds were fined for each word they used if they spoke 
Kurdish. Any form of expression of Kurdish culture, traditions, language and folklore were 
prohibited.635 It is stated that these assimilationist policies stirred up nationalism among Kurds 
which ended up with the construction of Kurdish national identity.636  
Due to the state’s oppression, the Shaykh Said rebellion took place in 1925, and other rebellions 
(the 1930-1931 Agri and 1937-1938 Dersim rebellions) followed this, but all of them suppressed 
brutally by the state. 637 Yavuz claims that the Turkish state constructed a discourse about the 
Kurds after these rebellions. The Kurds were framed as economically and socially backwards, 
religiously fanatic and a threat to the national integrity of the Republic.638 After these rebellions, 
there were no other revolts until the 1980s. Also, there was no social movement or mobilisation 
in the Kurdish society until the 1960s due to the state’s strict control in the region.639 The harsh 
assimilationist policies were slightly alleviated by the Democrat Party (DP), a centre-right 
political party, which came to power in 1950.640 They adopted a liberal approach to the economy 
and some developments took place in the economy. But the substantial gap between Kurdish 
and western provinces of the country in terms of economic development was widened.641 During 
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the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the Kurdish Question was interpreted through an economic and 
development discourse (as a regional backwardness problem).642 In 1960, a military coup 
toppled the Democrat Party and a new wave of oppressive and assimilative policies were 
initiated by the military regime such as imprisoning and exiling of the prominent Kurdish figures 
and sending Kurdish children into boarding schools, where they had to speak Turkish 
exclusively.643 There have been increasing calls from the Kurds for the recognition of their 
political, cultural and linguistic rights since the 1970s but these demands were silenced by the 
state.644  
In 1980, another coup took place and the military regime adopted repressive policies to 
assimilate Kurds.645 Zeydanlioglu states that “the systematic repression and assimilation of the 
Kurds reached its peak with the 1980 coup”.646 The military regime jailed almost 81,000 Kurdish 
dissidents who were exposed to systematic torture in prisons.647 In addition, newspapers, 
publishing houses and NGOs were shut down; the Kurdish language was prohibited; and the 
Kurdish towns and villages renamed with Turkish names.648 Yet, these policies strengthened the 
Kurdish identity politics rather than eliminating it; the oppressive policies of the military regime 
strengthened the separatist movement and the PKK was established.649 The state played an 
important role in the strengthening of the PKK because the oppression of the military coup 
pushed people to supporting the PKK.650 The People’s Labour Party (Halkin Emek Partisi) was 
formed in 1990 as the first pro-Kurdish political party, and seven more parties followed this until 
                                                          
642 Yegen, The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse, p.564.; Keyman, Rethinking the Kurdish 
question, p.471.; Ergin, The racialization of Kurdish identity, p.327. 
643 Zeydanlioglu, The White Turkish Man’s Burden, pp.165-167.; Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish 
Question, p.14.; Besikci, İ. (1970) Dogu Anadolu’nun Duzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller, Istanbul: 
E Yayınları, pp.400-404.; Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, pp.87-89.; Ozcan, Turkey’s Kurds, p.74. 
644 Gunter, M. (2004) The Kurdish Question in Perspective, World Affairs, Vol.166, No.4, p.200. 
645 Barkey, H. and Fuller, G. (1997) Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed 
Opportunities, Middle East Journal, Vol.51, No.1, p.73.; Yavuz, Five stages of the construction, p.10.; 
Gurses, M. (2010) Partition, Democracy, and Turkey's Kurdish Minority, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 
Vol.16, No.3-4, p.341. 
646 Zeydanlioglu, The White Turkish Man’s Burden, p.166. 
647 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.416-424.; Zeydanlioglu, The White Turkish Man’s Burden, 
pp.166-167.; Updegraff, R. (2012) The Kurdish Question, Journal of Democracy, Vol.23, No.1, p.122.; 
Bozarslan, H. (2001) Human rights and the Kurdish issue in Turkey: 1984–1999, Human Rights Review, 
Vol.3, No.1, p.46.; Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, p.48. 
648 Zeydanlioglu, The White Turkish Man’s Burden, pp.166-167.; Updegraff, The Kurdish Question, p.122.; 
Marcus, Blood and Belief, p.85. 
649 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, pp.21-22.; Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 
pp.109-111. 
650 Bozarslan, Human rights and the Kurdish issue, p.46. 
101 
 
today as the Constitutional Court in Turkey kept closing them, accusing the parties of “links with 
PKK and the promotion of separatism”.651  
During the 1990s, the alienation between Kurds and the state escalated, and Turkish nationalism 
and Kurdish discontent increased accordingly.652 It has been explained that there was a self-
censorship in the Turkish media, and the information was controlled by the state, therefore, the 
Turkish public did not really know what was going on in the Kurdish regions. Therefore, there 
was no considerable debate and pressure from the public regarding the policies concerning the 
Kurdish Question.653 Until the 1990s, “Kurd”, as a word, did not even appear in the 
newspapers.654 The cultural demands of the Kurds were often perceived and described as a 
threat to the unity of the state by the state elite.655 The state’s oppression pushed Kurds to a 
more hard-line stance against the state, and the Kurdish actors were also provocative at times.656 
The numbers of recruits to the PKK rose after the state’s indiscriminate violence and oppression. 
For instance, the PKK had many new recruits after the Maras Massacre which took place in 1978 
and resulted in the death of 111 Alevite Kurds.657 Likewise, when the local authorities in Hakkari 
banned Newroz, the traditional Kurdish spring festival, and then violently responded to the 
demonstrations in 2008, around a dozen students from that province joined the PKK one after 
another.658  
In 1999, Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and long-time leader of the PKK, was captured, the PKK 
declared a ceasefire and the European Union (EU) announced Turkey’s candidacy for 
membership.659 These developments paved the way for reforms for strengthening democracy 
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and searching for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question.660 Yet, although the PKK declared 
a ceasefire after the capture of Ocalan, it continued its activities.661 The PKK will be analysed in 
the following section more broadly. Yet, before moving there it must be remarked that the 
Turkish state had refused to acknowledge the ethno-political aspect of the Kurdish question until 
the 1990s by conceiving it as a socioeconomic and security/terrorism problem.662 There has been 
a continuing demand for the recognition of the Kurdish identity but the Turkish State denied it 
from the 1920s to 1990s as one of the state’s main policies was assimilation of the Kurds to 
tackle the Kurdish Question.663 Although the state abandoned the denial of Kurdish identity since 
the 1990s, this does not mean that the Kurdish identity has been recognised in a positive way.664   
Woefully, the Kurdish Question was not really discussed in academia, in media or in civil society 
due to the state ideology, policies and oppression.665 The Turkish media played an important yet 
negative role regarding the Kurdish Question, as they adopted the state discourse and often 
represented the Kurds in a negative way by linking them to terrorism and separatism.666 
Similarly, the Kurdish Question had been considered as a developmental or security problem in 
Turkish academia until the late 1990s rather than an ethnic one, but a liberal approach has come 
to identify the problem as “the longstanding assimilationist state tradition” after the 
developments in Turkey’s European Union process.667 
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2.1. The PKK insurgence 
The PKK deserves particular attention since it is a party of the current conflict and understanding 
the dynamics of its emergence and existence may contribute to finding a solution to the 
problem. The PKK was established in 1978 but its first military operations emerged in 1984.668 
The PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan, who then has become “the symbol of the Kurdish 
struggle”.669 The insurgency led by the PKK has been the longest-lasting Kurdish rebellion in 
Turkey. The primary aim of the PKK was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.670 
The PKK resorted to violence to achieve its goals, and it has been responsible for many violent 
attacks targeting state officials, civilians (both Turks and Kurds) and infrastructure including 
schools, bridges and hospitals.671 The PKK is also responsible for internal displacement672 which 
has been one of the most widespread violations of human rights.673 The PKK violated both CPR 
(such as violating the right to life) and ESCR (the right to housing, the right to education etc.) of 
people including the Kurds. Since the organisation adopted terrorist tactics such as killing people 
and destroying buildings and infrastructure, it has been identified as a terrorist organisation by 
the UN, NATO and the UK.674 The financing of the PKK has been strong, yet these financial 
sources have been contentious. While the organisation asserts that it is financed by the 
contribution of its supporters and patron states, the Turkish state claims that its financial 
resources are from extortion, kidnapping, burglary, robbery and drug trafficking.675  
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When the PKK committed violent acts and adopted brutal methods in the early years of its 
foundation, the Kurdish people showed antipathy towards the organisation but the generalised 
state coercion on the Kurdish people after 1980 turned the PKK into being perceived as a 
defender of the Kurdish identity.676 The PKK operations and the state’s response exacerbated 
problems in the lives of Kurdish people. The PKK’s aim in escalating the conflict was getting more 
support from the Kurds by radicalising them.677 When the PKK initiated its military operations, 
the state established a military unit named “the village guards” in 1985 to fight with the PKK.678 
The purpose of forming the unit was “to organize those familiar with local conditions as 
auxiliaries to the armed forces in trying to confront the PKK.”679 So, the state recruited and 
armed citizens in the region to fight alongside the Turkish army against the PKK.680 Yet, the 
system led to divisions in the region as the Kurds were divided as pro-government and pro-
PKK.681 The ones who refused to be village guards are labelled as PKK-sympathisers, although 
this was not necessarily the case, and sometimes these people were displaced for this reason.682 
The Kurds who joined the Village Guards and their families have become the target of the PKK.683  
The PKK has always represented itself as the only advocate of the Kurdish people and 
monopolised the Kurdish political sphere, even though it is not possible to find out how many 
Kurds support the PKK and to what extent they approve the methods of the organisation.684 
Because of the domination of the PKK and its hostility against its rivals, only few Kurds could 
object to it outspokenly. The PKK and Ocalan have oppressed alternative movements which 
would advocate the rights and interests of the Kurds.685 The PKK adopted the same means when 
it came to its internal critics: they were suppressed ferociously, and it was made difficult to leave 
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the organisation.686 For instance, Osman Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan’s brother, and a group of high-
ranking PKK members quit the organisation and launched PWD (Partiya Welatparezen 
Demokrat) in 2004. The PWD openly criticised the PKK, and the members of the group, 
particularly the leading figures, were killed by the PKK death squads in 2004 and 2005.687 In 2014, 
some conservative Kurds in the region were targeted by the PKK as they “refused to submit to 
its leadership.”688 The elimination of its rivals damages the PKK’s claim that it legitimately 
represents the Kurdish interests. 
2.2. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) period in the Kurdish Question 
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in Turkish) era deserves a more 
detailed explanation since the governing party adopted a non-conventional approach towards 
the Kurdish Question and conducted a peace process to solve the issue. Despite its deficits, the 
JDP government took important steps to redress both CPR and ESCR violations (including the 
right to education, the right to housing and the right to health) in the Kurdish Question which 
will be explored in this section. Contrary to the traditional approach, the JDP adopted a more 
liberal approach to the Kurdish Question when it was elected in 2002. The government has 
handled the Kurdish Question seriously and seemed determined to tackle the problem.689 Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, the founder and the leader of the JDP, stated that the Turkish state had made 
severe mistakes in dealing with the Kurdish Question and claimed that it should be resolved by 
democratic means.690 Although the Turkish state has had meetings with the PKK and Ocalan 
since the 1990s, the officials had never acknowledged these meetings. In 2012, Erdogan 
acknowledged these meetings for the first time in history.691  
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Turkey’s candidacy for the EU also had an important impact on the reforms introduced in Turkey 
under the JDP rule.692 When the JDP came to power, it attempted to enhance human rights and 
democracy and bring more pluralism to the country.693 The EU imposed numerous conditions 
for Turkey’s accession process including improving human rights and rule of law, tackling the 
Kurdish Question, solving the problems of internally displaced persons and respecting minority 
rights.694 The JDP’s agenda and the requirements for the EU accession process corresponded to 
each other. Thereby, in 2003 and 2004, the JDP adopted five important harmonisation packages 
which eased the oppression of the Kurdish culture and language and opened a space for the 
government to take further steps to tackle the Kurdish Question.695  
The JDP government introduced many reforms such as lifting the bans on the usage of the 
Kurdish language by establishing Kurdish language departments at universities, providing 
Kurdish language classes as an elective course in schools and founding a Kurdish TV channel.696 
The publications in Kurdish increased after 2002.697 These reforms could be considered 
important steps to realise ESCR of the Kurdish people.698 Yet, although reforms have been 
introduced to alleviate the oppression of the Kurds, they did not entirely tackle the problems of 
the Kurdish people.699 Their language rights, cultural rights as well as other human rights are not 
fully protected by the state; for instance, they cannot have education in their mother tongue 
and there are restrictions on their freedom of expression and their right to take part in cultural 
life.700 Still, coupled with the reforms, there were considerable improvements in general in terms 
of human rights when the JDP first came to power. The number of human rights violations 
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decreased significantly after 2003.701 Akturk noted that the JDP’s approach “constituted a radical 
break with previous state policies” despite its shortcomings.702 
There were also some improvements in the region’s economy and in the Kurdish citizens’ lives 
as the private sector was promoted to invest in the region703 and the JDP “has promoted the 
building of private hospitals, supported small and medium-sized businesses, and developed 
agriculture beyond subsistence levels.”704 The government also made significant investment in 
education in the region.705 These improvements should be considered as significant steps to 
protect and promote socioeconomic rights of the Kurdish people. Creating jobs and improving 
health and education services improved the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights (the right to an 
adequate standard of living, the right to education, the right to work and the right to health) of 
the people in the region.  
Although democratic reforms were being introduced in Turkey, the PKK decided to resort to 
violence again by breaking its unilateral ceasefire (which was declared in 1999) in June 2004, 
blaming the military operations conducted by the Turkish security forces.706 Two other 
ceasefires were declared in 2005 and 2006. Yet, they were not long-lasting. The first one was 
broken by the Turkish army, the second one was broken by the PKK.707 In 2009, another ceasefire 
was declared by the PKK, and the government and the PKK commenced negotiations for the 
peace process in Oslo.708 The JDP government initiated a “Democratic Opening” to solve the 
Kurdish Question by democratic reforms, yet the government faced veto from the main political 
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parties in the parliament, and this rejection and multiple other reasons prevented the initiative 
from being developed.709  
Unfortunately, the ceasefire was broken once again by the PKK, and the conflict and violence 
escalated dramatically in 2012.710 In 2013, the PKK declared a new ceasefire and both the 
government and Ocalan announced that the peace process was launched.711 Yet, the peace 
process lost its momentum gradually because both sides had difficulties in trusting each other 
and they were not ready to compromise enough to achieve peace.712 After June elections in 
2015 several pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi) municipalities 
announced self-governance and rejected working with the central government.713 Breaking the 
ceasefire, the PKK and its youth branches decided to bring the armed conflict into city centres 
as they dug ditches and set up entrenchments and barricades in the Kurdish provinces’ 
streets.714 Yanmis conducted a study in the region (with both opinion leaders and ordinary 
citizens) which depicts that a majority of the people (67.6%) disapproved of the barricades and 
entrenchments.715 A greater majority (88.2%) think that both the PKK’s barricade activities and 
the state’s counter operations are harmful.716 It was noted that “the chaos resulted in the deaths 
of 50 individuals, the widescale trashing and burning of government buildings, and the looting 
of stores and business.”717 The government responded by taking military actions in these 
provinces. Because of these problems, the peace process was halted, and clashes have been 
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taking place since July 2015.718 The state discourse has transformed back to a security/terror 
one regarding Kurdish Question after the escalation of violence since 2015.719  
It was noted that the demands of the Kurds have changed since the 2000s as they demand 
autonomy in the Kurdish region, rather than an independent state, and they want their identity 
to be recognised and respected.720 Yet, Ozkirimli remarks that the demands of the Kurds are 
countered by Turkish nationalism as they mutually consolidate each other (when the Kurdish 
claims increase, the Turkish nationalism increases too) and this resulted in a stalemate in the 
country.721 On the other hand, Islam has been a critical element in the JDP’s Kurdish policy as 
the government considered it a “cement” to end the conflict because Islam could have a unifying 
function in the society as it did during the Ottoman Empire.722 It has been argued that the Islamic 
approach (to overcome Kurdish nationalism and insurgency by promoting Islam) cannot tackle 
the Kurdish Question exclusively, yet it has a potential to contribute to the solution as Islam 
promotes multi-culturalism.723 There are several studies on the relationship between religion 
and ethnic-nationalism regarding the Kurdish Question, yet, the results contrast with each other. 
While some claim that religion has a positive impact on ethno-nationalism, others assert the 
opposite.724  
2.3. Economic marginalisation of the Kurdish region  
As stated earlier, the Turkish state denied the ethno-political dimension of the Kurdish Question 
and often considered it from a developmental perspective claiming that the Kurdish unrest was 
rooted in the under-development of the region. Although this was not the case, it does not mean 
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that under-development and socioeconomic problems have no significance in the Kurdish 
Question. The Kurdish Question is multidimensional and socioeconomic problems are among 
the root causes of the problem.725 The previous chapters emphasised the importance of 
understanding the root causes of unrest to solve the conflict. It was noted that: “In 
understanding conflict, it is imperative to examine the sources of discontent and animosity.”726 
Therefore, exploring the socioeconomic roots of the Kurdish Question is critical to finding a full-
fledged and sustainable solution.  
Although the region has large mineral deposits (chrome, iron, copper, oil etc.) and there is a 
mining industry which is run by the state,727 the region’s economy has lagged behind the Turkish 
economy since the foundation of the Republic.728 Geography and socioeconomic dynamics also 
played a role in the region’s economy. The Kurds have often inhabited the isolated areas, and 
they have adopted an agrarian lifestyle.729 The region is rugged and mountainous, and it is far 
from trade centres such as Istanbul and Izmir.730 Due to its mountainous nature, the land in the 
Kurdish region was not very productive for farming, and the agriculture was mainly at 
subsistence level.731 In addition, the agricultural lands have been dominated by large (Kurdish) 
land owners since the 16th century. So, the peasants did not own the land most of the time and 
they sold their labour to the landlords through sharecropping or renting.732 These unfavourable 
circumstances culminated in gaps between the region and the rest of the country in terms of 
socioeconomic conditions. Ensaroglu and Kurban state that the region has been rife with poverty 
and deprivation due to “discriminatory economic policies adopted since the founding of the 
Republic, an ongoing armed conflict lasting more than 20 years, forced migration, and the 
problem in Northern Iraq”.733 
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Kurds inhabited in the poorest and least developed parts of the countries they live in734 and their 
main source of income has been agriculture and livestock.735 The Kurdish region in Turkey has 
hardly been connected to the rest of the country.736 There were no railways until the late 1930s 
and no highways until the 1950s in the Kurdish region. Even then, few railways and highways 
were built for the benefit of the state such as linking large cities which had military bases.737 
Turkey’s modernisation project created regional differences in terms of economy, education, 
urbanisation and communication in the new Republic.738 For instance, Kendal states: “In 1946, 
out of the 43,263 companies, factories and workshops registered under Turkish labour 
legislation, only 2,427 were in Kurdistan, representing 5.6% of the total.”739 Unfortunately, these 
discrepancies among the regions continue to exist and they affect the enjoyment of ESCR of 
people in the Kurdish region as will be shown in detail below. In 2011, the CESCR also highlighted 
these disparities in its concluding observations regarding Turkey and recommended that the 
state must enhance the conditions in disadvantaged regions to ensure that everyone enjoys 
their ESCR fully.740 
After the foundation of the new Republic, the Turkish economy was integrated into the world 
economy and commenced its own industrialisation process.741 The railways were built but they 
were not distributed evenly; the railways and industrialisation activities were concentrated on 
western part of the country where establishing trade networks was more convenient.742 
Moreover, due to the rebellions, the state “established a tight military control in the Kurdish 
regions which included the imposition of a special administrative system as well as its economic, 
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political, and cultural isolation from the rest of the country.”743 These policies raised the question 
of whether the marginalisation of the Kurdish region was deliberate or not. Some scholars think 
this was intentional as they claim that governments avoided investing there, and the region was 
impoverished and internally colonised by the state through extracting raw materials.744 Kirisci 
and Winrow, on the other hand, assert that the low-level of development in the Kurdish region 
was not the result of an intentional policy of the state because the Black Sea region (which does 
not have a considerable Kurdish population) is also under-developed compared to western 
regions. Moreover, they depict that the state allocated a higher proportion of public spending 
and public investment expenditures to the Kurdish region compared to the other regions. 
However, they acknowledged that this spending and investment could not enhance the 
socioeconomic conditions in the region due to several factors such as lack of private investment 
and conflicts in the region.745 Heper also noted that governments intended to achieve 
development in the region as they considered this as a solution to the Kurdish Question since 
1933.746 Although unravelling the truth is important, it should be acknowledged that whether or 
not these policies were deliberate “economic backwardness has hampered eastern Turkey’s 
integration into the rest of the country”747 and “Kurds live in an environment of insecurity both 
materially and non-materially.”748 
As mentioned previously, the Democrat Party adopted a liberal economic approach and the 
country experienced various developments. The Kurdish region also benefited from this 
liberalisation to some extent as the government has built roads, hospitals and schools in the 
region.749 Yet as noted earlier, this did not eliminate the regional disparities. The people in the 
region were maintaining their lives by subsistence level farming but when the mechanisation of 
agriculture started in the 1950s, they started losing their jobs.750 Many people left the region 
and moved to urban centres in search of jobs.751 The Democrat Party and following governments 
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were concerned with the under-development of the region and designed economic programs 
and made investments to achieve development in the region but they were not successful.752 
The Southeast Anatolia Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, GAP), which was initiated in 1975, 
has been the most prominent development project which was designed for the region. Although 
the project aimed at achieving development and improving people’s lives through energy 
production, agriculture, irrigation, education and infrastructure, the state also considered it as 
a tool to tackle the Kurdish Question.753 The state assumed that the GAP would help to alleviate 
the tensions in the region but it failed to understand that the Kurdish Question was not merely 
a socioeconomic and under-development issue, therefore, the political dimension of the issue 
cannot be tackled through such efforts.754 Anyhow, the project received criticisms regarding its 
beneficiaries and environmental impact, and it also caused the displacement of many Kurds.755 
Like other economic programs and projects, the GAP was far from being successful in improving 
the lives of the Kurds.756   
It is important to realise that the initial disadvantaged conditions of the Kurdish region also 
affected the region’s development process. The lack of infrastructure, low-level of 
industrialisation and political turmoil also aggravated the development because the region could 
not attract enterprise and capital.757 The prevailing poverty in the region has led to further 
unemployment and deprivation. This marginalisation in the economy and society has been 
                                                          
752 Mousseau, An inquiry into the linkage, p.57.; Sarigil and Fazlioglu, Exploring the roots, p.439.; Bilgel, F. 
and Karahasan, B. C. (2017) The Economic Costs of Separatist Terrorism in Turkey, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.61, No.2, p.473.; Aydinli, E. (2002) Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's 
Struggle with the PKK, Security Dialogue, Vol.33, No.2, p.218.; Yildirim, J. and Ocal, N. (2013) Analysing 
the Determinants of Terrorism in Turkey Using Geographically Weighted Regression, Defence and Peace 
Economics, Vol.24, No.3, p.206. 
753 Jongerden, J. (2010) Dams and Politics in Turkey: Utilizing Water, Developing Conflict, Middle East 
Policy, Vol.17, No.1, pp.138-140.; Derin‐Gure, Separatist Terrorism and the Economic Conditions, p.393.; 
Mousseau, An inquiry into the linkage, p.57.; Robins, The Overlord State, p.663.; Unver, Turkey's Kurdish 
question, p.116. 
754 Jongerden, Dams and Politics in Turkey, pp.140-141.; Phillips and Kouchner, The Kurdish spring, p.61.; 
Kirisci, K. (1998) ‘Turkey, Regional Profile Europe’ in Hampton, J. (ed) Internally Displaced People: A Global 
Survey, London: Earthscan Publications, p.199. 
755 Robins, The Overlord State, p.664.; Haddad, The Kurds in Turkey, p.94.; White, Economic 
marginalization of Turkey's Kurds, pp.150-151.; White, Primitive Rebels, pp.110-112.; Yadirgi, The Political 
Economy of the Kurds of Turkey, pp.254-258. 
756 White, Economic marginalization of Turkey's Kurds, pp.150-151.; Yildiz, K., Bernu, R. and Stevenson, J. 
(2010) The Situation of Kurdish Children in Turkey: Fact-finding Mission and Research Report, London: 
Kurdish Human Rights Project, p.23.; Cabuk, N. (2003) Güney Doğu Anadolu'da Yoksulluğun Sosyal 
Göstergeleri, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.43, No.2, pp.41-65. 
757 White, Economic marginalization of Turkey's Kurds, p.148.; Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, pp.19-
20.; Kendal, Kurdistan in Turkey, p.44.; Kirisci, K. (1996) Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern 
Iraq, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.3, p.28. 
114 
 
exacerbated since the 1980s because of the conflicts.758 Bilgel and Karahasan conducted a study 
to investigate the effects of the conflict on GDP, and their “findings suggest that in the post-
terrorism period extending until 2001, the real GDP declined on average by 6.6 percent relative 
to a synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia without terrorism.”759 Moreover, the state 
implemented the state of emergency in the Kurdish region due to the conflicts for 15 years. 
Kayaoglu depicts that the state of emergency ruling had a serious negative impact on 
development, employment and education investments.760 Therefore, let alone ending the 
conflict, Kayaoglu remarked that the state of emergency exacerbated the insurgency due to the 
aggravation of the socioeconomic conditions of the region. Many people whose lives were 
impacted by the emergency rule (as in forced displacement) began to side with the PKK.761 These 
negative circumstances in the region had a huge impact on people’s enjoyment of their 
socioeconomic rights including the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living and 
the right to education.  
Indeed, forced migration had a negative impact on the economy for various reasons. Kirisci 
explains that the IDPs had to sell off their livestock to move from their villages. The region lost 
revenue from tourism as the sector nearly vanished due to the conflict. Moreover, 
unemployment levels were exacerbated as many capital owners shut their businesses and left 
the region for western Turkey.762 Agriculture and livestock were the main sources of income, 
and both activities were seriously damaged due to forced displacement.763 These negative 
impacts must be considered as a violation of the right to work and the right to an adequate 
standard of living as people lost their livelihoods. Moreover, only a limited number of the 
Kurdish IDPs received assistance from the state, which was inadequate as it was limited to food 
and some materials for simple housing, whereas many others were left without any 
assistance.764 This is a violation of the right to humanitarian assistance which is defined in the 
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Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.765 The state was required to provide humanitarian 
assistance to people who were forcibly displaced.  
2.4. Relative deprivation of the Kurds 
Regional differences in development are often interpreted as discrimination by the Kurdish 
people and paved the way for nationalist movements.766 It must be noted that the elimination 
of discrimination in enjoying ESCR is an immediate obligation of states according to the 
ICESCR.767 Non-discrimination is an important principle in enjoying human rights and it is also 
identified in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.768 Analysing the discrimination 
issue is critical in the Kurdish Question because this perception both leads to unrest among some 
people and it is a violation of the ICESCR which needs to be dealt with. 
Some scholars claim that the Kurdish Question can be related to relative deprivation theory.769 
The relative deprivation theory suggests that “as the perceived discrepancy or gap between the 
‘ought’ and the ‘is’ increases, the intensity of discontent also increases”770 and this discontent 
may lead to peaceful or violent protests and rebellions.771 It is explained that when economic 
inequalities intersect with ethnic lines and suppression of ethnic identities, this may pave the 
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way for ethnic mobilisation and aggression.772 Yet, socioeconomic and structural inequalities 
alone do not lead to ethnic conflict, there are other catalysts.773 
It was noted that the perception of deprivation does not always reflect the reality. However, 
even though the perceptions are subjective, they might produce discontent and frustration 
which are often driving forces for ethnic and political mobilisation.774 For instance, members of 
an ethnic minority may believe that they are left underdeveloped by the state because of their 
ethnicity. In reality, their perception might be false because their deprivation may rise from 
some other reasons rather than the state’s deliberate policies. Yet, this does not necessarily 
change their perception. Moreover, Derin-Gure claims that “it is not the absolute economic 
conditions in south-eastern Turkey but it is the economic conditions in the area relative to the 
rest of the country that matters in terms of separatist terrorism.”775 This approach also suggests 
that the perception of “relative deprivation” might be more important than the reality of 
socioeconomic conditions regarding ethno-nationalist mobilisation. 
Sarigil and Fazlioglu’s study, which is based on a survey which was conducted by a public opinion 
research company with 6516 respondents, suggests that 47% of the Kurds in Turkey believe that 
Kurds are discriminated against by the state.776 Another study which was conducted by Wise 
Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM, Turkish acronym) in 2009 depicts that 51% of Kurds 
believe that there is discrimination against them.777 It was pointed out that the eastern part of 
the country has always been poorer than the rest due to its remoteness and rugged nature. The 
Turks who reside in the northeast Turkey are also poor like the Kurds in the southeast, but they 
did not interpret this relative deprivation as an ethnic one.778 According to Sarigil and Fazlioglu’s 
study “the perception of discrimination is one of the strongest and most consistent 
determinants of ethno-nationalist orientation among Kurds.”779 Their study suggests that 
socioeconomic improvements and growth alone may not suppress ethno-nationalist tensions.780 
Income level does not always have a significant impact on supporting ethno-political 
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nationalism. For instance, Quebec in Canada and the Basque Country in Spain are economically 
advanced regions. Yet there are still ethno-political tensions. Therefore, ethno-nationalist 
tensions and conflicts cannot be tackled without addressing political aspirations.781 It must be 
noted that almost half of the Kurds perceive that they are being discriminated against and even 
though this perception might be subjective, the state needs to address this perception and look 
for the ways in which this perception can be eliminated.782 Even though the Kurdish Question is 
not only a socioeconomic problem and it includes political and cultural demands, the state needs 
to tackle socioeconomic problems to have a full-fledged solution.783 As Ensaroglu and Kurban 
noted, even though the Kurdish Question is political, it damaged the social sphere most.784 
Therefore, to tackle the Kurdish Question successfully and sustainably, the economic and social 
demands of the Kurds must be recognised as well as civil and political demands.785  
Socioeconomic injustices become more critical regarding the Kurdish youth. Numerous scholars 
pointed out that young Kurds who are frustrated with socioeconomic inequalities and 
unemployment are more prone to radical forms of ethno-nationalism and joining the PKK.786 
This is also linked to the argument about the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
ethno-nationalism. While some scholars assert that people with higher socioeconomic status 
are less likely to support ethno-nationalist movements, others claim the opposite or assert that 
there is no link between them.787 The state also assumed that there was a negative relationship 
between socioeconomic status and ethno-nationalism and wanted to prevent people from 
supporting the PKK by promoting economic development in the region; it was believed that the 
Kurdish people, particularly the youth, could be de-radicalised.788 Although it is difficult to reach 
a conclusive decision on this issue, there is merit in tackling the socioeconomic problems in the 
                                                          
781 Sarigil and Fazlioglu, Exploring the roots, pp.449-450. 
782 Gurses, Partition, Democracy, p.345. 
783 Yavuz, Five stages of the construction, p.20. 
784 Ensaroglu and Kurban, A Roadmap for a Solution, p.29. 
785 Yildiz, Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict: Pathways to Progress, p.170.; Gurses, Partition, Democracy, p.345. 
786 Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.126.; Sarigil and Fazlioglu, Exploring the roots,  
p.448.; Yavuz, Five stages of the construction, pp.11-12.; Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 
pp.88-89; Bilgel and Karahasan, The Economic Costs of Separatist Terrorism, p.462.; Mousseau, An inquiry 
into the linkage, p.56.; Villellas, A. (2011) Turkey and The Kurdish Question: Reflecting on Peace Building, 
Report by Escola de Cultura de Pau, Agencia Catalana de Cooperacio al Desenvolupament, p.11.; Abbas 
and Yigit, Perspectives on Ethno-National Conflict, pp.303-304.; Celik et al., Towards A Resolution, pp.35-
36.; Yanmis, Resurgence of the Kurdish Conflict, p.26. 
787 Sarigil, Curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism, p.545.; Aydinli, Between Security and Liberalization, p.218.; 
Ekmekci, Understanding Kurdish ethno-nationalism, p.1614.; Derin-Gure, Separatist Terrorism and the 
Economic Conditions, pp.396-405.; Yildirim and Ocal, Analysing the Determinants of Terrorism, pp.195-
209.; BILGESAM, Güneydoğu Sorununun Sosyolojik Analizi, p.96. 
788 Phillips and Kouchner, The Kurdish spring, pp.60-61.; Derin-Gure, Separatist Terrorism and the 
Economic Conditions, pp.394-405. 
118 
 
region. Eliminating discrepancies in the enjoyment of ESCR can contribute to preventing the 
Kurdish youth from adopting radical forms of ethno-nationalism. Yet it must be kept in mind 
that there are many factors and reasons for joining the PKK789 and addressing socioeconomic 
problems alone cannot tackle the Kurdish Question and prevent people from joining the PKK.790 
3. The human rights abuses and the significance of ESCR violations 
The PKK-led conflict has been going on for more than 30 years and myriad human rights 
violations have been committed during this period.791 It is noted that “[t]he real physical and 
human cost of the insurrection has fallen disproportionately on the residents of the 
southeast.”792 Belge states that activists, family members of the PKK militants, lawyers, party 
officials, journalists and ordinary people were detained and beaten for participating in protests 
and demonstrations, joining human rights organisations and pro-Kurdish political parties and 
writing for pro-Kurdish newspapers.793 There have been serious human rights violations against 
Kurdish people including enforced disappearances, deaths in detention, burning villages and 
forcibly evacuating residents during the 1990s.794 These gross human rights violations were 
committed when the state commenced its counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK’s 
violent campaign.795 The civilian casualties were less than battle deaths (about 5000 civilian 
deaths compared to 35,000 battle deaths).796 Much of the Kurdish population was governed by 
an emergency rule with extraordinary powers between 1987 and 2002.797 Belge stated that 
“[w]ithout emergency rule, the widespread use of coercive practices such as torture, 
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extrajudicial killings, unidentified murders, disappearances, and village burnings and 
evacuations would not have been possible.”798  
There are different figures about the disappearances, unidentified murders and extrajudicial 
killings during the conflict. In 2013, the Human Rights Inquiry Committee of the Turkish 
Parliament prepared a comprehensive report on the violations of the right to life during the 
conflict between the state and the PKK.799 The report states that 2872 unidentified murders, 
1945 extrajudicial killings, 1147 deaths in detention and 940 enforced disappearances took place 
between 1980 and 2011 based on the data of the Human Rights Association and Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey.800 The village guard system also led to some human rights abuses and 
causes unrest in the society, with some village guards also involved in crimes.801 For instance, 
one study reveals that some people were forced to displace because of the pressure of village 
guards.802 Likewise, one of the reasons that prevents IDPs from returning their villages is village 
guards.803  
Every neighbourhood and family has been affected by the violence one way or another.804 A 
whole generation was born into the state of emergency conditions and these young people grew 
up listening to the stories of their families’ suffering in addition to their own frustration.805 These 
children suffer from serious traumas because of the conflict environment, and they need to be 
rehabilitated.806 Baser and Celik wrote: “some Kurdish intellectuals have argued that they are 
the last generation with whom the Turkish state can peacefully negotiate because the young 
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generation of today will not be as peaceful as they are.”807 The Kurdish youth is quite frustrated 
and radical as mentioned above and it is not surprising considering that they grew up in an 
environment in which human rights abuses became an everyday practice and the daily lives of 
the Kurdish people have been shaped by the war-like conditions.808  
Although the PKK criticised the state for its human rights violations, it also killed civilians, 
executed so-called collaborators and applied forced recruitment, displacement and taxation.809 
Likewise, the PKK committed wide-scale human rights abuses among its own members such as 
torture and killings.810 The PKK also put people in a position to choose a side between the state 
and itself considering the former as an “enemy”.811 Civilians were often caught between two 
fires as both sides of the conflict oppressed them.812  
3.1. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 Violations of ESCR and other socioeconomic consequences of the conflict had a huge impact on 
people’s lives in the Kurdish region. Yet, before examining ESCR violations, socioeconomic 
impacts of the Kurdish Question will be analysed to lay the foundation and understand the 
socioeconomic context. The conflict between the PKK and the state shaped public opinion in 
Turkey about the Kurdish Question.813 Numerous scholars remarked that there has been an 
increasing anti-Kurdish discourse in Turkish society due to the conflict, and ethnicity-based 
divisions have been aggravated since the mid-1990s.814 For instance, the funerals of soldiers who 
lost their lives in these conflicts led to the rise of the Turkish right and of prejudice against 
Kurds.815 In western cities, Kurds and Turks started to compete in social and economic life which 
also pushed some Turks to identify Kurds with the PKK.816 Similarly, some Turkish public servants 
and soldiers had become reluctant to serve in the Kurdish region.817 Although the Kurds demand 
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democratic autonomy and cultural rights rather than independence, the Turkish people believe 
that the PKK want an independent state, and it is not easy to change their beliefs on this.818 
Although two large-scale public opinion polls depict that Turks and Kurds are considerably 
integrated with each other socially through neighbour, professional, friendship and family 
relations,819 Cilingir depicts that there has been an “increase of the fracture between Turks and 
Kurds, particularly in terms of marriage and neighbor relations.”820 This increase is likely to be a 
result of the escalation of the conflict. 
There have been some community-level tensions between Turks and Kurds, particularly in 
western regions.821 Saracoglu claims that there had not been a considerable tension between 
the Kurds and Turks until 2000 because people did not associate the PKK with Kurds even though 
there were bloody conflicts. Yet, this has changed since the 2000s due to various factors, such 
as the migration of the Kurds to western Anatolia, and there has been an increasing anti-Kurdish 
manifestation among people, particularly in western cities, due to the identification of the Kurds 
with the PKK.822 He also asserts that this negative discourse is mainly produced by the social 
interactions of people through “superficial contacts” with Kurds rather than political and 
historical discourses.823 Karakoc, however, contradicts Saracoglu’s assertion by remarking that 
the negative sentiments against the Kurdish people are rooted in the nationalist Turkish state 
discourse which has been imposed on people through state institutions and media.824 There are 
other studies which suggest there is a considerable rise in negative sentiments against the 
Kurdish people among Turkish citizens.825  
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Linguistic rights, particularly using the Kurdish language in education, have been one of the most 
important demands of the Kurds.826 Language often has a critical role in ethnic conflicts827 and 
it is also the case for the Kurds as it is probably “the most visible and symbolic indicator of 
cultural identity.”828 Many of the demands concerning the Kurdish language such as giving 
children Kurdish names, broadcasting in Kurdish and establishing institutions to teach Kurdish 
have been solved by the JDP government.829 Yet, education in the Kurdish language has not been 
approved by the government and it continues to be a prominent argument between the state 
and the Kurds.830 
 The conflict led to numerous violations of ESCR in the region. Conflicts have demolished the 
means of living such as agriculture and stockbreeding.831 This should be considered as a violation 
of the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of living because losing their means 
of living led to poverty and unemployment for the victims. More than 3000 villages and hamlets 
were evacuated; schools and medical care centres were closed in the region which affected 
thousands of people.832 As many medical centres were closed, this negatively affected the 
enjoyment of the right to health in the region. Enrolment rates, the number of schools and 
teachers had already been relatively low compared to the other regions, and due to conflicts, 
more than a million children were left without basic education.833 It should be acknowledged 
that the enjoyment of the right to education has been negatively affected by the conflict and 
children’s right to education was violated.  Losing their means of living and being displaced in 
urban centres culminated in poverty and deprivation for the Kurdish people. Forced 
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displacement has been the most prevalent violation of human rights since the conflict has 
started.834 Moreover, forced displacement has been accompanied by other socioeconomic 
problems such as unemployment, health and education related problems etc. Therefore, forced 
displacement deserves an extended analysis.   
3.2. Forced migration  
Yukseker states that: 
Internal displacement during the 1990s has caused indelible sociological realities in 
Turkey whose effects can still be felt. These realities include urban poverty, 
deprivation of educational opportunities, participation of women and children in 
the labor force under very unfavourable conditions, lack of access to healthcare 
services, and health problems related to migration and to sudden urbanization.835   
As stated above, internal displacement’s effects range from unemployment to child labour, and 
addressing forced migration is critical to tackle socioeconomic problems in the Kurdish Question. 
Before analysing the forced migration in Turkey, it is important to briefly contextualise forced 
migration and internally displaced persons.  
IDPs have become a serious problem since the end of the Cold War.836 The worldwide figures 
increased from 1.2 million on 1982837 to 48.5 million as of May 2018.838 As mentioned in the 
introduction, IDPs lack efficient protection and they face serious human rights abuses. The 
relationship between displacement and human rights violations is multifaceted: human rights 
violations often lead to displacement; displacement itself is a violation of human rights and 
displacement enables other human rights violations to take place as it “often leaves its victims 
vulnerable to other human rights violations.”839 As IDPs are displaced within their countries’ 
borders, the international community often considers the issue as an internal problem of states 
which cannot be intervened without the consent of the states.840 This approach leaves IDPs 
unprotected because their own countries rarely take responsibility and act to solve their 
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problems considering many forced displacements take place because of ethnic conflicts and 
identity crises.841 In short, IDPs are often excluded from both national and international 
protection.842 Although problems and needs of IDPs may differ, it is often assumed by 
international organisations that IDPs have similar issues and wants.843 It is important to analyse 
the specific context and identify the problems and needs of the IDPs, and then a solution plan 
can be designed. There is a wide and still growing literature on IDPs but exploring it is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
Returning to the forced displacement in the Kurdish Question, internal displacement has been 
“one of the most sustained and widespread (and still ongoing) violations of human rights in 
Turkey.”844 The nearby cities in the south-eastern region and large cities in other regions such as 
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Mersin have become the main destinations for Kurdish 
IDPs.845 Istanbul has become a city with the biggest Kurdish population in Turkey due to 
migration.846 In 1997, an investigation commission was formed by thirteen members of the 
Turkish Parliament (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, 
TBMM), from five political parties, to inquire into the forced migration cases. The Turkish 
Parliament Investigation Commission published its report in 1998 which has been a significant 
resource on the issue since then.847 The report states that the total number of the evacuated 
villages and hamlets was 3428 as of 1997.848 There are different figures for the number of people 
who were forcibly displaced in the country. According to the TBMM report (1997), around 
378,000 people were forcedly displaced.849 Various national and international NGOs claim 
different figures from one to four million people.850 Since there is not enough specific data about 
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IDPs, it is difficult to determine the number of IDPs.851 Ayata and Yukseker state that the 
underlying reason for different figures of IDPs in Turkey is the varying definitions of IDPs. When 
the state only considers people whose villages or hamlets are forcibly evicted as IDPs, the NGOs 
also include the people who had to migrate because of insecurity, armed clashes and threats 
from different actors such as the security forces, the PKK or the village guards.852   
The TBMM commission’s report (1997) stated the reasons of forced migration in the region as: 
1) people leaving their villages because of the collapse of animal husbandry and 
agriculture − a result of the ban on the use of pastures, and because of military 
operations/armed clashes; because of pressure exercised by the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan − “PKK”) on villages in which there were 
village guards; and because of the intensification of military operations in villages 
that were regarded with suspicion by the security forces due to their refusal to 
become village guards; 2) the eviction by the PKK of certain villages and hamlets 
whose inhabitants accepted to become village guards; and 3) the eviction by 
security forces of villages whose inhabitants refused to become village guards, 
whose security could not be provided, or who were thought to aid the PKK.853 
It was noted that security forces often displaced people “to cut off logistic support to PKK 
militants.”854 Yet, it is claimed that cutting off the logistic support may not be the actual reason 
as some correlations were observed between displaced villages and their political profile such 
as voting patterns (voting for pro-Kurdish political parties) and  not-enlisting for the village guard 
system (this often was considered as allegiance with the PKK).855 Belge states that the 
evacuations took place when the Turkish army failed to restore order in the villages.856 People 
also left their homes as they were caught between the security forces and the PKK.857 It is 
explained that in some cases, people had time, although insufficient, to arrange their migration 
process as they were given notice in advance; in other cases, they were evacuated abruptly as 
their houses were destroyed or burnt. In the former, people could at least sell their assets and 
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animals even for a little money, but in the latter, they lost all their belongings.858 In many cases, 
the belongings of the IDPs were destroyed to prevent people from returning.859 Burning the 
houses is a clear violation of the right to housing, the IDPs should have been provided with 
protection, humanitarian assistance and compensation. 
Most of the time people were displaced beyond the law, and the extra-legality of the 
displacement left people without financial assistance from the state.860 The Kurdish IDPs did not 
get support from the state, they only received support from other Kurds, the Kurdish political 
party (People’s Democracy Party) and some NGOs.861 This also makes forced displacement 
different from economic migration. As explained before, there was a migration wave from the 
region to the large urban centres after the 1950s due to economic reasons.862 Unlike economic 
migration, forced migration often breaks off the social/material bonds and personal relations 
which IDPs had with their hometowns or villages.863 The Kurdish IDPs experienced these 
difficulties as most of them did not have anyone left in their places of origin to support them.864 
Lastly, after the collapse of the peace process in July 2015, armed clashes took place in the 
Kurdish cities and towns for ten months. During these clashes (in 2015 and 2016), nearly 500,000 
people were displaced in the Kurdish region and many of them still could not return to their 
homes. The government did not design “a comprehensive plan as to how the residents would 
be able to return to their homes.”865  
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3.2.a. The problems of IDPs 
Turkey has been criticised by national and international human rights organisations for failing to 
respect and protect the rights of the Kurdish IDPs by violating their right to life and property and 
failing to provide them food, shelter and medical-care.866 Many IDPs have an intense feeling of 
victimisation.867 The studies conducted on IDPs in Turkey reveal that the most critical problems 
are urban problems such as poverty, unemployment, housing, healthcare and education.868 Lack 
of language skills also have a negative impact on their lives in metropolis as they have difficulties 
in schools, hospitals etc.869 Due to the under-development and conflicts, southeastern and 
eastern regions had already been disadvantaged in terms of education, healthcare, 
infrastructure and income before the forced migration. However, these problems exacerbated 
due to the displacements of large numbers of people. These problems significantly affected their 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. This also contributes to the perception of discrimination 
among these people as there is a considerable difference among regions in terms of enjoyment 
of socioeconomic rights.  
The unexpected growth in population due to forced migration creates serious problems 
concerning infrastructure, housing, transportation and public health problems in the cities which 
receive large numbers of IDPs.870 For instance, Diyarbakir has been one of the main destinations 
for IDPs since the forced migration started. The city’s population was around 380,000 in 1991 
and it increased to approximately 800,000 in five years.871 Numerous problems have arisen from 
forced displacement such as the increasing infant mortality rates and infectious diseases, the 
shortage of classrooms and healthcare facilities, and the inadequacy of piped water and sewage 
systems.872 This is not to say that these problems did not exist before the forced migration. Yet, 
the waves of IDPs deteriorated the situation in urban centres. Since the IDPs did not have the 
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means to find formal housing, they often built or rented gecekondus which often produce slums 
and “marginalized spaces”.873  
Most of the Kurdish IDPs’ livelihoods depended on farming and livestock breeding before 
displacement. As they could not continue these activities in the urban centres, they have 
become unskilled labour after displacement.874 They had few socioeconomic assets such as 
social and financial capital; they arrived in their destination cities with poor education and, 
sometimes, lack of language skills.875 A majority of these migrants were already extremely 
impoverished, and when they fled from their homes, they often arrived in these cities without 
means to survive.876 The IDPs incurred financial losses because they had to abandon their means 
of livelihood such as livestock and land.877 Therefore, the Kurdish IDPs live in poor socioeconomic 
circumstances and they often suffer from poverty and unemployment.878 There is also an 
“extremely wide socio-economic gap between migrants from Eastern Anatolia and the rest of 
the city population.”879 It is well-documented that there is a significant link between forced 
displacement and poverty.880 These socioeconomic problems are closely linked to ESCR 
violations as well as the underdevelopment of the region since the foundation of the republic. 
The violations of the right to housing, the right to work, and the right to an adequate standard 
of living exacerbated the initial socioeconomic problems in the region.  
 Forced migration has a serious impact on children.881 Since IDPs suffer from poverty and 
unemployment, children of the IDPs often drop out of their schools to work and support their 
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families.882 Moreover, several studies, which were conducted in various Turkish cities which 
received great numbers of Kurdish IDPs, depict that there is a considerable connection between 
children working on the street and forced migration.883 There is also a link between 
impoverished IDP children and crimes.884  
Forced displacement has negative impacts on public health, physical health and mental health, 
and leads to many health problems for IDPs. IDPs’ access to healthcare and the quality of 
healthcare deteriorated after the forced migration.885 The IDPs suffer from unhealthy housing 
conditions, malnutrition/insufficient nutrition, lack of insurance and inability to access 
healthcare because of economic difficulties arising from forced displacement.886 The 
deterioration in the health services can be identified as discrimination, as the state is obliged to 
avoid discriminatory practices in the realisation of ESCR (the right to health in this case). 
Moreover, various studies were conducted to inquire into the psychological consequences of 
the forced migration on IDPs. The findings show that many of the IDPs suffer from different 
mental health problems such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder and 
somatisation.887 They do not experience only forced migration, many of the IDPs are also victims 
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Toplumsal Sonuçları” (Internal Displacement: Psychological and Social Consequences), Anadolu Psikiyatri 
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of gross human rights violations.888 Therefore, in addition to physical healthcare services, IDPs 
also need mental health services to overcome their psychological problems.889  
Due to conflict, a great number of Kurds had to migrate to the cities in western Anatolia where 
they have been marginalised and socially excluded, and this added a new dimension to the 
Kurdish Question.890 As mentioned earlier, the public has had very limited information about the 
dynamics of the conflict due to the censorship in the media, and the state has long adopted a 
security and terror discourse to describe the Kurdish Question. Therefore, the majority of the 
Turkish population considered the Kurdish Question exclusively as a terror issue and they often 
identified all the Kurdish people with the PKK postulating that the organisation represents all 
the Kurds.891 The Kurdish IDPs are often frustrated with the marginalisation and exclusion, 
therefore, according to a study, which was conducted in Izmir with both Turkish and Kurdish 
people, it was observed that the Kurdish migrants tended to distance themselves from the PKK 
when it broke the ceasefire, and sought acceptance and inclusion from Turks.892 The behaviour 
of the Kurdish IDPs is understandable considering the increasing anti-Kurdish sentiment among 
people. 
Numerous scholars depicted that the Kurdish women IDPs’ experience is different than men’s 
as they are often more marginalised and excluded than men.893 Many Kurdish IDP women did 
not even have basic education and they suffer from lacking language skills in Istanbul and other 
cities.894 Kurdish girls have a more disadvantaged situation compared to Kurdish boys in 
education as there are various reasons which prevent Kurdish girls from attending school such 
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as traditional boundaries, poverty and poor educational facilities.895 Unlike women, men often 
have a greater chance for education, which is taught in Turkish, and they also have an 
opportunity to learn Turkish during their obligatory military service.896 Women had limited 
opportunities for establishing social relations as they were often restricted by the traditions and 
their families, particularly men in the families.897 It is also noted that the negligence and the lack 
of empathy of the Turks towards the sufferings of the Kurdish IDPs also negatively affect the 
relationship between the two groups.898 Domestic violence has always been an issue in both 
Turkish and Kurdish societies, yet the conflict has exacerbated the situation as conflict damaged 
family and social structures.899 Therefore, many IDPs miss home as they had a community and a 
traditional lifestyle that they enjoyed.900 
3.2.b. The Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP) and the Compensation Law 
The Turkish state has implemented various policies to address the problems arising from forced 
migration. The RVRP was launched in 1994 to address the problems of displaced people due to 
natural disasters and development projects as part of the GAP.901 In 1998, the government 
initiated a new RVRP as the previous one (adopted in 1994) had limitations regarding its scope 
and funding.902 The RVRP (1998)’s aims are: 
resettling those who wish to return to the vicinity of their own villages or in other 
available areas; building the necessary social and economic infrastructure, and 
facilitating sustainable living conditions in these areas; rebuilding and reviving the 
disrupted rural life; developing a more balanced settlement plan in rural areas; 
providing a more rational distribution of government investments and services; and 
supporting the development of “central villages”903  
Within the scope of the RVRP the state provided IDPs in-kind aid such as farm animals and 
construction material to rebuild/repair their houses.904 In addition, the state constructed 
infrastructure in some villages, provided piped water and repaired the roads for various villages 
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and hamlets.905 In some cases, such as in Kulp district of Diyarbakir, the state built and delivered 
houses to IDPs to compensate their destroyed houses.906 The state also allocated some 
resources of the Social Aid and Solidarity Foundation (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 
SYDV) to IDPs as a part of the RVRP. Although these efforts can be considered as redressing the 
violations of ESCR, their scope was limited. It is noted that these aids were inadequate and only 
limited people could access these aids from the RVRP and the SYDV.907 The RVRP has also been 
criticised for its poor implementation process as there have been problems regarding clarity, 
transparency and efficiency.908 In most cases, IDPs had to survive by themselves without the 
assistance or aid of the state.909  
The JDP government initiated various projects to gather data on internal displacement.910 This 
could be considered as a positive approach to tackle the problems arising from forced migration 
as analysing the problem and exploring the root causes are critical to producing a solution. The 
JDP government implemented several policies to improve health, education and transportation 
in the Kurdish region and the results were considered as promising.911 For instance, successful 
programs include “free healthcare for the poor (the ‘Green Card’), income transfers to families 
who keep their children in school, income transfers to farmers, monetary and in-kind aid to 
needy families and the campaign to enroll school-age girls in primary education.”912 These have 
been important steps to realise ESCR of the Kurdish people and to eliminate discrepancies in the 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights among the regions (and eliminate the perception of 
discrimination). 
In 2004, the JDP government enacted the Compensation Law to address the problems of the IDP 
and this law has been considered as the most important and concrete step that has ever been 
taken for IDPs.913 The law is designed to compensate the material losses which resulted from 
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the terrorism or the fight against terrorism since 1987.914 According to the preamble of the law, 
Turkey’s EU candidacy and the cases of Kurdish IDPs taken to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) motivated the government to enact the law.915 The law does not hold state 
officials responsible for their unlawful acts which inflicted damages regarding forced 
migration.916 Three types of losses are going to be compensated according to the law: damage 
to moveable or immoveable property, damage to the life and body of the person, and damage 
sustained due to inability to access one’s property.917 Psychological damages are excluded since 
the law addresses only monetary losses.918 The law was criticised for failing to deliver justice on 
various grounds such as difficulties in its application and decision process (unrealistic demands 
regarding evidence and delays in the process), arbitrariness in the calculations and the lack of 
independence of the commissions.919 Although there have been deficits, the law should be 
considered as an important attempt to redress ESCR violations rising from forced displacement. 
However, the law does not consider forced migration in the context socioeconomic rights and 
does not mention ESCR violations.920 The law should have acknowledged that forced migration 
causes ESCR violations, and the compensation of losses should have been identified as 
redressing these violations. By this way, the IDPs could base their claims on rights violations 
which would provide them a strong argument. 
It must be noted that some IDPs may not want to return to their places of origin for various 
reasons, and the government needs to formulate policies for them as well.921 Integration plays 
an important role as the IDPs, who are more integrated into the society by finding jobs and 
mastering the Turkish language, are less prone to return.922 Studies show that older IDPs are 
more willing to return to their homelands whereas younger generations are more eager to stay 
as they often see better opportunities in cities in terms of employment, education, health and 
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living standards.923 There are several reasons which prevent the Kurdish IDPs from returning to 
their homes including socioeconomic problems, landmines, security, village guards and poor 
living conditions in the region.924 Celik points out that the state must provide assistance to the 
internally displaced Kurds since their quality of life declined drastically because of the forced 
migration.925 These problems need to be tackled to encourage the IDPs to return. For instance, 
the lands and properties of the IDPs must be returned or compensated.926 The public services 
such as health and education, and physical conditions in the evacuated villages such as roads 
and infrastructure must be improved.927 The government needs to address their problems and 
assist those who want to return. 
4. Conclusion 
Solving the Kurdish Question is critical for Turkey not only for the Kurdish people, but also for 
the country as a democratic solution could enhance the country’s human rights record, help to 
eliminate regional disparities and achieve sustainable development.928 The counterterrorism 
campaign against the PKK had a serious negative impact on the economy since the 1990s.929 
There are various estimates about the cost of war ranging from 7 to 15 billion dollars annual 
spending between 1984 and 1999.930 It is claimed that one third of the annual budget of the 
government went to the fight with the PKK in the 1990s.931 Moreover, terrorism negatively 
affects economic activities and growth, particularly in the Kurdish region.932 Historically, there 
have been socioeconomic disparities among the regions, but the conflict has exacerbated these 
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inequalities for the Kurds in terms of poverty, education, health and unemployment.933 
Elimination of these inequalities are critical to have a full-fledged solution to the Kurdish 
Question. 
Important steps have been taken to solve the Kurdish Question such as alleviating the ban on 
the Kurdish language, introducing some mechanisms to address the problems of the IDPs, and 
other reforms through democratisation initiatives.934 Yet, these are not adequate to tackle the 
Kurdish Question. Therefore, transitional justice mechanisms could play an important role 
through exploring the wide range of problems and their root causes in the Kurdish Question and 
designing appropriate mechanisms to find a full-fledged solution. It must be reemphasised that 
socioeconomic issues have had a critical role in the Kurdish Question. So, redressing ESCR 
violations and realising ESCR fully could make a huge contribution to tackling the Kurdish 
Question. The next chapter will look at transitional justice processes of Peru and East Timor to 
explore the points to take into consideration to design the most suitable and efficient 
transitional justice mechanisms. Then, the last chapter will attempt to find the most appropriate 
transitional justice mechanisms to be adopted in the context of the Kurdish Question. 
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Chapter 4: Comparisons: East Timor and Peru 
1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to contribute to the overall thesis by analysing the transitional justice 
experiences of East Timor and Peru. It does so by exploring their transitional processes and 
determining what worked and what did not work in these countries in addressing past human 
rights violations and particularly ESCR violations. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
part addresses East Timor’s transitional justice process by explaining the historical background, 
analysing transitional justice mechanisms implemented in East Timor and Indonesia, and 
showing the significance of socioeconomic dimension of the process. The second part addresses 
Peru’s transitional justice process and it does so by giving the historical background of the 
conflict, exploring the transitional justice mechanisms adopted in Peru and depicting the 
significance of socioeconomic dimension of the process. The experiences of these two countries 
remark the importance of carefully designing and implementing transitional justice mechanisms 
to respond to the needs and demands of victims and affected populations. Moreover, both 
countries’ examples show that addressing violations of ESCR, structural violence and root causes 
of the conflict is critical for a successful transition.   
2. East Timor 
East Timor had suffered from a conflict and an occupation for 25 years between 1974 and 1999. 
Prior to that East Timor had been a colony of the Portuguese for hundreds of years. The war 
affected the entire population and had egregious effects on people. To deal with the past, the 
country has gone through a transitional justice process through several transitional justice 
mechanisms including truth commissions, trials and reparations. A truth commission was 
established to address this painful past, and the commission published a final report to show 
what had happened during the conflict. The final report’s findings are of critical importance as 
they unearth the truth about the past. This section is going to give a historical background of the 
conflict, then going to describe the transitional justice process and its mechanisms, and the last 
part is going to depict the significance of the socioeconomic dimension of the conflict. 
2.1. Historical background 
Until 1974, East Timor had been under Portuguese colonial rule for almost five hundred years. 
After the withdrawal of Portuguese colonial administration in 1974, several political groups were 
formed in the country. Two prominent ones were the Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor (Portuguese acronym FRETILIN) and the Timorese Democratic Union (Portuguese 
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acronym UDT), and both aimed at the independence of East Timor.935 In August 1975, a brief 
civil war broke out when the UDT commenced an armed struggle to control the territory, and 
the FRETILIN answered in ten days.936 The civil war did not last long and ended in September, 
but what happened after the war was a turning point for the country. FRETILIN unilaterally 
announced the independence of East Timor on 28th of November 1975, but Indonesia occupied 
the country nine days later.937 The UDT and three other smaller political parties escaped to West 
Timor and became allies with Indonesia which carried on air, sea and land attacks in East 
Timor.938 FRETILIN had to retreat to the mountains where they formed a resistance against the 
Indonesian invasion.939 Rae noted that East Timor witnessed the most egregious violence in the 
first two years of the Indonesian occupation.940  
The CAVR’s final report states that the international community remained silent towards the 
invasion of East Timor, and the Indonesian army carried out a fierce campaign in the country 
during occupation years.941 The United States and Australia implicitly approved the conquest of 
Indonesia.942 This also meant that Australia and other major powers ignored the violence and 
human rights abuses in East Timor.943 It was noted that East Timorese people had been started 
being massacred since the first day of the occupation and the death toll was about 60,000 in the 
first six months of the occupation.944  The final report described that the campaign was 
particularly brutal in the 1970s when the Indonesian army aimed at annihilating FRETILIN’s 
resistance and did not differentiate between guerrillas and civilians.945 Tens of thousands of 
civilians were put in detention camps and resettlement villages where they suffered from a 
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disastrous famine. Yet, the resistance was reformed in the 1980s and the Indonesian army 
expanded its domain to reach every single village in East Timor.946   
According to the final report of the CAVR, in 1991, the Santa Cruz Massacre (which was 
committed by the Indonesian security forces) drew attention and criticism from the 
international community.947 Rae explains that by the end of the Cold War, the states which 
backed (or condoned) Indonesia’s occupation changed their positions. These states and the UN 
started to manifest their discomfort about the brutal violence in the absence of the bipolar 
political system of the Cold War.948 A referendum was administered by the UN in 1999 and the 
vast majority of people (nearly 80%) voted for an independent East Timor.949 It is noted that the 
Indonesian security forces attempted to intimidate and threaten people to make them vote for 
integration with Indonesia, yet people chose independence against all the odds.950 Though, 
following the announcement of the referendum results on 3rd of September 1999, pro-Indonesia 
militia groups threw the country in turmoil which culminated in the death of almost 1500 
people, myriad rapes and beatings, forced displacement of 25% of the population to West Timor 
and the demolition of 80% of all buildings.951 These militia groups were “organized, financed, 
trained, equipped, and assisted by the Indonesian Armed Forces.”952 The CAVR’s report 
indicated that after the referendum, some 250,000 East Timorese fled to West Timor (most of 
them forcibly).953 Cumes states that public utilities, administrative buildings, education and 
health institutions, and homes were demolished. Likewise, the judicial system and infrastructure 
of the country were damaged as judicial documents were destroyed, judicial officers fled the 
country, and the courts were plundered.954 
An Australian-led international force under the UN aegis arrived on 20th of September and took 
control of the country. The country was governed by the UN between October 1999 and May 
2002 because there was no institutional infrastructure, and these needed to be established in a 
tight schedule.955 When the country voted for independence, there was no functioning 
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bureaucracy, no constitution and no political system.956 After the end of conflict, the transitional 
process began in East Timor under the auspices of the UN. The CAVR was established on 13th of 
July 2001 by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).957 
According to the commission’s estimation, the number of conflict-related deaths was around 
102,800 in East Timor (18,600 of these deaths were killings, and 84,200 of them resulted from 
hunger and illness.). The findings depict that 57.6% of the killings and disappearances were 
committed by the Indonesian army and police, whereas 32.3% of them were perpetrated by the 
East Timorese auxiliaries of Indonesian security forces.958  
Although the transitional process was in progress in the country, a crisis broke out in 2006. 
Ottendorfer explained that a group of soldiers signed a petition claiming that they had been 
discriminated against regarding recruitment, promotion and disciplinary measures “based on 
the allegation that people from the Western part of Timor Leste had formerly collaborated with 
the occupation forces while people from the East had fought for independence.”959 Petitioners, 
around 600 soldiers, were dismissed from the armed forces, and many other dissenting groups 
joined them as they were frustrated because of employment, living conditions and government 
benefits.960 Although, ostensibly, the petitioners’ discrimination allegations were considered as 
the reason for the conflict, there were several causes which contributed to the conflict including 
political divisions, socioeconomic problems and youth unemployment.961 It is explained that the 
tensions in the aftermath of independence paved the way for the conflict. People had high 
expectations in the post-independence period, particularly regarding peace dividends and 
economic development. Yet, these expectations were not met as oil and gas revenues did not 
benefit the population much, and most of the people continued to suffer from poverty.962 That 
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is why managing the expectations and framing a realistic picture for the future is crucial in 
transitional contexts. Moreover, the discrimination allegation of the petitioners was a 
complicated issue. The UN’s special inquiry commission noted that both the easterners and the 
westerners perceived that they were discriminated against by each other in East Timor.963 It is 
also noted that although the youth was not a primary factor in the 2006 crisis, they were still an 
important factor as they constituted a considerable percentage of the population and struggled 
to find jobs. It was unsurprising for them to be utilised in violent conflicts by political agitators.964 
As explained in the third chapter, the perception of discrimination (based on Kurdishness) and 
youth unemployment are significant in the Kurdish Question as well, and Turkey needs to tackle 
these issues to ensure sustainable peace and reconciliation. 
The UN inquiry commission reported that 38 people were killed, and more than 150,000 people 
were forcedly displaced because of the violence in 2006.965 To address the resentments of 
people which participated in violence, the government created benefit schemes “to provide 
cash payments to certain societal groups, including: veterans of the resistance to the Indonesian 
occupation; deserters from the F-FDTL [FALINTIL-Forca de Timor-Leste, The Timor Leste Defence 
Force] who had instigated the crisis; persons internally displaced by the crisis; the elderly and 
disabled; and female-headed households.”966 The veterans of FRETILIN received cash payments 
depending on their service in the independence struggle.967 Wallis explained the impacts of the 
payments on society. The valorisation of FRETILIN after independence and provision of cash 
payments to its veterans led to resentments among people who have supported the resistance 
clandestinely since the 1980s. These people were not recognised as part of the independence 
struggle by the state, and their resentment inclined them to be involved in the 2006 violence. 
Likewise, the pensions paid to petitioners gave rise to resentments among people as many 
thought that they were rewarded for causing trouble.968 In fact, the benefit scheme entailed 
arguments in identifying veterans and granting them payments in general.969 Moreover, people 
who were not entitled to benefits have become disadvantaged in the society. Wallis gives an 
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example to illuminate this: as of 2007, the lowest pension was $276 per month, and 52.9% of 
the East Timorese were living on less than $1.25 per day. These payments were funded by the 
oil and gas revenues.970 It can be understood that people who did not get to receive cash 
payments were frustrated as a big gap emerged between their incomes and beneficiaries’ 
incomes. This was also related to the valorisation of the resistance. Rothschild mentions that 
the state produced a discourse about heroic veterans, and this put veterans in an advantaged 
position.971  
Cumes explained that the 2006 crisis persisted until presidential and parliamentary elections in 
2007, with periods of violence which diminished after the elections. Yet, in February 2008, there 
were coordinated attacks orchestrated against the president and the prime minister (wounding 
the president and killing the former commander of the military police) which led to the 
application of emergency law and restrictions on freedoms until May 2008. Cumes concluded 
that even though tensions continue to exist, there has been no tangible violence after 2008.972 
Even though the 2006 violence harmed both the economy and the confidence in the state,973 
the violence has decreased, and the political stability continues in East Timor as of 2018.974 
2.2. Transitional justice process 
After the UN’s intervention and the cease of the violence, the transitional justice process started 
in East Timor. Despite all the disadvantages inherited from the colonisation and occupation 
periods, East Timor finally had a chance to build a country and to progress. The UNTAET was 
founded by the UN to assist East Timor to rebuild the country from scratch.975 Yet, rebuilding 
the country was not the only duty of the government; addressing the past violations was also 
imperative. However, the government alone could not achieve these duties as it lacked capacity 
and resources. East Timor needed the support of the international community to achieve its 
aims.  
President Gusmao and the political leadership in East Timor prioritised “reconciliation through 
forgiveness” over the pursuit of justice and claimed that East Timor needed to concentrate on 
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development and reconciliation rather than prosecuting perpetrators.976 Lieberfeld asserts that 
Gusmao was being pragmatic when he wanted to allocate scarce resources to economic 
development instead of pursuing criminal justice.977 President Gusmao promoted forgiveness 
for both high-ranking and low-ranking perpetrators to achieve reconciliation.978 In fact, there 
are contradicting claims regarding whether prosecutions are necessary or not. Kent asserts that 
the overwhelming majority of victims979 prioritise prosecutions based on her research.980 
Kingston also says that, unlike Gusmao, the civil society, the church and many victims were in 
favour of prosecutions to combat impunity.981 On the other hand, Robins claims that the families 
who were interviewed did not prioritise prosecutions. He notes that only ten percent of them 
spoke of retributive justice; and even when they were asked explicitly, only 40% of them 
considered them as important. Economic support was the most pressing need for the majority 
of the interviewees (61%).982 Pigou’s study also depicts that there were different views among 
victims: some emphasised the importance of criminal justice whereas others were keen on 
forgiveness.983 When the UN’s Commission of Experts produced their report on East Timor in 
2005, they referred to a 2004 opinion poll which claims that 52% of the people of East Timorese 
wanted justice “even if it slows down reconciliation with Indonesia, while 39 per cent favoured 
reconciliation even if that meant significantly reducing efforts to seek justice.”984 Considering 
these contrasting claims, it would be better to look at the context to see what victims want. In 
addition to victims’ demands, the possibility and applicability of prosecutions need to be 
examined for every country. This should also be the case for Turkey; transitional justice 
practitioners need to consider what people want regarding prosecutions. 
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In East Timor, a hybrid tribunal, two truth commissions, a traditional reconciliation program and 
a reparations program were introduced to address and redress the past human rights violations. 
Serious crimes were planned to be dealt in the Serious Crimes Process (SCP) whereas less serious 
crimes would be dealt through the Community Reconciliation Program (CRP), a traditional 
reconciliation mechanism under the auspices of the CAVR.985 They will be explained in detail 
below.  
2.2.a. Trials  
Human rights violations which took place following the referendum were documented by the 
UN’s International Commission of Inquiry on Timor-Leste and three special rapporteurs of the 
UN. Several reports were prepared by this commission and the Indonesian Human Rights 
Commission to recommend the establishment of an international tribunal to try perpetrators. 
Yet the UN rejected these recommendations and left these prosecutions to the Indonesian 
government.986 As the UN was not in favour of an international tribunal, this opportunity was 
put aside. It would be impossible for East Timor to prosecute the perpetrators without 
international support because, as noted, the country did not have experienced judges and 
lawyers, and Indonesia eradicated the country’s pre-existing legal infrastructure – judicial 
facilities, archives, books.987 In addition, without the cooperation of Indonesia, the perpetrators 
could not be brought before the courts. Cumes asserts that economic concern was also an 
important reason for not establishing an international tribunal in East Timor.988 
Since the UN did not support the idea of an international tribunal, it decided that past violations 
would be dealt through two internationally sponsored tribunals: The Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (SPSC) and the Indonesian Human Rights Court (IHRC). The SPSC was a hybrid tribunal 
whereas the IHRC was a domestic one.989 Katzenstein defined the hybrid tribunal as “a system 
that shares judicial accountability jointly between the state in which it functions and the United 
Nations.”990 McAuliffe noted that hybrid courts “typically deploy to states like East Timor, Sierra 
Leone and Kosovo where the formal justice system of courts and public prosecutors is in 
                                                          
985 Hirst, M. and Varney, H. (2005) Justice Abandoned: An Assessment of the Serious Crimes Process in East 
Timor, Occasional Paper Series, New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, p.5. 
986 Kingston, Balancing justice and reconciliation, p.273. 
987 Kingston, Balancing justice and reconciliation, pp.275-276.; McAuliffe, P. (2008) East Timor’s 
Community Reconciliation Process as a Model for Legal Pluralism in Criminal Justice, Law, Social Justice 
& Global Development Journal (LGD), p.4. Available at: 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2008_2/mcauliffe/mcauliffe.pdf (access date: 08.09.2018). 
988 Cumes, Conflict and International Intervention, p.286. 
989 Cumes, Conflict and International Intervention, p.278. 
990 Katzenstein, S. (2003) Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Vol.16, p.245. 
144 
 
disarray, where there are few judges and lawyers or where those that exist are largely 
discredited by association with the formal regime.”991 Katzenstein described the hybrid tribunal 
in East Timor as comprising three elements: the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (two panels 
operating at the Dili Court of Appeals and one at the Dili District Court), the Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) and the Public Defenders’ Office.992 The Special Panel within the Dili District Court was 
established in June 2000 by the UNTAET to try serious crimes.993 The UNTAET regulation listed 
serious crimes as: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and 
torture.994 Unfortunately, the violations of ESCR were not included in the mandate. 
The SCU’s mandate (and accordingly the SPSC’s) was limited to the past crimes which took place 
in 1999.995 Although the violence which took place under 24 years of occupation was more 
destructive for Timorese people, the SCU’s mandate did not include this period.996 The SCP 
exclusively focused on individual and direct crimes and did not address structural injustices, 
socioeconomic crimes and complicities.997 Since an international tribunal was not established, 
the UN and international community exerted pressure on Indonesia to try the perpetrators of 
violence in East Timor. Indonesia claimed the sovereignty principle and assured that 
perpetrators would be tried.998 The UN report regarding East Timor stated that the SCP “ensured 
a notable degree of accountability for those responsible for the crimes committed in 1999.”999 
The ICTJ’s report on this subject also remarks that the process dealt with a notable amount of 
cases considering its operation time.1000 Yet, Cohen notes that even though the UN considered 
the criminal process in East Timor as a success, it has been rife with problems since the 
beginning, regarding the inadequate funding and recruitment, unclear mandate, ineffective 
management and absence of political will.1001 General Wiranto’s indictment was a good example 
to show the lack of political will of important actors. The SCU issued a warrant for Wiranto (the 
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commander of the Indonesian armed forces during the 1999 violence), but the unit could not 
find support from the UN and East Timor. Indonesia certainly opposed the indictment, and 
Wiranto continued enjoying impunity.1002 Moreover, the funding was limited for the hybrid 
tribunal, because approximately $6-7 million per year was allocated for the process, whereas 
Cambodia’s Extraordinary Courts received $19 million and Sierre Leone’s Special Court received 
$16 million per year.1003 Cohen describes the limitations of the panels and Public Defenders’ 
Office due to financial problems. They did not have funding for experienced judges, interpreters 
and investigators. They could not even manage to bring witnesses to trials in first 14 trials.1004 
Likewise, the publicity of the SCP was a problem due to geographical and financial constraints. 
Although hearings were open to the public, many people including victims did not even know 
that trials were taking place, and even if they knew, they were unable to attend because of these 
constraints.1005 Another criticism of the trials came from the victims. Kent notes that in East 
Timor’s serious crimes process, victims were treated as a source of evidence, and they were not 
able to make extensive contributions to the cases. Her research depicts that some victims felt 
that they were used, because they were repeatedly asked for information, but they were not 
provided with feedback and information about the process of their trials.1006 
Likewise, Cumes explains that both tribunals (the SPSC and the IHRC) completed their mandate 
without success. The SPSC could only try low-level perpetrators due to the lack of resources and 
support from both Indonesia and other international major powers. The IHRC only convicted a 
handful of perpetrators who were eventually acquitted on appeal.1007  In fact, it is stated that 
the absence of Indonesia’s cooperation was the main obstacle to serious crimes process; and 
because of Indonesia’s attitude towards this process, the vast majority of the high-ranking 
perpetrators went unpunished.1008  Without the cooperation of the army, many perpetrators 
also escaped trials in Peru, as explained in section 3.2.c below. It would be even more difficult 
to try perpetrators without cooperation in East Timor considering that East Timor is a nascent 
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country, and Indonesia is a powerful one. Moreover, the vast majority of the perpetrators were 
in Indonesia, and East Timor was not in a position to force them to surrender.1009 
In May 2005, the SCP was ended not because the cases were completed, but because of lack of 
commitment of Indonesia, East Timor, the UN and the international community.1010 The Serious 
Crimes Investigations Team (SCIT) was founded in 2007 to conclude the remaining investigations 
but the SCIT’s mandate was even more limited (only investigation tasks).1011 In addition to 
limited mandate, the SCIT was also insufficiently funded and it lacked adequate staff like the 
SCP.1012 Despite these challenges, the team managed to complete some of the investigations 
that were left from the SCU.1013 To conclude, the success of the prosecutions in East Timor was 
very limited and the violations of ESCR were excluded from this process. 
2.2.b. The CAVR 
The CAVR was established in July 2001 by the UNTAET1014 after a consultation process.1015 The 
commission was designed as an independent institution which would not be under the 
supervision of the government, and it was given 24 months to operate, but this period was 
extended three times.1016 The CAVR’s mandate was: to reveal the truth about human rights 
abuses committed between 1974 and 1999, to prepare a final report, to make 
recommendations, to promote reconciliation and human rights, and to implement the CRP. The 
mandate included inquiring into the context and causes which led to the conflict.1017 It can be 
considered that the mandate of the CAVR was comprehensive as it included the root causes of 
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the conflict. It must be noted that the commission did not operate like a court. It did not address 
individuals or individual cases and issue indictments, but its mandate included “recommending 
prosecutions, where appropriate, to the Oﬃce of the General Prosecutor.”1018 Nevins thinks that 
the commission prioritised social justice frameworks over legalistic frameworks as it considers 
victims in a collective perception rather than focusing on individual victims.1019 
The commission was funded by more than 25 governments and international organisations to 
operate in six offices with 300 staff in the field.1020 The CAVR had seven national (including two 
women) and 29 regional commissioners (including ten women).1021 The commission operated in 
several languages and translated the report into them to make it available to stakeholders.1022 
The commission adopted Tetum primarily for the verbal process and had international staff who 
could speak Tetum fluently. This helped the process to be more understandable and relevant 
for the people.1023 The CAVR held eight national hearings which included seven thematic 
hearings and one victims’ hearing. These themes had different characters such as women and 
conflict; children and conflict; forced displacement and famine; and four more.1024 The CAVR 
took 7669 statements from 13 districts and 65 sub-districts, and conducted more than 1000 
interviews in Dili, districts, Indonesia and Portugal to record human rights abuses.1025 To 
facilitate this process, the commission employed and trained many East Timorese so they could 
travel and take testimonies of people.1026 Recruiting a high percentage of locals through a 
grassroots approach contributed to its legitimacy and the local ownership.1027 Yet, it was also 
said that locals’ participation was more symbolic as the management was in the hands of the 
international staff.1028 
The CAVR also held 52 Sub-district Victims’ Hearings where 214 people gave testimonies and 
approximately 6500 community members attended.1029 The people showed a significant interest 
in public hearings as many people travelled from across the country although the journey was 
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onerous.1030 Yet, Rae explained that many victims and witnesses were frustrated during the 
public hearings due to cultural differences. They were not comfortable with talking to the 
foreign personnel and being asked direct inquisitorial questions. They were often unable to have 
a cathartic experience as their responses were often limited to yes or no. Likewise, they 
struggled answering questions about the violations, as their perceptions of time and place were 
different from those of modern capitalist societies. Furthermore, female victims encountered 
difficulties in testifying about sexual crimes.1031 These experiences prove that the settings in 
which victims testify are of great importance. As is discussed in the first chapter, truth-telling 
may lead to re-traumatisation.  
The CAVR conducted six healing workshops in Dili; victims from all districts of the country were 
invited to participate.1032 Healing workshops included dancing, singing, praying and 
reflection.1033 The commission adopted a victim-centred approach as victims from all parts of 
the country, mostly from rural communities, participated in both national hearings and sub-
district hearings, and their testimonies were broadcasted to the entire nation.1034 The healing 
workshops allowed the commission to identify the needs of victims and to determine specific 
victim groups, such as rape victims, who were more vulnerable than others.1035 Moreover, the 
CAVR conducted Community Profile Workshops by its district teams to examine the impacts of 
the conflict on communities and the needs of them. These workshops helped the commission 
to analyse the broad economic, social and political contexts and deep impacts of violations on 
communities during the conflict. More than 4700 people attended 297 workshops in total across 
the country.1036 Through these workshops, local histories were delineated.1037 Furthermore, the 
commission produced and broadcasted radio programs, films and the recordings of national and 
community level meetings to promote reconciliation both in East Timor and West Timor.1038 
Ultimately, the final report was presented to the parliament in October 2005.1039 Indonesia 
rejected the final report, stating that the future was more important; the international actors 
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ignored it; and the East Timorese leadership declined its recommendations.1040 The 
recommendations were criticised by President Gusmao because he thought enhancements in 
living conditions and governance, and achieving healing and social justice were more important 
than prosecuting the perpetrators as such attempts carried a risk of renewed violence.1041 Other 
political leaders such as then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta also criticised 
the final report and prioritised reconciliation over prosecutions.1042 Kingston comments that in 
the case of East Timor where there is a lack of capacity for trials and the absence of international 
support, Gusmao did his best to achieve reconciliation.1043 As is discussed in the previous section, 
Gusmao’s decision can be comprehended because without the cooperation of Indonesia and 
the support of the international actors, East Timor could not pursue retributive justice. Still, the 
CAVR’s covering the complicity of international actors made its work unique.1044 When the CAVR 
recommended reparations, it asked powerful states and corporations to pay for them as they 
benefited from the conflict by trading with Indonesia and selling weapons.1045 
Consequently, the East Timorese parliament didn’t discuss the report’s content.1046 It has been 
observed that the political elite in East Timor had little support for addressing the issues and 
implementing the recommendations identified in the final report. The CAVR process and the 
final report were considered as an end in itself.1047 There have been calls from several national 
and international organisations (Amnesty International, ANTI, KontraS),1048 but no official 
program has been introduced to implement the recommendations.1049 Amnesty International’s 
2016/2017 report depicts that the prime minister formed a working group to counsel the 
government on applying the recommendations of the truth commission as victims of the conflict 
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still ask for justice and reparations.1050 Certainly, implementing the recommendations of the 
commission is important. Nevertheless, Nevins comments that the work of the commission was 
invaluable regarding its moral authority, even though its recommendations were mostly not 
applied through a follow-through.1051  
It was claimed that the commission got support from Timorese people, civil society, political 
parties, the government and the parliament.1052 Yet, the work of the commission was criticised 
on several grounds. Robins asserts that the CAVR’s understanding of truth did not really 
correspond with the victims’ understanding of truth. Victims expected a more private truth such 
as the fate of their beloved ones but the CAVR’s truth was more of a public truth such as a 
component of historiography.1053 Likewise, Kent depicts that the government adopted one 
version of the past which glorified the resistance of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation 
of Timor Leste (FALINTIL) and other truths which did not accord this narrative (for instance the 
stories of the victims of the resistance groups, stories of women) were suppressed.1054 This 
approach was linked to the recognition of the victims; as veterans were recognised and granted 
pensions, and other victims were not.1055 Victims of FRETILIN claim that the CAVR ignored them 
by focusing on violations of Indonesian security forces exclusively. They were also excluded from 
the valorisation program.1056 Another criticism was about victim groups in East Timor. It was 
noted that there were no strong victim groups in East Timor1057 and the ones which did exist 
were dominated by the victims of the 1999 conflict. In addition, the victims of Indonesian 
security forces outnumbered the victims of the FRETILIN in victim groups.1058 Therefore, the 
victims of FRETILIN and the victims of violence which took place before 1999 thought that their 
voices were not heard.1059 As explained below in the fifth chapter’s section 6.3.a, Turkey also 
created a hierarchy among victims, as the state has granted reparations to the victims of the 
PKK, ignoring the victims of the Turkish security forces. It needs to be understood that 
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transitional processes should be designed cautiously to prevent emergence of hierarchies 
among victims and to address all the victim groups’ needs. 
The Community Reconciliation Program (CRP) 
The CRP was established on 13th of July 2001, and it was inspired by a traditional practice named 
nahe biti (to spread the mat).1060 The CRP, a new and unpractised initiative, was introduced by 
the CAVR at the grassroots level for less serious crimes. Its mandate excluded serious crimes like 
“crimes against humanity, rape, torture and murder”.1061 According to the CAVR’s report, the 
aim of this initiative was to promote reconciliation in local communities through a participatory 
approach. The CRP adopted exercises from different disciplines such as traditional justice, 
mediation, arbitration and criminal law.1062 Reconciliation at the local level was important as 
former militias and pro-integration East Timorese needed to be reintegrated into communities 
after their return from West Timor.1063 After their return, the refugees confessed their actions; 
they were either handed over to the authorities in cases of serious crimes or they were given 
sanctions through community reconciliation process.1064 The report described how the CRP 
initiatives promoted reconciliation. The commission held public hearings where victims, 
perpetrators and community members participated. Perpetrators needed to confess their 
crimes fully to reach an agreement and to carry out particular actions such as community work 
or paying reparations to victims.1065 After completing these tasks, the agreement needed to be 
registered with the nearest district court and the community would reintegrate them.1066 It 
should be noted that the case had to be presented to the Oﬃce of the General Prosecutor first 
to determine whether it was applicable for the CRP.1067 Although there is no satisfactory data in 
the literature on ESCR violations which were addressed through the CRP, it is noted that the CRP 
looked at house-burning cases (considering them as less serious crimes).1068 This can be 
considered as addressing the violations of the right to housing. Even though it is difficult to 
analyse which ESCR violations were addressed in the CRP due to lack of information, it can be 
said that some ESCR violations such as violations of the right to housing and the right to food 
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could be dealt in this process. If Turkey conducts a community reconciliation process in the 
future, less serious violations of ESCR must be included in this process to promote reconciliation 
among communities. 
The CRP also helped the judicial system by settling some of the ordinary crimes as the huge 
number of cases would be a burden otherwise.1069 Being fast, cost-effective and originated from 
local traditions were considered as the strength of the CRP1070 and the program stimulated wide 
interest in the communities.1071 Among other benefits, the CRP also contributed to the fight 
against impunity. According to the report, the idea of amnesty for the perpetrators of less 
serious crimes was not accepted by the community members, and many perpetrators were held 
accountable for their past crimes through the CRP program.1072 It was claimed that a symbolic 
closure and reconciliation were achieved for many communities through the CRP. The target 
was 1000 cases in the beginning, but 1371 perpetrators accomplished a CRP and reintegrated 
into their communities, and there was a strong demand for the program to carry on.1073 Although 
it was estimated that there were more than 3000 cases which could be dealt in the CRP program, 
it did not continue.1074 It must be noted that the CRP was the only experience of an official legal 
mechanism for many participants according to their statements, because the CRP extended to 
distant parts of East Timor.1075 Although it was not a full-fledged tribunal, its proximity to 
communities was a great advantage in giving the communities a sense of justice. 
Nevertheless, the program was not conducted without criticisms. Firstly, the CRP was a 
voluntary process, and many perpetrators did not participate in the program and enjoyed 
impunity. The Jakarta Ad Hoc Tribunal and the Serious Crimes Process was not successful in 
bringing the perpetrators of the most serious crimes to justice, and a situation of unequal 
accountability had occurred in East Timor where many perpetrators of less serious crimes 
attended the CRP program and were held accountable, whereas offenders of the most serious 
crimes enjoyed impunity.1076 Many deponents of the CRP pointed out this issue and criticised 
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that the most responsible people went unpunished while they participated in the CRP. Likewise, 
the CRP sent some files to the Oﬃce of the General Prosecutor as serious offences were revealed 
in these cases. Yet, no punishment was imposed on the perpetrators by the SCU for these 
crimes.1077 
Many perpetrators claimed that they were also victims as they were forced to join militia but 
still they engaged in the program.1078 Yet, although there was not a threat to be prosecuted, 
many offenders voluntarily applied to the CRP, and this was considered as a success by 
Burgess.1079 However, the perpetrators of sexual crimes enjoyed impunity as these offenses 
were considered as serious crimes and could not be dealt in the CRPs.1080 Furthermore, Horne 
states that traditional methods were adopted and included in the program to enhance the 
efficiency and legitimacy of the process. Yet, this was more of a symbolic role as the design and 
implementation process was led by external actors. She remarks that although elders and 
traditional actors were part of the CRP panels, their role was more of a symbolic one as they 
were not given authority on the cases. A regional commissioner of the CAVR was the chair of the 
panel and the authority of decision-making and of inflicting a punishment belonged to the 
chair.1081 Still, including a women’s representative in the panels was mandatory which should be 
praised.1082 
According to Larke’s observations the process aimed at rehabilitating the perpetrators rather 
than addressing the sufferings of the victims.1083 This observation is parallel with Kent’s study 
which reports that the experiences of the deponents regarding the CRP were more positive 
compared to the victims’ experiences.1084 Some victims said that they were retraumatised 
because of participating the CAVR and the CRP, and they said that if there is no result to meet 
the needs of victims (especially financial needs), talking itself was not healing or cathartic for 
them.1085 The CRP was criticised for ignoring the needs and rights of individual victims and 
focusing on community reconciliation and collective good.1086 As mentioned in the second 
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chapter, tensions are likely to occur between individual and collective aims in transitional 
societies; individuals often prioritise accountability and individual redress whereas wider 
communities demand collective measures. Larke, on the other hand, claims that the CRP was 
not designed to heal victims, instead, it aimed to facilitate integration and reconciliation within 
communities.1087 Furthermore, as is mentioned in earlier chapters, traditional methods must be 
applied carefully. It is stated that East Timorese people raised concerns about unjust traditional 
power dynamics when traditional methods were being applied.1088  
Finally, the acts of reconciliation were considered as too lenient since only an apology was 
requested in the majority of the cases. In addition, the victims were not informed properly about 
the CRP and in many cases, they did not know what they could ask for as an act of 
reconciliation.1089 Since the CRP was considered as a practice of closure, further civil action 
would be impossible, and this was criticised because many victims were not even properly 
informed about the program.1090 It seems unfair to take away victims’ right to take further action 
about violations, especially when they were not prepared for the CRP. 
2.2.c. The Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) 
The CTF was established in 2005 by Indonesia and East Timor to “establish the conclusive truth 
in regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999”.1091 The 
CTF was defined as the world’s first bilateral truth commission, and it operated between 2005 
and 2008.1092 It was claimed that the reason behind the establishment of the CTF was developing 
good relations between East Timor and Indonesia.1093 The Term of Reference (TOR) for the CTF 
confirmed this by stating that the commission’s aim was “further strengthening of reconciliation 
and friendship between the two countries and peoples.”1094 Ottendorfer remarks that the CTF 
was criticised for being an attempt to prevent demands for further investigations.1095 Moreover, 
it was mentioned previously that East Timorese leadership did not want to antagonise its 
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powerful neighbour. This commission could put an end to the calls for addressing the past 
human rights violations. So, the commission could serve to the interests of both countries.  
The CTF’s mandate was: unveiling the truth about the violence in 1999 and human rights abuses 
(including their causes, nature and extent); preparing a final report to inform the public; and to 
make recommendations to achieve healing of past wounds.1096 The commission consisted of ten 
members;1097 East Timor and Indonesia appointed equal numbers of commissioners to the CTF, 
and the selection process was completed without any consultation with the public and civil 
society.1098 The commission was funded by East Timor and Indonesia.1099 Hirst remarks that 
community engagement and public scrutiny were very limited regarding the CTF’s work. Yet, 
holding public hearings, in a way, provided some involvement of the public.1100 Six public 
hearings were conducted (five in Indonesia and one in East Timor) but they were strongly 
criticised by both Indonesian and East Timorese NGOs. They remarked that the public hearings 
failed to establish the truth as witnesses did not speak truthfully.1101 The hearings were criticised 
for the selection of witnesses (the military brought some witnesses from West Timor to testify 
against East Timor) and prioritising perpetrators over victims in testifying (only 13 victims and 
43 perpetrators including 24 military and militia members accused of human rights abuses).1102 
The CTF hearings were primarily conducted in Indonesian but interpreters were provided for 
those who did not speak the language.1103 Overall, 147 statements were taken by the 
commission.1104 Considering that the CAVR had taken nearly 8000 statements, the CTF’s work 
seems to be rather weak. Moreover, Hirst noted that very little support has been given to the 
victims regarding their testimonies. They were not informed before the hearing and not 
provided psychological support after the hearings.1105 Unlike the CAVR, the CTF did not give 
socioeconomic rights adequate focus. Although the final report of the CTF mentioned forced 
displacement and considered it as a serious crime, it did not consider this from an ESCR 
perspective. In addition, the CTF did not look at deaths from famines (produced by Indonesia) 
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and illnesses which were clear violations of the right to food and the right to health.1106 Yet, its 
recommendations included education and health programs which could enhance the enjoyment 
of ESCR if implemented. 
The CTF’s final report was presented to the presidents of East Timor and Indonesia in July 
2008.1107 The CTF’s final report explained that gross human rights violations were committed in 
East Timor in 1999, and these violations were systematic and widespread rather than random 
and spontaneous acts. The report also stated that these acts were mostly committed by pro-
Indonesia militia members and Indonesian security forces against the pro-independence East 
Timorese.1108 Although the East Timorese people were hostile to the CTF in the beginning, this 
was mitigated after the final report.1109 The commission’s findings were quite the opposite of 
the expected conclusions, and this was considered as an important achievement.1110 Hirst 
remarks that the acceptance of the final report by the Indonesian president was considered as 
the first official recognition by Indonesia of its role in violence which took place in East Timor.1111 
The CTF suggested short-term and long-term recommendations for “promoting friendship and 
reconciliation between peoples of the two countries, meeting the needs of those affected most 
by violence, healing old wounds, and preventing future reoccurrences of conflict.”1112 The 
recommendations included institutional reforms, the creation of new institutions, and policies 
to foster diplomatic and economic relations between two countries.1113 Although the TOR did 
not mention reparations, the CTF suggested collective reparations in its report.1114 Yet, it was 
noted that the report did not suggest a comprehensive reparation program.1115 In addition, the 
CTF did not grant amnesty to perpetrators, although it had the authority to do so.1116 
Yet, the CTF was criticised for being established without the consultation with victims, the public, 
the UN and human rights groups which then refused cooperation and engagement with the 
commission. The efficacy and credibility of the CTF were affected negatively from this.1117 The 
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UN also boycotted the CTF because it was given the authority to grant amnesty.1118 Other 
criticisms for the CTF included its vague criteria to grant amnesty and, given that Indonesia is 
responsible for the grave human rights violations, the improbability of unearthing full truth.1119 
In addition, its time restriction was also criticised as it only looked at the violence which took 
place in 1999.1120  The TOR excluded individual responsibility and remarked that the 
commission’s work would not “lead to prosecution”1121 and this led to criticisms.1122 The TOR did 
not even mention victims once, and did not make any recommendations regarding their 
needs.1123 Although the TOR stated that the final report would be available in Tetum, Indonesian, 
English and Portuguese,1124 the final report of the CTF was in English and was not translated into 
Tetum.1125 Hirst criticised the recommendations of the CTF on the grounds of their generality. 
She explained that the recommendations were described loosely without details. Likewise, they 
did not refer to countries specifically. This was a downside of the recommendations as it would 
be better to specify the circumstances of the countries and make recommendations regarding 
them.1126 Lastly, the CTF should have focused on ESCR violations as they have a critical 
importance in East Timor. 
2.2.d. Reparations 
The CAVR’s final report made recommendations regarding reparations to the victims of gross 
human rights violations. The right to remedy and reparations is recognised in international law, 
and East Timor signed several international treaties1127 which included this right.1128 According 
to the CAVR, the main aim was assisting these victims in repairing the harms inflicted on them 
because of the violations. The forms of reparations included rehabilitation, restitution, 
compensation, establishment of the truth, and reassurance of non-repetition.1129 The CAVR 
recommended material and symbolic reparations at both individual and collective levels 
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including provision of medical and psychological care, material support, reburials, 
memorialisation, exhumations and commemoration ceremonies.1130 The CAVR did not see 
material support as monetary payments; instead, it referred to provision of services and 
assistance regarding health, education and housing. The provision of these services has a 
potential to contribute to the enjoyment of ESCR in East Timor. It must be noted that various 
reparations were granted to the victims of forced displacement which will be explored in detail 
in section 2.3.d below.  
The report explained that all the East Timorese were victims in one way or another, but some 
victims were more vulnerable, and the reparations program needed to focus on those most in 
need. These victims were “victims of torture; people with mental and physical disabilities; 
victims of sexual violence; widows and single-mothers; children affected by the conflict; 
communities who suffered large-scale and gross human rights violations.”1131 It should be 
remarked that the commission did not mention the political affiliations of the victims. Therefore, 
victims of the FALINTIL and the pro-integration individuals could be beneficiaries if they have 
the necessary qualifications. 
The CAVR’s final report placed the greatest responsibility for financing the reparations on 
Indonesia as it was the main perpetrator of the crimes. The commission stated that the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia, and Indonesian and other international 
companies who profited from the conflict also needed to fund reparations.1132 They need to 
finance reparations as they were complicit in the occupation.1133 Yet, Indonesia, Australia and 
other countries ignored these recommendations.1134 The CAVR recommended Indonesia issue 
apologies and stated that it must acknowledge the violations committed during the 
occupation.1135 Yet, this has not happened.  
The East Timorese leadership has not introduced a reparation program, years after the 
publication of the final report.1136 Gusmao advocated social and economic justice over 
prosecutions as there were many people lacking basic needs such as electricity, clean water and 
healthcare.1137 The recommendations regarding reparations have been neglected for years. In 
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2010, after the lobbying efforts of both national and international NGOs,1138 political leaders of 
East Timor were convinced to draft laws for reparations and the establishment of an institution 
(Institute for Memory) which would monitor and promote the implementation of the 
recommendations of the CAVR and the CTF.1139 The draft law designed symbolic and material 
reparations at national, individual and collective levels with a focus on education, health, 
rehabilitation and infrastructure.1140 Unlike veterans’ program, the draft law for reparations 
focused on vulnerable victims regardless of their political background (pro-independence or pro-
integration). Yet, this led to criticisms among political elites as some members of parliament 
thought that pro-integration victims did not deserve payments.1141 Likewise, the law’s definition 
of victim was problematic for the public as many East Timorese and FRETILIN members thought 
pro-integration victims did not deserve any reparations.1142 Although two laws have been 
drafted and submitted to parliament in 2010, the parliamentary negotiations has been quite 
slow.1143 It must be noted that the CTF also suggested recommendations regarding reparations 
including apologies from the heads of the state of Indonesia and East Timor, healing programs, 
and provision of services concerning education and health etc.1144  
Reparations have been of great importance for the people in East Timor. Robins claims that 
victims’ most pressing demand is economic support to improve their livelihood, and they 
prioritise this over other transitional justice mechanisms.1145 Kent also remarks that the East 
Timorese NGOs changed their agenda by starting to prioritise reparations rather than 
prosecutions after many years.1146 Likewise, a series of workshops were organised by national 
and international NGOs1147 to analyse the situation, needs and demands of victims in 2008 and 
2009. The two prominent findings of the study were that victims’ “current social and economic 
vulnerability can be linked to the human rights violations” and they “prioritized their needs as 
assistance with children’s education, housing repairs, and health care.”1148 
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In fact, the CAVR saw the importance of reparations even before publishing its report. After 
visiting the villages across the country, the CAVR found out that many victims were in urgent 
need because of the violations they were subjected to. The Urgent Reparations Scheme was 
designed by the commission as a temporary program to address these needs, and the 
beneficiaries were determined by the district teams.1149 It was funded by the Trust Fund for East 
Timor and administered by the World Bank1150 and 712 victims benefited from this scheme.1151 
It was noted that this type of a reparation had never been applied in a truth commission before, 
as payments were made during the CAVR’s operation. Orphans, widows and disabled 
constituted the majority of those beneficiaries.1152  
As previously explained, a valorisation program was introduced for veterans of the 
independence struggle. Rothschild explains that unlike the CAVR’s narrative about suffering 
victims and human rights violations, a new narrative has been promoted by the state which was 
built on a heroic resistance struggle. Veterans were promoted as heroes whose dedication must 
be praised through symbolic and material means.1153 These veterans were given medals, and 
some of them were granted compensation payments and pensions. Moreover, a big high-tech 
museum, a martyrs’ cemetery and numerous monuments were established for them.1154 
Although these acts of the state resemble reparations, the veterans’ program, in fact, was not 
designed as reparations.1155 It benefited some veterans and their families who were also victims, 
but the payments were granted to the former resistance members for their role in the 
independence struggle. The basis of the program was recognising and assisting veterans.1156 It 
must be borne in mind that if the responsibility for human rights abuses is not acknowledged, 
the provision of financial assistance does not necessarily constitute reparation.1157 Likewise, the 
government has made cash payments to IDPs to tackle displacement in the scope of the National 
Recovery Strategy (NRS) but this program was also not considered and defined as reparations 
by the government.1158 The NRS is explained in detail below in the forced displacement section. 
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Although the valorisation program was quite popular among veterans, its scope was criticised 
by many victims including the families of the dead and the missing, victims who clandestinely 
supported the resistance, women, members of younger generations, the victims of the FALINTIL, 
and pro-integration victims.1159 Many victims are upset that veterans are recognised and granted 
payments, but they were not. They explain that they were also part of the resistance as there 
were different forms of resistance. In addition, all the victims, including pro-integration ones, 
have suffered during the conflict, and they also deserve recognition and reparations.1160 
Lipscomb noted that if one group of victims were prioritised, there can be resentments and 
maybe other negative consequences among others. She says that reparations can play a role in 
preventing future conflicts by addressing the root causes of the poverty and conflict in East 
Timor.1161 So, in order to prevent resentments and other negative outcomes, identifying 
beneficiaries and designing a comprehensive reparation program are significant. 
In the absence of an official recognition and commemoration of the civilian victims, the local 
communities conducted their own unofficial memorialising practices throughout the country. 
Kent describes the construction of memorials, monuments and commemoration of the 
massacres, and notes that local practices challenged the government’s narrative about the 
glorious resistance and veterans by paying tribute to ordinary people who sacrificed their lives 
for independence. She notes that local memorialisation and commemoration practices are 
significant as they were shaped by local customs and have a potential to help recovery through 
addressing the needs of victims.1162 Furthermore, local memorialisation is important for victims 
as memorials in big cities were considered distant from victims.1163 Yet, local practices should be 
looked at cautiously as they also have some shortcomings. For instance, victims of sexual 
violence, deaths resulting from hunger or sickness and victims of violations of resistance groups 
were often excluded from these practices. These victims’ stories probably did not buttress the 
valorisation of the resistance, so they were simply left out.1164 It can be comprehended that both 
official and unofficial memorialisation and commemoration practices ignored ESCR abuses as 
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the victims of these violations were overlooked in East Timor. This should not be the case for 
Turkey as ESCR violations are as important as CPR violations and they need to be included in 
these practices. 
Finding funds for reparations was difficult for the CAVR, and both national and international 
sources were eager to grant money for general development plans rather than reparation 
programs. Yet, the CAVR’s report makes it clear that although reparations and development 
complement each other, reparations should not be subsumed within development plans as they 
have a profound function to serve justice and to contribute to human rights protection.1165  
2.2.e. Amnesties 
Amnesties have not been a significant element of the transitional process in East Timor. Since 
the main perpetrators have been enjoying impunity in Indonesia, amnesties were irrelevant for 
them. In addition, the East Timorese leadership, notably Gusmao, has opposed prosecutions and 
advocated for reconciliation through forgiveness. Although there has not been a blanket 
amnesty for perpetrators, several amnesties were granted by the government.1166 Some of the 
perpetrators who have been pardoned had been convicted for crimes against humanity by the 
UN Special Panels for Serious Crimes.1167 In a remarkable case, in 2009, the government was 
criticised as a former militia leader (an Indonesian citizen, Maternus Bere), who had been 
accused of crimes against humanity by the UN’s SCU, was released and transferred to Indonesian 
authorities. The East Timorese leadership and Gusmao explained that this happened due to 
political pressures.1168  
This, in fact, reflects the pragmatic approach of the leadership in the country. As explained 
earlier, the political leadership prioritised reconciliation and development over justice. They 
claimed that this reflects the people’s needs and demands. However, the survey which was 
conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2008 depicts that 90% of East Timorese did not approve of 
impunity and claimed that if someone committed murder, this person should not be able to 
“avoid punishment”.1169 Amnesties have been explained previously and the debates around 
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them continue in the literature. To conclude, it must be understood that amnesties can 
contribute to reconciliation and peace in some contexts. Yet, they should not be designed and 
granted without consultation with public.   
2.2.f. Institutional reforms 
In 1999, most of the infrastructure was destroyed in East Timor including public buildings, 
schools and hospitals. In addition, Indonesia took much of the administrative experience away 
when it left the country after the ballot.1170 It was stated that of the civil service “around one 
quarter were non-Timorese and these filled the top positions in the administration, including 
judges, prosecutors and police.”1171 This shows that there had been a considerable dependency 
on Indonesia in terms of administration and human capital. Yet, East Timor, as a newly 
independent country, had to establish many modern state institutions (including the parliament, 
local government structures, the police service and the army) from scratch under the auspices 
of the UNTAET.1172 It was noted that most of the civil servants (including legal professionals such 
as judges and prosecutors) were not experienced or trained for their roles.1173 The country 
needed to develop capable civil servants and apply institutional reforms to achieve effective 
governance.1174 
The CAVR’s mandate stated that the commission “shall make recommendations concerning the 
reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise which could 
be taken to achieve the objectives of the Commission, prevent the repetition of human rights 
violations and respond to the needs of victims of human rights violations.”1175 The CAVR did not 
explicitly indicate institutional reforms in the report but it has suggested a wide spectrum of 
recommendations which could be considered as institutional reforms, ranging from regulating 
detention centres and processes to training public servants and security forces.1176 Likewise, the 
CTF’s final report stated that: “Remedying systemic and institutional failures through 
institutional reform is thus necessary to prevent future reoccurrences of violence.”1177 And the 
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same report suggested various institutional reforms including security sector reform, 
educational reform and legislative amendments to promote human rights and prevent future 
violence.1178 To conclude, East Timor needed to establish state institutions and implement 
institutional reforms for the existing ones to ensure that human rights would be respected and 
not violated again in the future.  
2.3. ESCR and development 
Violations of civil and political rights such as killings and disappearances often draw more 
attention in post-conflict contexts, but violations of socioeconomic rights are critical and need 
to be addressed as well. Violations of these rights can be destructive for countries, and they 
have huge impacts on the lives of people in the post-conflict societies. For instance, the first 
years of the Indonesian invasion caused great catastrophe in East Timor as tens of thousands of 
people died because of hunger and starvation. It was estimated that around 200,000 people lost 
their lives because of the famine.1179 These were clear violations of the right to food and the 
right to an adequate standard of living as the state failed to ensure minimum obligations of these 
rights.  
The causes of poverty and low-level development in the country rooted in the Portuguese 
colonial rule which had made very little investment in education, capacity building and 
economy.1180 Due to the colonial legacy and devastation, in the first years of Indonesian 
occupation the country became one of the poorest regions of Indonesia.1181 Hill remarks that 
the country experienced some level of growth under the Indonesian occupation considering that 
this did not occur during colonial times. Yet, this did not mean the country experienced industrial 
development. In 1997, manufacturing only made up 3% of East Timor’s economy (one-eighth of 
the national average of Indonesia).1182 Nevins explains socioeconomic abuses of Indonesia in 
East Timor: 80% of the existing buildings and infrastructure were destroyed after the ballot; East 
Timor’s significant amount of natural resources (timber, coffee etc.) were stolen;1183 its economy 
had been decapitalised dramatically; and the development of the country was stunted because 
of the occupation.1184 In addition, during the Indonesian occupation billions of dollars’ worth of 
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oil and gas revenues were exploited by Australia at “impoverished East Timor's expense.”1185  In 
short, one of the most important challenges regarding development was the legacy of 
Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian rule after independence.1186  
In 2002, a broad development plan was prepared by the government to establish a road map 
for the country to progress. The National Development Plan was produced after a broad 
countrywide consultation process as some 38,000 people engaged in the meetings.1187 After the 
broad consultation process, two development goals came to the fore: “a) To reduce poverty in 
all sectors and regions of the nation, and b) To promote economic growth that is equitable and 
sustainable, improving the health, education, and wellbeing of everyone in East Timor.”1188 The 
development plan described the country’s profile regarding poverty, education, health and 
infrastructure: more than two fifths of the people were poor; standards of education were 
amongst the lowest in the world; access to health was very limited and the standards were poor; 
and infrastructure, sanitation, access to safe water and housing were weak and inadequate.1189 
In addition, the government adopted the NRS to address these problems in 2007 since 
socioeconomic problems were underlying causes of the violence in 2006. The strategy included 
cash payments to certain societal groups such as veterans and IDPs.1190 
Considering these poor conditions of the country, economic assistance to victims becomes more 
crucial. It is not surprising that there have been pressing demands from victims for economic 
assistance. Moreover, the enjoyment of ESCR needs to be improved by the state to ensure that 
minimum obligations of socioeconomic rights are ensured in the country.   
2.3.a. Economy 
The Portuguese had colonised and ruled East Timor for almost five centuries. The Portuguese 
did not make any effort to develop the economy of the country. Until the 19th century 
sandalwood was the most valuable product, but then coffee exports to Portugal and subsistence 
farming had constituted the large part of the production in the economy.1191 Moreover, the 
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Portuguese precluded the East Timorese from accumulating capital. For instance, the 
Portuguese and Chinese traders obtained most of the profits from coffee exports.1192 Likewise, 
the East Timorese were forced to pay taxes in kind at times. Coffee production was increased by 
these in-kind taxes to the detriment of the indigenous population.1193 In addition to heavy taxes, 
the colonial administration adopted forced-labour policies to use people in road construction 
programs and coffee plantations.1194 
After the end of the colonial period, there was an improvement in the economy during 
Indonesian occupation1195 as Indonesia made investments in the country. Yet, the country 
remained poor, among the poorest provinces of Indonesia.1196 Besides, it was noted that the 
investments in East Timor were aimed at reinforcing military rule by Indonesia and increasing 
the production of cash crops.1197 The economy of East Timor stagnated under the Portuguese 
and Indonesian rules. Moreover, the natural resources (gas and oil) of the country were 
exploited by Australia since the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Maritime boundaries of 
East Timor were determined by Australia and Indonesia,1198 and there was an alliance between 
them to benefit from the natural resources of East Timor.1199 East Timor could not file a case 
against Australia as it did not want to antagonise its powerful neighbour. Now East Timor is 
trapped in poverty. It is remarked that, let alone paying for its crimes, Australia is still benefiting 
from East Timor’s oil and gas revenues.1200  
Even though Indonesia made some investments to secure its presence in East Timor, its 
aggressive policies had detrimental effects on the economy and daily lives of the East Timorese 
people. To eliminate the resistance, massive bombing campaigns were conducted by Indonesia. 
Farming became impossible, and people had to flee from one place to another.1201 People were 
unable to maintain their subsistence farming most of the time, as they were forced to work at 
road construction and logging, their times were restricted for producing their own food, and 
they were forced to produce cash crops for export.1202 The CAVR report explains that people’s 
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means of making a livelihood were destroyed because either their crops, agricultural 
implements, lands and livestock were demolished, or they were unable to conduct these 
activities due to conflicts.1203 Indonesia violated socioeconomic rights (the right to food, the right 
to work, the right to an adequate standard of living) of the people through these activities. 
People were prevented from working and making a living, and this exacerbated their living 
standards dramatically.  
Hill explains that the 1999 rampage hit the country’s economy dreadfully. Although it is not 
possible to calculate the precise cost of the violence, he says that the GDP of the country may 
have diminished 25-30% in this period.1204 The UNDP’s report describes the period and remarks 
that the destruction in 1999 caused “enormous human suffering” by further impoverishing the 
East Timorese people who were already living in poverty. In terms of economy, 80% of schools 
and clinics were destroyed (partially or completely); a substantial proportion of the livestock 
was annihilated; and telephone landlines and electricity-generating capacity were significantly 
damaged.1205 All the banks (state and commercial banks) and their branches were closed 
because of the violence.1206 It can be comprehended that the destructive activities of Indonesia 
worsened the enjoyment of ESCR of the people such as the right to education and the right to 
health. 
When East Timor became independent, it had to build the country from scratch as the economy 
consisted only of subsistence agriculture, and state bureaucracy was wiped out.1207 The main 
source of income was agriculture in 94% of sucos (usually translated as “village”1208) as of 
2001.1209 Senior civil servants, teachers, and much commercial expertise left the country 
because of the violence.1210 As a bright side of the situation, however, large amounts of aid and 
the country’s gas and oil revenues were important resources for economic development.1211 
Contrary to all challenges, the country managed to recover the economy in the 2000-2001 
period, and reached pre-1999 levels.1212 It must be noted that a serious amount of aid (8.8 billion 
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US dollars) was received by the country between 1999 and 2009.1213 Yet, the population was 
struggling with widespread poverty. 41% of the population was living under the poverty line 
($0.55 per person per day was formulated as the national poverty line).1214 It was explained that 
there have been considerable disparities both between rural and urban settings and between 
different regions regarding economic and social indicators. Poverty was higher, and access to 
basic social services was lower in rural areas. The same pattern was observed for the regions as 
the West was poorer than the East.1215 
Sahin claims that the economic growth after independence was not achieved by improvements 
in production capacity of the country’s economy, instead it was generated by the government 
spending which was funded from the nation’s Petroleum Fund.1216 It is not a secret that natural 
gas and oil revenues have constituted a significant portion of the country’s economy. Yet, the 
Timorese economy’s dependency on these revenues is problematic. Parma notes that the 
country is among the most petroleum-dependent countries in the world (as of 2012, 98% of 
government revenues were dependent on petroleum money).1217 It could be conceived that the 
country’s development could be achieved conveniently regarding the vast amount of aid and 
petroleum revenues the country receives. Yet, Duncan remarks that: “The development 
experience of the past 40 years or so shows that exploitation of mineral resources and 
accumulation of aid is not the route to economic growth and development.”1218 He explains that 
empirical evidence from development experiences around the world depicts that aid and natural 
resource revenues are not a positive force for growth. They do not foster development alone; 
there should be good economic policies, institutions, physical infrastructure and human 
capital.1219 Lack of infrastructure and human capital was a serious obstacle in East Timor’s 
economic development.1220 In fact, there are arguments in the literature about whether natural 
resources are a “curse” and detrimental to economic development in some cases.1221 The scope 
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of this section does not allow for further analysis of this argument.  However, it could be said 
that whether or not the natural resources of East Timor are a curse, the country requires good 
economic policies, institutions, infrastructure and human capital as the country was built from 
scratch after independence.  
Rae explains that East Timor was not successful in development in terms of economic growth, 
infrastructure, health, education and basic services. The country was not able to create new 
employment opportunities for people, and poverty continues to prevail in both urban and rural 
areas. Compared to rural areas, urban centres had some businesses and opportunities, and this 
caused increasing urbanisation and income inequalities.1222 According to the UNDP report, 
46.8% of the population are below the poverty line in East Timor as of 2016.1223 Maj asserts that 
the East Timorese governments prioritised government-led big development schemes and 
projects rather than ones which integrate rural populations and address their needs and 
concerns. Developing employment opportunities in agriculture and for young people have 
resulted in little success.1224 Cumes explained that the UN and the international community 
adopted an approach which did not reflect the needs and interests of the East Timorese people. 
Because of the exclusion of local participation, socioeconomic development has not been 
successful in East Timor, although vast amounts of aid were provided to the country.1225  
Based on the empirical data of several development projects (a dairy, a greenhouse, a seed 
development program, and a permanent farming initiative), Shepherd remarks that there were 
difficulties and tensions between development agents and locals, and these differences need to 
be reconciled to achieve development.1226 Similarly, Carroll-Bell’s empirical study suggests that 
application of orthodox approaches of development was not promising for East Timor, and 
alternative ways of development which ensure the engagement of locals and their 
understandings must be sought out.1227  
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According to the latest official statistics, the unemployment rate was 11% as of 2013 in East 
Timor,1228 but the figure was higher for young people (15-24): 21.9%.1229 These figures should 
not be interpreted as employed people having secure jobs in East Timor. It was noted that a 
large portion of these people were in vulnerable employment which means they do not have 
job security or a guaranteed salary every month.1230 Returning to poverty, it was noted that there 
is a significant correlation between education and poverty. People with less or no education 
tend to earn less than their more educated counterparts. For instance, 74.6% of the people who 
were in the poorest quintile of the population had no education whereas the percentage was 
2.4% for people who attended more than junior high school according to 1998 statistics.1231  
2.3.b. Education 
East Timor has a remarkably young population as 48% of the population is below the age of 
18.1232 This young population can be an advantage as the country has been built from the scratch 
and youth can be an important part of the development of the country. However, their human 
capital is critical for them to advance development of the country, and East Timor has serious 
problems regarding education. According to the National Development Plan, which was 
prepared in 2002, the country’s literacy rate was among the lowest in the world.1233 The poor 
education level was the result of the policies of Portuguese colonialism and the Indonesian 
occupation.  
The Portuguese colonisers considered education as a means to assimilate East Timorese elites. 
So, they provided education to the children of the elites and ignored the rest of the 
population.1234 It is noted that the main aim of the Portuguese was to educate an administrative 
elite rather than mass education.1235 Only 5% of the population was literate when Portugal left 
East Timor.1236 Education under Indonesian occupation was not much different at all. After the 
Indonesian occupation, the enrolment rates in school improved compared to the colonial 
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times.1237 Yet, Shah explains that even though provision of education opportunities was largely 
improved, the aim remained similar: “to assimilate future generations into Indonesian society, 
and discount the existence of a distinct Timorese identity.”1238 In addition to this 
disadvantageous historical legacy, the country’s school system was devastated in the 1999 
violence. 95% of schools were destroyed by the militia, and a large number of teachers (20% of 
primary school and 80% of secondary school teachers) departed from East Timor as they were 
from Indonesia.1239 These should be considered as a violation of the right to education of the 
East Timorese people, as the enjoyment of their right was prevented through deliberate 
activities of Indonesia. East Timor was able to rebuild almost 86% of the classrooms within 18 
months.1240 However, rebuilding the schools did not mean that the physical conditions of schools 
were satisfactory. Most of the schools did not have electricity, toilets or water.1241  
Access to basic education was improved as the primary enrolment rate increased from 64% in 
2005 to 94% in 2010.1242 Yet, it was noted that there are important challenges for students 
enrolled in school including: lack of learning materials, poor teacher performance, high student-
teacher ratios, poor conditions of schools and education in a new language.1243 The language is 
a serious challenge for many students as most of them speak different languages at home rather 
than Portuguese and Tetum. It was noted that children can perform better if they are taught in 
their mother tongues.1244 It should be understood that providing education in other languages 
would be a serious challenge for the country as producing learning materials and training 
teachers for these languages will be a difficult task. Berlie notes that the country received 
educational support from Portugal and Brazil for Portuguese, but teachers are still struggling 
with using Portuguese in primary and secondary schools.1245 Besides, poor learning outcomes 
are also a serious challenge as many students repeat the same grades (for example, 30% of 
students repeat the first grade), most of them start the school over-age, and their achievements 
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are poor.1246 The differences between rural and urban settings are also reflected upon student 
profiles. The students in rural areas have poorer living conditions (regarding electricity, running 
water etc.) at home, their parents are less educated, and they have less resources compared to 
their peers in urban households.1247  
The CAVR’s findings depict there have been anger and frustration among young males in the 
society. They were unable to have or complete their education due to the violence. After 
independence, lack of education and unemployment made them feel marginalised and 
excluded.1248 It is claimed that youth are vulnerable to agitation and violence if they have no 
regular work.1249 The arguments about whether young males pose a threat in post-conflict 
societies continue in literature.1250 The UNDP’s report on youth stated that promotion of youth 
employment could prevent violence.1251 In the context of East Timor, Distler explains that youth 
had not been considered as a threat to peace before 2006, but after the violent events in 2006 
and 2008, both national and international actors started to consider them so.1252 UNICEF’s 
report regarding the Timorese children also explained the involvement of youth in violence with 
their frustration with unemployment and exclusion.1253 The report clarified that unemployment 
was not the only reason for youth violence, but it was an important one.1254 A survey conducted 
in East Timor depicts that employment was considered as a key to cease the violence among 
youth as almost all the participants agreed on this.1255  
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2.3.c. Health, sanitation and infrastructure  
Violence in 1999 hit East Timor’s health system as well. Most of the doctors and health staff 
departed from East Timor as they were from Indonesia, and almost three-quarters of the health 
facilities were devastated partially or completely.1256 The National Development Plan described 
the health standards of the country as weak since life expectancy was around 50-58, and other 
health indicators (infant mortality [IMR], under-5 years mortality [U5MR], maternal mortality 
rates) were poor. A significant number of children were chronically malnourished (about 20%) 
and underweight (about 45%) as of 2002.1257 The country made an impressive improvement in 
U5MR and IMR as the death figures were reduced about 50% in both from 2002 to 2016.1258 
However, it was not the case for malnutrition. Malnutrition had long been a problem for East 
Timorese children. Kohen notes that mental development of half of a generation of these 
children was damaged because of malnutrition under the Indonesian occupation.1259 It was 
remarked that there have been some improvements in malnutrition since 2002, but it is still a 
major concern.1260 Relating to this, the country had the lowest percentage of children 6–59 
months of age who are neither stunted nor wasted in the world1261 and the highest stunting in 
the world as of 2015.1262  
Sanitation and infrastructure have also been a big concern for East Timor. When the country 
became independent, the sanitation and infrastructure were in poor conditions. It was reported 
that “three in four persons live without electricity, three in five persons without safe sanitation 
and every other person without safe drinking water”.1263 Besides, there was a stark difference 
between rural and urban areas: only 4% of the population had access to electricity, drinking 
water and sanitation in rural areas whereas it was almost 50% for urban areas.1264 There have 
been some improvements regarding drinking water, sanitation and electricity. Access to drinking 
water increased both in rural (from ≈44% to 61%) and urban areas (from ≈70% to 95%) from 
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2001 to 2016.1265 There has not been a significant improvement in sanitation as figures did not 
change much from 2001 to 2016: in rural areas ≈30% in 2001 and remained the same in 2016; 
and in urban areas it increased from ≈70% to 73%.1266 East Timor experienced a remarkable 
improvement regarding electrification as it increased from 22% (2003) to 71% (2014) 
nationwide.1267 According to two polls conducted in 2016 and 2017, “lack of healthcare, 
education and infrastructure development” were the main reasons for the people who think the 
country was on the wrong course,1268 and 42% of the interviewees stated that roads were the 
main problem of East Timor.1269 The state needs to eliminate the disparities in these conditions 
to prevent discrimination in the enjoyment of ESCR.  
2.3.d. Forced displacements  
Forced displacement had long been a phenomenon for East Timorese people. Almost the entire 
population has been displaced once or more during the Indonesian occupation, the 1999 
violence, or the 2006 violence.1270 Since it has been a pressing problem, the CAVR’s fourth 
national hearing was on forced displacement and famine.1271 An inquiry on forced displacement 
was carried out by the CAVR to understand the sufferings of the victims, and the report stated 
that forced displacement and famine were adopted as a weapon of war and a collective 
punishment method to disrupt the daily lives of civilians in East Timor. They were correlated 
with other political, economic, social and cultural rights abuses.1272  
Taylor explained the internal displacements during Indonesian occupation. The army aimed to 
keep the Timorese under its control and prevent them from joining the resistance. So, people 
were forced to depart from their original villages to resettlement camps and villages which were 
controlled by the Indonesian army.1273 The physical conditions of the camps and villages were 
extremely poor which caused diseases among the people. In addition to diseases, people faced 
famine as they were unable to grow food due to Indonesia’s military operations and forced 
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displacements. Their movement was heavily restricted by the army, and they were forced to 
work in construction, road building, timber logging and cultivation of cash crops.1274 Moreover, 
the Indonesian military burnt their corps and destroyed the food stocks of displaced people.1275 
Findings of the commission depict that at least 84,200 people died because of hunger and illness 
which were caused by displacement.1276 The displacement-related deaths took place because 
displacements led to hunger and famines which made people more vulnerable to diseases, and 
these people did not have access to medical care. The CAVR’s report states: “It is likely that more 
people died from the eﬀects of displacement than from any other violation.”1277 It must be 
understood that these policies of Indonesia are clear violations of ESCR of the East Timorese, 
and some of these violations constitute serious crimes. 
Although people were suffering from famine in the camps and villages, the international 
humanitarian aid agencies were unable to operate freely to help these people because of the 
Indonesian government. Their aid was abused by the Indonesian army; the supplies were 
misappropriated and maldistributed (or sold) to the Timorese people by the army members.1278 
Moreover, in 1982, Indonesia started to distribute the fertile lands of the displaced people to 
non-Timorese people who were brought from other parts of the country.1279 Eventually, the 
resettlement campaign of Indonesia expanded in East Timor; almost all the East Timorese 
people were living in resettlement villages by 1990.1280  
During the 1999 conflict, roughly 450,000 people were displaced (including 250,000 East 
Timorese who fled to West Timor) as Indonesia-backed militias launched a violent campaign in 
the aftermath of the vote for independence.1281 It was claimed that this displacement wave was 
a planned operation and systematic as many people were forcibly carried to West Timor by the 
Indonesian military.1282 Although some 140,000 refugees who had fled to West Timor returned 
to East Timor by 2001 when the war was over,1283 many people who were actively pro-
integration and suspected militias and their families remained in West Timor as they were afraid 
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of being targeted. Babo-Soares states that these people were considered as a threat by the East 
Timorese government as they may destabilise the country in the future.1284 East Timorese 
political leaders, including Gusmao, visited West Timor and held meetings with pro-integration 
political leaders to convince these people to return.1285 Yet, the elite-driven reconciliation 
process among political leaders was not effective for return and reconciliation among society. 
Therefore, a grassroots reconciliation program was adopted to facilitate returns and integration 
which was explained in the previous section. 
The commission implemented a specific program to monitor and assist the returnees as they 
faced many struggles. Earning a living has been the most critical problem for them as they lost 
their lands and assets during the conflict and lived in refugee camps in West Timor. Therefore, 
many returnees migrated to Dili and other urban centres to make a living.1286 Yet, the returnees 
and IDPs settled in urban centres and this created problems regarding housing, resources and 
unemployment.1287 The competition for jobs and resources led to jealousy and tensions among 
these people.1288 In fact, the CAVR had recommendations to achieve reconciliation within 
communities regarding local conflicts and grievances;1289 yet, it was noted that these problems 
were not addressed properly and they contributed to the violence in 2006.1290 The 2006 crisis 
created a new wave of displacement in East Timor. Over 150,000 people (almost 15% of the 
population1291) were displaced between 2006 and 2008 and these people faced lots of problems 
regarding housing, security and health.1292 This new wave of displacement also caused numerous 
violations of socioeconomic rights as in other cases. The details of the 2006 crisis was elucidated 
in the historical background of the conflict section and will not be explained here. However, the 
government’s strategy to deal with the displacement crisis was effective in tackling the problem 
and merits a brief analysis.1293 
When the violence significantly declined in 2008, the government created a comprehensive plan 
(the NRS) to tackle the displacement issue.1294 Vieira explained the process of how the NRS was 
                                                          
1284 Babo-Soares, Nahe biti, p.16. 
1285 Ibid, pp.16-17. 
1286 The CAVR, Chega, pp.30-31.; Vieira, The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis, p.9.; Rae, 
Peacebuilding and transitional justice, pp.74-75. 
1287 Koefner, Displacement in East Timor, p.79.; Vieira, The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis, p.14. 
1288 Vieira, The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis, p.16. 
1289 The CAVR, Chega, p.191 (Recommendations 8.1-8.3). 
1290 Vieira, The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis, pp.15-16. 
1291 Van der Auweraert, Ending the 2006 Internal Displacement Crisis, p.7. 
1292 Ferguson, P. (2010) IDP camp closure and gender inequality in Timor-Leste, Forced Migration Review, 
No.34, p.67. 
1293 Van der Auweraert, Ending the 2006 Internal Displacement Crisis, pp.9-10. 
1294 Vieira, The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis, p.10. 
177 
 
designed. The government conducted a series of dialogue initiatives with the IDP communities. 
The government officials, including the president and the minister of social solidarity (who was 
responsible for IDP-related problems), visited the IDP camps; large-scale community ceremonies 
and mass information campaigns were held; and individual land and property disputes were 
mediated. After these dialogues and debates, the government decided to grant cash payments 
(called “recovery package”) to IDPs to facilitate their return and resettlement.1295 These efforts 
could be considered as an important attempt to redress violations (such as the right to housing) 
raising from the forced displacement. Van der Auweraert remarks that merely providing 
payments to IDPs would not be enough for their return and resettlement smoothly. So, the 
government formed “dialogue teams” to work with IDPs to facilitate their return.1296 These 
teams were effective in local peacebuilding and reconciliation processes which helped to 
facilitate a sustainable return process. It was not possible to assess that reconciliation had been 
achieved entirely, but it could be said that in general, the process continued without 
considerable violence.1297  
Closing camps and facilitating returns and resettlements were not free from problems though. 
Within the scope of the NRS, the government provided payments to the IDPs for their homes 
which were destroyed or damaged; and closed the last IDP camps in 2010.1298 Yet, there was a 
concern regarding gender-parity in these payments to IDPs; the payments were granted to the 
male heads of the households, and there were many cases in which men disappeared with the 
money.1299 So, the government should have taken gender parity into account concerning these 
payments. Moreover, land and property disputes, and socioeconomic problems in the urban 
centres were important issues in the context of IDPs. It was noted that land disputes and 
property ownership posed a threat to security and stability in East Timor.1300 There have long 
been land and property disputes in East Timor due to the different land titling systems of the 
Portuguese and Indonesia. Destruction of property records in 1999 and the 2006 crisis 
exacerbated these disputes.1301 Likewise, the numerous displacements contributed to these 
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problems in East Timor. There were no legal documents or proof to verify the ownership of lands 
and properties to which the IDPs wanted to return. Since enacting a law and tackling all the 
property and land issues would require time, the government decided to consult with the 
affected communities to verify land and property claims of the IDPs.1302 In 2017, a land law 
named “Special Regime for the Ownership of Immovable Property” was enacted.1303 
Regarding the urban centres, lack of adequate housing, infrastructure and employment 
opportunities challenged the government. For instance, Dili’s population increased from 
100,715 (1999) to 173,541 (2004) in only five years1304 but housing, infrastructure, employment 
opportunities did not grow at a similar rate.1305 Vieira remarked that the government and the 
international organisations were not successful in employing complementary measures to 
address these problems. He noted that IDPs need to be supported to find a sustainable solution 
to the displacement problem as the movement of thousands of people begets many 
challenges.1306 To mitigate these challenges some government officials wanted to persuade the 
IDPs to resettle in districts other than Dili through material and transport support, but this 
proved not to be successful as a majority of IDPs returned to Dili in the end.1307 Moreover, return 
and resettlement may not mean that the displacement problem is solved. Koefner noted that if 
the problems which arose from displacement remain and the normalcy in all respects of life is 
not restored, it is not possible to say the displacement problem is solved. He continued that 
people were still dependent on aid, and reconciliation was not entirely achieved in the society 
as some of the returnees continued to face harassment, particularly the ones who were pro-
integration.1308 Although achieving development is not a responsibility of transitional justice, 
redressing ESCR violations and contributing to elimination of historical inequalities should be 
among the aims of transitional justice efforts. Although there have been deficits, East Timor 
attempted to achieve this by taking socioeconomic issues into account in its transitional process. 
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3. Peru 
Between 1980 and 2000, Peru had suffered from an internal war between the Peruvian military 
and the Shining Path (the Communist Party of Peru - Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) − a subversive 
group which aimed for a communist revolution in Peru.1309 In 1992 the leader of the PCP-SL was 
captured, and the war started to fade away. After 2000, a transitional process started in Peru; 
and various transitional justice mechanisms, including trials, truth commission and reparations 
were applied to redress the past human rights violations committed during the war. To analyse 
the transitional justice in Peru, the historical background of the war needs to be understood.  
This section will start explaining the historical background of the war, then will describe the 
transitional justice process with a specific focus on ESCR violations. The last part of this section 
will make an analysis of the socioeconomic dimension of the transitional process in Peru.  
3.1. Historical background 
Peru had been under Spanish colonial rule for nearly 300 years and the country became 
independent in 1824. Yet, the legacies of colonialism could not be eliminated by declaring 
independence. Root explains that Peru had long been divided intensely, and two different 
groups of people had lived in the country. The first group, mainly the descendants of Spanish, 
has been urban and middle class. The second group, mainly indigenous people, has lived in 
Andean highlands, and they were poor and rural peasants. There was a stark difference between 
these groups in terms of income, health, education and living conditions.1310 Even the language 
they spoke was different; the first group spoke Spanish, whereas second group spoke Quechua 
and other indigenous languages.1311 The government’s approach had been ignoring the 
exclusion and marginalisation of indigenous people and this left these people without political 
and economic power.1312 The approach of the government towards the marginalisation of the 
indigenous people allowed this division in the society to continue to exist, if not get worse. In 
fact, the division in the society was deeply rooted in Peru. Heilman depicts that indigenous 
Peruvians had been considered as backwards, ignorant and uncivilised in Peru since the 19th 
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century. They were disenfranchised, their labour and lands were exploited, and they were 
excluded from political participation.1313 It must be added that there were still some 
marginalising statements after the conflict; for instance, the president Garcia referred to 
indigenous people as “enemies of modernity” and “enemies of national progress” in 2007 and 
2009.1314 
Since the society was deeply divided and beset with inequalities, there was unrest among poor 
sections of the society, mainly among the indigenous people of the Andes. The communist 
parties had been effective in these communities and they were promising to change the unjust 
system of the country. The Shining Path was one of them and its leader was Abimael Guzman. 
Guzman was a philosophy professor at a university in Ayacucho region and he started his 
communist campaign in the 1970s among students to achieve a peasant revolution in Peru. The 
military campaign of Guzman to overthrow the government was started in 1980 in the poor 
districts of Ayacucho.1315 The PCP-SL was not the only rebel group at that time, there were other 
violent groups such as Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Spanish acronym MRTA), yet the 
most prominent rebel group among others had been the PCP-SL.1316 
It is important to understand the circumstances in the society which paved the way for a 
subversive campaign to become an internal war. Therefore, analysing the dynamics in Peru prior 
to conflict is crucial. Heilman explained that the indigenous peasants of the Andes had sought 
to have a healthy dialogue with the state to transform the unequal share of the political, 
economic and social power long before the emergence of the PCP-SL; yet the state’s approach 
to them had varied from neglect to oppression which might also explain the initial popularity of 
the subversive groups.1317 It was noted: “The economic catastrophe, the poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment along with the persecution of the peasantry in the highland regions made it a 
hot bed of such revolutionary and guerrilla activities.”1318 In addition, the country was 
transitioning to democracy when the PCP-SL started its insurgent campaign, and the nascent 
democracy and its institutions were not strong or prepared to handle a subversive campaign.1319 
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There is often no single reason to explain the emergence of a conflict. Historical marginalisation 
and oppression of the indigenous peasants of the Andes and the Amazon do not exclusively 
explain the conflict in Peru. Yet, these realities can be helpful to understand both the conflict 
and the reasons why people had supported the subversive campaign. 
The PCP-SL’s initial popularity must be analysed more thoroughly to get a good grasp of the 
conflict. Root described how Guzman initiated his campaign and recruited people. Guzman 
convinced the poor and marginalised indigenous Peruvians that they lived in poverty and misery 
because of the bourgeois Peruvians who were essentially corrupted.1320 This view explains the 
initial popularity of the PCP-SL but there is a contradicting view that suggests the organisation’s 
campaign could not find much support in the beginning. According to this view, the PCP-SL did 
not attempt to win the sympathy of people; instead, they forced people to support them by 
installing fear and resorting to violence.1321 The first view sounds more convincing as it is 
plausible to think that oppressed and marginalised people would support a campaign which 
promised them to eliminate these inequalities. Even so, whether the PCP-SL had tried to win the 
hearts of the people in the region, the group often targeted the very people it claimed to 
champion since the beginning of its campaign. Therefore, their brutal policies and attacks 
damaged its popularity over time. Root notes that the PCP-SL turned to alternative ways to 
continue its operations when the public support for them had diminished. They started child 
recruitment and forced recruitment to find new soldiers. In addition, they resorted to 
narcotrafficking with the Colombian drug cartels to fund their organisation.1322  
The reason for losing the public support could also be explained by the PCP-SL’s abusive and 
brutal exercises in the communities they controlled. They declared these areas as “liberated 
zones”, yet their governance was not liberating at all. Heilman gives an example from a district 
named Carhuanca that: “There was nothing liberating about life in the ‘liberated zone’ of 
Carhuanca.”1323 In addition to oppression, people were put in a difficult position by the PCP-SL 
economically. It is depicted that the organisation extorted 50% of the agricultural production of 
the areas it controlled and also got extortions from the businesses.1324 Heilman summarises this 
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as: “Far from liberation, the PCP-SL had brought only violence, devastation, and ruin to 
Carhuanca, to Ayacucho, and to Peru.”1325  
The state’s approach to the people was not very different from the PCP-SL’s. The government’s 
initial response to the subversive campaign was sending the paramilitary police to the region 
but their behaviour towards the local population was abusive and indiscriminate.1326 It is also 
noted that the government’s approach to the insurgency was not intelligent because they 
labelled the whole indigenous people of Ayacucho as enemy. Their abusive and harsh 
counterinsurgency policies and militarisation of the region led to greater support for the PCP-
SL.1327 Although the government did not consider the Shining Path as a serious threat in the 
beginning, by the 1983, their activities reached a point where the government could not ignore 
them anymore. It is noted that the government adopted a hard-line stance against the PCP-SL 
and declared a state of emergency in the zones the organisation operated. Military leaders took 
control of the political power which meant the suspension of even the basic human rights of the 
people. Enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and torture were adopted as a means of 
counterinsurgency campaign.1328 Peru’s response to the PCP-SL’s campaign is quite similar to 
Turkey’s response to the PKK. As depicted in the third chapter, Turkey’s counterinsurgency 
campaign led to serious human rights violations in the Kurdish region, and this increased the 
support for the PKK among Kurds. 
The hard-line response of the state, in fact, benefited the rebels. Root noted that the PCP-SL 
resorted to violence to marginalise people because the state’s response was indiscriminate in 
the region. She explains that the state’s indiscriminate violence in the region reflected the 
divisions in the Peruvian society. The members of the security forces were mainly from Lima and 
other urban centres, and they did not speak Quechua and other indigenous languages. The 
soldiers and people could not communicate, and they did not trust each other. This exacerbated 
the tension between them.1329 As the military had a powerful position, its expenditures were 
around 30% of the national budget during these years. In addition to the budget, the army 
enjoyed impunity for its large-scale human rights violations, and it was given autonomy which 
allowed the army to exercise great power in the countryside and in emergency zones.1330 People 
often found themselves in the cross-fire and they suffered from the actions of both the 
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subversive organisations and the state officials.1331 Lacking the protection of the state, people in 
the conflict zones sought alternative ways to protect themselves. When the PCP-SL’s violence 
targeted the peasants, they got frustrated and formed rondas (or rondos/ronderos), self-
defence groups, to protect themselves.1332 Later, the state integrated these self-defence groups 
into its counterinsurgency campaign and started training and equipping them to buttress its 
security forces.1333 It can be understood that the lives of people in conflict zones were highly 
militarised, and this often leads to traumas at individual and societal levels which will be 
explained in the following sections.  
During the 1980s, the PCP-SL continued to expand, and the country witnessed increasing 
violence. Therefore, not only poor peasants living in the Andes but also middle-class Peruvians 
living in Lima and other urban centres also started experiencing civil war.1334 The PCP-SL started 
to concentrate on shantytowns of the big cities such as Lima where the organisation got better 
protection from security forces and better opportunities to recruit new people.1335 This led to a 
change in government’s approach. In 1990, Fujimori became president by promising that he 
would bring an end to the conflict. Yet, Fujimori undermined democracy when he was in power 
and the country slid towards authoritarianism.1336 The legal system was corrupted under his rule: 
many innocent citizens were convicted even though there was not sufficient evidence against 
them; whereas the members of the security forces enjoyed impunity although there was 
sufficient evidence showing their involvement in grave human rights abuses.1337 During his 
presidency, a paramilitary group, Grupo Colina (the Colina Group), committed human rights 
abuses, and the group was backed by the government covertly.1338 Fujimori’s harsh policies 
against the PCP-SL served their purpose in Peru. In 1992, Guzman was captured, prosecuted and 
sentenced to life imprisonment which led to a stark decline in the PCP-SL’s subversive activities. 
Gradually, the organisation turned into a small gang engaged in drug trafficking after Guzman’s 
capture.1339 In 1993, a “repentance law” was enacted by Fujimori for the militants of subversive 
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groups, and more than 5000 of them surrendered within the context of this amnesty.1340 Yet, 
the draconian policies of the Fujimori regime did not end after this, and militarised policies were 
applied against the regime’s critics, opponents, human rights defenders and journalists.1341 In 
1995, an amnesty law was passed by the Peruvian Congress which granted “total legal amnesty 
to all military and police officers implicated in human rights abuses since 1980.”1342 The purpose 
of this law was to grant impunity to the members of the security forces who committed human 
rights abuses. In addition to these practices, Fujimori was involved in corruption cases which 
later compelled him to flee the country. 
Fujimori resigned from office and fled to Japan in 2000 as his presidency was collapsing after the 
corruption he was involved had been unearthed.1343 After his resignation, the country started 
taking steps to re-institutionalise democracy and human rights. It is noted that after Fujimori, 
an interim president, Valentín Paniagua, came to power, and although he was in power for only 
eight months, he had taken fundamental steps to enhance human rights and transitional justice 
in Peru.1344 The transitional justice efforts in Peru will be explained in the next section, but before 
that, looking at the socioeconomic dimensions of the war is beneficial to have a complete 
understanding of the war in Peru.  
3.1.a. Socioeconomic background 
First of all, it must be noted that most of the violence took place in certain parts of the country 
− mainly highlands and jungle areas − which are far from Lima and other urban centres, and 
inhabitants of these regions experienced exclusion and indifference from the rest of the 
country.1345 The unequal development and modernisation in Peru left these regions without 
important investments, highways and hydroelectric projects prior to the conflict.1346 These 
regions had already been in unfortunate conditions.  Gangopudhyay claims that before the PCP-
SL’s subversive campaign, there were alarming socioeconomic problems which had long been 
ignored. These included poverty, particularly among Peru’s rural and urban youth, and disrupted 
rural economies of peasant communities which had resulted from demographic pressures and 
agrarian reforms. This socioeconomic environment enabled the rebel group to become 
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attractive.1347 Although a low level of development is not transitional justice’s concern, it is still 
important to understand this for analysing the root causes of the conflict. It can be 
comprehended that a low level of development of a region is often associated with a low level 
of enjoyment of socioeconomic rights in that region. So, as mentioned in the second chapter, 
transitional justice and development efforts should be cooperated in a constructive manner to 
achieve development and enhance the enjoyment of ESCR. 
It is unfortunate that the region could only draw attention when the civil war began. Perhaps, if 
the region had been given adequate prominence and the problems had been tackled in the first 
place, the support that PCP-SL got from people could be much less. In fact, Gangopudhyay’s 
assertion supports this opinion. She says that the PCP-SL’s primary targets were young people 
and lower/middle class Peruvians who had been frustrated with economic depression, violence 
and oppression by the authorities.1348 The PCP-SL received support of people by promising them 
a revolution which would overthrow the prevailing political, social and economic inequalities. 
However, what was promised to people never came true. In fact, the opposite became the 
reality. The indigenous people were severely affected by the war. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, they had been extorted by the PCP-SL. Their means of living were damaged by the 
conflict. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes because of the 
conflicts. They fled to relatively safer areas, and many of them inhabited the slums of Lima.1349 
In addition to losing their means of livelihoods, they were discriminated against in these cities 
because of their ethnic background and lack of education and language.1350 Although political 
abuses such as enforced disappearances, killings and torture receive more attention in post-
conflict settings, socioeconomic abuses and ESCR violations also deserve attention as they also 
have egregious impacts on people. 
3.2. Transitional justice process  
Peru experienced eight years of authoritarianism (1992-2000) and 20 years of conflict (1980-
2000).1351 After the resignation of Fujimori in 2000, a transitional government was formed, and 
this government commenced the transitional justice period to deal with those horrendous 
legacies of the past. Root notes that Peru has adopted almost all sorts of transitional justice 
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mechanisms during its transition period including “official apologies, the legislation of 
reparations programs, a truth and reconciliation commission, a revocation of official amnesties, 
and prosecutions of members of the armed forces, intelligence agencies, guerrilla organisations, 
and the executive branch.”1352 It must be noted that Peru did not have negotiations or a peace 
agreement with the PCP-SL, as the organisation was defeated militarily. Yet, even after a military 
defeat, the country needed a transitional justice process.  
There is no hierarchy among transitional justice mechanisms, but it could be argued that truth 
commissions are more prominent than others as they bring the past violations to light. 
Understanding the past thoroughly is extremely useful to draw a roadmap for redressing the 
past. In addition, truth commissions make recommendations when they prepare their reports. 
These recommendations can be a starting point for other mechanisms. The Peruvian truth 
commission likewise recommended the prosecution of 150 people who were identified by the 
commission.1353 The commission also suggested that the official apology would not be enough, 
and the Peruvian government needed to act on behalf of victims to redress the violations.1354 
So, this section will focus the Peruvian truth commission first. Then, other transitional justice 
mechanisms will be explained.  
3.2.a. Truth commission 
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Spanish acronym CVR) was established in 
June 2001. The proposal of the CVR came from the National Coordinator for Human Rights (the 
Coordinadora), an umbrella organisation for Peruvian NGOs. Establishing a truth commission 
was part of their 44-point agenda for the advancement of human rights in Peru. Then, an Inter-
Institutional Working Group was formed by the president Paniagua to prepare a design for the 
truth commission.1355 The group consulted with national and international experts and − more 
importantly − hundreds of groups from the civil society to decide on the design of the 
commission.1356 After the consultation process, the group decided that the truth commission 
should not have restricted itself to a specific type of crimes. So, it was concluded that the 
commission would look at all sources and patterns of violence committed between 1980 and 
                                                          
1352 Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, p.8. 
1353 Peru Support Group, Truth and Reconciliation, p.34. 
1354 Ibid, p.43. 
1355 Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, p.53. 
1356 Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, p.54. 
187 
 
2000.1357 In addition, the working group decided that “the Truth Commission should be a 
precursor to trials.”1358 It meant that the commission would not obstruct trials. 
The mission of the CVR was: “shedding light on crimes and human rights violations that were 
committed, providing an interpretation of the underlying causes of the violence, contributing to 
justice and proposing recommendations for a reparations policy and institutional reforms.”1359 
According to the commission, its ethical mandate was “to pay respect to thousands of victims, 
to recognise them and to give them the public voice that violence and exclusion had denied 
them throughout Peruvian history.”1360 It must be noted that the CVR did not only aim to find 
the truth about the human rights violations, it also sought to find political, economic, cultural 
and psychological root causes of the conflict which led to violence and atrocities.1361  
Selection of members of the truth commission was designed by a supreme decree.1362 So, Toledo 
appointed the commissioners from different backgrounds including a congresswoman (from 
Fujimori’s political party), a journalist, a retired army lieutenant, academicians and religious 
leaders with the approval of the Council of Ministers.1363 The commission set up one central 
office, four regional offices and eight local offices, and went to every department of the country 
(530 districts in 137 provinces) between 2001 and 2003.1364 The CVR operated for 26 months 
and published its final report on 28th of August 2003. The CVR collected nearly 17,000 
testimonies from victims, held public hearings and conducted forensic and social research.1365 It 
is noted that Peruvian human rights organisations had already been gathering testimonies and 
information throughout the civil war and these were included in the commission’s work for 
contribution.1366  
The CVR did not only gather testimonies from people, it also gathered several types of written 
evidence such as “press reports, parliamentary commissions of enquiry, judicial documentation, 
other official documents from a range of government agencies, the archives of the various 
human rights organisations, etc.”1367 Politicians, military officials and militants of subversive 
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groups were called for interviews with the commissioners and many of them − including Alan 
Garcia (president between 1985-1990) and Abimael Guzman (the founder of the Shining Path) 
− accepted to talk. Only Alberto Fujimori and some members of the death squad refused to 
talk.1368 The CVR examined experiences of other countries thoroughly to learn from them.1369 
The CVR also examined the dynamics of culture and society to understand the conditions which 
allowed violence and abuses to take place. Peruvian society is multicultural, and hierarchies and 
prejudices are extant from colonial times.1370 The details about the way the CVR worked depict 
that there was a significant effort to find the truth about the past. 
Public hearings were important in raising awareness among people who lived in urban centres 
such as Lima and were unaware of the human rights abuses.1371 To contribute to the 
dissemination of the truth about the civil war, the commission broadcast eight hearings on 
television.1372 The CVR wanted to prevent re-traumatisation of the victims who would give 
testimony, so all the victims who participated in public hearings were provided with mental 
health professionals before, during and after they gave testimony.1373 It is described that even 
the commission’s hearings were designed carefully for the testimony givers. They sat around a 
table with commissioners and there was no questioning, no cross-examination and no 
confrontation with the perpetrators.1374 Since the settings were designed cautiously, many of 
the victims reported positively about their experience, stating that they had felt like they were 
considered as equal human beings.1375 It must be noted that the report did not only disclose the 
shame and dishonour of people, it also disclosed the stories of the ones who had defended the 
rights of others.1376 It is important to include such stories for two reasons. Firstly, it helps to give 
a balanced account of the past and secondly, it gives hope to people. It may help people to trust 
in society and institutions.  
Root notes that both national and international NGOs had made a great contribution to the 
CVR’s work. For instance, the International Center for Transitional Justice assigned consultants 
to assist the commission and Coordinadora sent members to work in the field.1377 The Peruvian 
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government and foreign donors financed the CVR. Yet, the CVR encountered financial difficulties 
and sometimes its work was affected negatively. Nevertheless, the commission continued to 
operate even though the staff members were not paid.1378 The CVR submitted the final report 
to the President of the Republic, the National Parliament and the National Chief Prosecutor’s 
oﬃce officially. In addition, a public ceremony was held in Ayacucho to present the final report 
to Peruvian society.1379 An abridged version of the final report, which was originally 8000 pages 
long, was also published after a few months to disseminate it to more people and raise greater 
awareness.1380  
It is observed that the final report of the CVR led to debates in Peru after its publication. 
Mainstream media criticised and undermined both the CVR’s findings and the concerns about 
human rights. Many politicians, particularly the right-wing politicians, and retired military 
officials adopted a similar approach to the mainstream media; they criticised the commission 
and its findings by accusing them of being communists and of helping the subversive 
organisations inadvertently.1381 On the other hand, many civil society organisations, human 
rights groups and some politicians, including Alan Garcia who was seriously criticised in the 
report, commended the commission and its findings. In addition, according to a poll conducted 
after the publication of the report, 54% of the interviewees approved of the commission and 
the findings.1382 
After explaining the establishment and the operation of the CVR, its findings deserve to be 
mentioned as well. First of all, the final report of the CVR concluded that more than 69,000 
people have been killed or forcibly disappeared by subversive groups or state agents during the 
conflict which lasted for two decades.1383 Unlike other Latin American countries, the state was 
not responsible for the greater number of deaths and forced disappearances. According to the 
final report, 54% of the human loss was caused by the PCP-SL and the remaining fatalities were 
attributed to state agents, paramilitary groups, self-defence groups and the MRTA.1384 The 
report remarked that indiscriminate violence was used against civilian populations by both 
subversive groups and state security forces, and both ignored the civilian losses by considering 
them as a price to be paid to achieve their goals.1385 The report also points out that the crimes 
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were committed systematically by the subversive organisations and the state officials rather 
than being committed by “perverse individuals who acted outside the norms of their 
institutions.”1386 
Although the conflict in Peru was not identified as an ethnic conflict in the report, 75% of the 
victims were peasants whose native language was Quechua or another language other than 
Spanish, and they had been dispossessed and disdained by the state and the urban society. This 
marginalisation made destruction and death possible for these people.1387 It is important to note 
that only one-fifth of the population spoke Quechua in Peru.1388 Although Quechua speakers 
constitute 20% of the population, they constituted 75% of the deaths and disappearances in 20 
years of conflict. It could be assumed that they had been the primary target in conflict. 
Furthermore, testimonies collected by the CVR depicted that these people were systematically 
insulted and abused racially prior to other human rights abuses such as rape, torture, kidnapping 
and killing.1389 This shows that race was determining in victimhood. Yet, race was not really a 
determining factor regarding guerrillas, as only 23% of the captured guerrillas were of 
indigenous origin.1390 
As argued in the first chapter, the effects of testifying at a truth commission are controversial as 
there is no consensus in academia whether testifying is harmful or helpful. However, it must be 
admitted that the settings of the environment in which victims testify are quite important and 
this brings us to a point of consideration. Laplante conducted a research with Peruvian victims 
who had testified at the commission. The research depicts that all the interviewees gave positive 
feedback regarding their experiences. The scale of the research is not wide as Laplante 
interviewed only 20 people. This prevents us from generalising the results, but it still gives us 
significant insights about the process.1391 The positive feedbacks of the interviewees could be 
related to the CVR’s careful design of the settings. As previously mentioned, the testifiers were 
provided psychological assistance before, during and after their participation. And the settings 
of the room were different from courts in which victim-survivors were not cross-examined and 
not questioned. These might give an idea that if the settings are well designed, more positive 
outcomes may arise from giving testimony. 
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Although there was a consultation process with civil society before the establishment of the 
CVR, the scope of the consultation was criticised for being narrow. Arce notes that the CVR also 
received criticism regarding its members as some of the members had been associated with 
leftist parties. Therefore, President Toledo, increased the number of members from 7 to 12.1392 
As mentioned earlier, Toledo included a congress member from Fujimori’s political party and a 
retired military officer in the commission. Perhaps, Toledo, with these moves, wanted to depict 
that the commission was not biased. Yet, it still received criticism from political opponents 
(especially right-wing groups), the business sector and army officials. They argued that the final 
report of the commission was biased, and the army should not be held responsible, as it was 
protecting the country from terrorists. Likewise, they claimed that the army should not be 
blamed for its members’ individual crimes.1393 Moreover, the members of the CVR were 
criticised for not being suitable for the tasks of the commission. Eleven of the twelve members 
of the CVR were from Lima, and ten of them were men. Only two members could speak 
Quechua, and the commission lacked Quechua-Spanish translators.1394 Selection of the 
members of a truth commission is important because if it does not represent the society, it may 
not be accepted by the public.  
The way the CVR operated was explained in detail above because understanding its modus 
operandi is crucial to analyse it. This is true for all commissions as implementation of a 
mechanism is as important as its design. In addition, if adequate attention is not given to 
implementation of a mechanism, it may not serve its purpose even if it is designed properly. 
Moreover, its modus operandi can be enlightening for other countries. 
3.2.b. Reparations 
 The reparation program in Peru was a significant component of the transitional justice process 
and it will be explained in this section. The Comprehensive Reparations Plan (Spanish acronym 
PIR) was prepared pursuant to the CVR’s recommendations, and more than 40 workshops were 
held with victims’ organisations by the reparation study group of the CVR to designate the needs 
and expectations of the victims.1395 The CVR’s recommendations clarify that the reparation plan 
seeks to achieve reconciliation and address the socioeconomic injustices in the country. So, 
reparations do not only aim to redress the past violations but also aim to eliminate structural 
                                                          
1392 Arce Arce, G. A. (2010) Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transitional Justice in Peru, International 
Journal on Human Rights, Vol.7, No.13, p.30. 
1393 Arce Arce, Armed Forces, pp.33-35. 
1394 Peru Support Group, Truth and Reconciliation, p.12. 
1395 Waardt, M. (2013) Are Peruvian Victims Being Mocked: Politicization of Victimhood and Victims' 
Motivations for Reparations, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.35, No.4, p.835. 
192 
 
injustices in terms of social, economic and cultural rights.1396 Waardt also comments on this and 
states that reparations should not aim to restore the status quo ante unquestioningly. The 
former situation may not be just for some people if people had been suffering from poverty and 
structural injustices. She claims that reparations should aim to improve the circumstances and 
correct historical injustices at least partially.1397 Moreover, Laplante and Theidon claim that the 
PIR has been the most comprehensive reparations plan regarding its inclusivity of beneficiaries 
and its design of wide-ranging types of reparations. In addition, the PIR implicitly states that 
reparations aim to ensure sustainable peace and national reconciliation.1398  
The CVR’s reparations plan designated six types of reparations: symbolic reparations, 
reparations in health, reparations in education, restoration of citizens’ rights, economic 
reparations and collective reparations.1399  Symbolic reparations included public gestures, 
memorials and acts of recognition which aimed to foster reconciliation and solidarity among the 
Peruvian society.1400 Reparations in health were designed to redress the affected people and 
assist them to recover both mentally and physically. Reparations regarding education included 
scholarships, exemptions from tuition fees and adult education programs to provide recipients 
opportunities in their education.1401 According to the CVR’s plan, reparations regarding 
restoration of citizens’ rights aimed to empower victims to get equal footing with other citizens 
regarding their civil and political rights. These reparations encompass normalising the legal 
situations of people who were disappeared or were subjected to arrest warrants, abolishing 
legal, police and criminal records, and providing legal assistance.1402 Economic reparations 
aimed to compensate the victims of the sufferings caused by the conflict. These included both 
monetary reparations and non-monetary reparations in the form of services.1403 Lastly, the goal 
of collective reparations is to achieve the reconstruction and consolidation of communities 
which were affected by the conflict. Collective reparations included: consolidation of 
institutions; restoration and reconstruction of productive infrastructure; restoration and 
expansion of basic services; and employment and income generation.1404 Suchkova comments 
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that Peru’s collective reparations program was considered as one of the most developed ones 
in the world.1405  
In fact, the reparation program shows that the state acknowledged structural inequalities in 
social, economic and political terms in Peru. These inequalities were the basis of the PCP-SL’s 
argument for the revolution, and the state admitted these wrongs and designed a plan to tackle 
them. In a way, the PCP-SL arguments were acknowledged by the state. Interestingly, the critics 
of the truth commission (the army and the right-wing) mostly focused on the accusations against 
the security forces rather than the acknowledgement of these inequalities.1406 Perhaps, it was 
understood that ignoring these inequalities will not benefit the country in the future. Moreover, 
it can be comprehended that these reparations were used as a tool to address ESCR violations 
(the right to health, the right to education and the right to an adequate standard of living etc.) 
in Peru. The state also attempted to eliminate historical inequalities which were considered as 
a discrimination in the enjoyment of ESCR. 
The CVR made recommendations regarding the funding of the reparations program. The 
commission remarks that the state is responsible for funding the reparations and it advises the 
establishment of a National Reparations Fund. According to the CVR, the national budget and 
extraordinary resources such as corruption-related money which is repatriated would be the 
primary sources of this funding. The CVR also remarks that the international community’s 
contribution would be significant for the reparations program.1407 Baldo and Magarrell consider 
Peru as a good example regarding states’ responsibility for reparations. The state accepted full 
responsibility for the reparations in Peru, acknowledging that it could not protect its citizens. So, 
regardless of the perpetrators, all the victims will be granted reparations by the state.1408  
Following the CVR’s recommendations, the government attempted to commence the 
implementation of the reparations program, but the steps taken were limited. In 2004, the High 
Level Multisectoral Commission (Spanish acronym CMAN) was formed to design the reparations 
plan but it was not provided adequate funding and administrative power1409 due to the absence 
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of political will and commitment.1410 The full version of the reparations program became law in 
2005 and an executive decree detailed the law in 2006. A reparation council was formed under 
this law to identify beneficiaries and complete their registration.1411 It is important to note that 
two types of beneficiaries were classified in the plan, individuals and collectives. According to 
this definition, peasant and native communities and settlements were recognised as being 
“collectively affected by the armed conflict through scorched-earth strategies, forced 
displacement, destruction of local institutions and loss of local private and public infrastructure, 
such as land, cattle and houses, community houses and community services.”1412 This is 
important because recognition of communities as beneficiaries can pave the way for repairing 
the damages of these communities. 
The PIR’s definition of victim was quite inclusive as it considered the victim of a violation 
regardless of the perpetrator and the victim’s affiliations. The definition excluded only the 
guerrilla members who were harmed during a battle by taking up arms against the state. 
Otherwise, even guerrilla members who were subjected to violations when they were not 
fighting could be considered as victims.1413 However, when the reparation plan was passed into 
law, the definition of victim was changed, and the new definition did not include convicted 
guerrilla members even though they were subjected to human rights abuses.1414 They were 
excluded because they took up arms against the state. Likewise, most of the Peruvians thought 
that these people did not deserve reparations as they considered ex-guerrillas as enemies.1415 
Yet, this limitation was overturned in 2016 to eliminate the discrimination of some victims, and 
victims of the both sides of the conflict were entitled to receive reparations.1416  
In fact, narrowing the definition of the victims was not the only problem with the new 
reparations law. There were other administrative, financial, political and logistical problems 
which affected the implementation of the program. Waardt explains that identifying the victims 
and determining the scope of reparations were onerous. Although the government launched 
the General Victims’ Registry, there were problems regarding the identification and registration 
of victims and the designation of individual reparations. For instance, the decree put some age 
limits for the beneficiaries (the beneficiaries had to be older than 65 years old and in some cases 
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the limit was 80) and some monetary limits to reparations (the maximum amount was 10,000 
nuevos soles, which is about $3847). Moreover, many victims were in rural areas and they did 
not have the means to travel to registration offices, and they lacked the necessary legal 
information to claim reparations.1417 Waardt criticises the implementation of the reparations 
program for not treating victims equally as the government created hierarchy among victims by 
prioritising the elderly over other victims.1418 Moreover, the government postponed the 
implementation of individual economic reparations a few times; then, it was said that it will be 
implemented after the completion of the registration of the victims by December 2011.1419  In 
2011, Humala was elected to the presidency and the government started paying individual 
reparations. 287,260,779 soles (approx. $88,789,586) was paid to 82,721 individual victims from 
2011 to 2016 according to the CMAN’s annual report. The report notes that there are 4199 
pending cases for individual reparations.1420  
The implementation of collective reparations led to debates in Peru. Waardt explains that the 
state has not recognised the victims properly, and the way the government planned to grant 
collective reparations could easily be considered as the provision of basic services arising from 
general obligations of the state.1421 For instance, Toledo pledged to spend 800 million US dollars 
and promised some extra spending for Ayacucho and other regions which were affected by the 
conflict most. However, he did not clarify whether this spending was related to reparations.1422 
White explains that reparation programs must be differentiated clearly from other development 
spending which concerns providing and enhancing basic social services, as reparations have a 
distinct purpose of compensating past abuses to give victims a sense of justice.1423 It must be 
noted that reparations are different from development plans because reparations refer to the 
acknowledgement of the sufferings of the victims. Reparations show that the past violations are 
acknowledged and addressed by the state.1424 Development spending and basic services, on the 
other hand, plan to eradicate poverty and enhance the living conditions of people regardless of 
past violations. 
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Reparations are quite important in the Peruvian context as a majority of the victims are 
impoverished and the effects of the conflict on them were destructive. So, in order to let them 
break the cycle of poverty, they need monetary reparations − both individual and collective. 
Waardt also reiterates that the socioeconomic profile of the victims is important regarding 
reparations. In other countries such as Northern Ireland, Argentina or Brazil, the victims did not 
accept reparations, considering them as blood money. However, in Peru, victims prioritise 
reparations as their socioeconomic conditions have been poor.1425 It is noted that the 
socioeconomic profile of the victims has an important impact on their demands and choices. For 
instance, some Argentinian mothers of the disappeared rejected the compensation as they 
demanded retributive justice.  Yet, this was not an option for many Peruvian victims who had 
been struggling with poverty for quite a long time.1426 In short, reparations have an important 
role to play in the Peruvian context. 
Understanding the motives of the victims for wanting reparations is necessary to analyse the 
reparations scheme in Peru. Waardt describes five motivations of the victims regarding 
reparations based on in-depth interviews with members of various victim associations.1427 The 
first: Many victims were stigmatised by authorities or the public and being registered as a victim 
and receiving reparations prove that they were not terrorists.1428 The second: Some victims 
expect benefits in return for participating in public hearings.1429 The third: Some victims think 
that the state failed in its obligation to protect them.1430 The fourth and fifth motivations are 
related to the victims’ associations and their leaders. These groups made great effort for the 
rights of the victims and they consider reparations as “proof of associations’ right to participate 
and to exist”.1431 In short, reparations carry various meanings which go beyond the material 
benefits. 
Peruvian victims have a strong desire for reparations. Theidon and Laplante’s research depicts 
that all the interviewees remarked that they want reparations, whereas they did not all expect 
criminal investigations and trials.1432 Likewise, Arce depicts a survey, which was conducted in 
2007 in different regions of Peru, which shows that people prioritise economic reparations and 
development of the poor regions over prosecution of the perpetrators of human rights abuses. 
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This prioritisation was the same in every region from Lima to Ayacucho.1433 Although we cannot 
generalise the result of this research, it still carries significant implications about the victims’ 
desires. The authors remark that whilst the Peruvian victims seem to prioritise reparations over 
criminal justice and trials, this should not be interpreted as them not having any demands for 
justice. In fact, this is a complicated subject. Justice is often equated with trials, but it has many 
forms.1434 Reparations may also be considered as a form of justice for some victims. Indeed, once 
again the importance of consultation with victims comes to the fore, as the context may 
determine the perceptions of justice. In some contexts, symbolic or material reparations may 
give victims a sense of justice being done, while in others, victims may not be satisfied without 
trials. That is why understanding the context and finding out the demands of the people is crucial 
to achieve reconciliation. Moreover, the demands vary even in a specific context. For some 
victim groups, trials might be considered as a necessary condition to achieve reconciliation. 
3.2.c. Trials 
Retributive justice is an important component of transitional justice processes. Some countries 
prefer international tribunals whereas others conduct prosecutions in their own justice systems. 
Peru conducted investigations and trials in its national justice system. In fact, Peru is the first 
country to prosecute and convict a democratically elected president (Fujimori) in its own justice 
system for human rights violations.1435 Several presidents (Jorge Videla, Isabel Martinez de 
Peron and Roberto Viola) were convicted before him but they were not democratically elected 
leaders like Fujimori.1436 
In 2009, Fujimori was prosecuted by the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court for the 
involvement in human rights abuses and sentenced to 25 years.1437 Fujimori was only convicted 
for the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres and two kidnappings, not for other crimes.1438 
The court stated that these massacres were committed against civilians by death squad Grupo 
Colina which was “hierarchically subordinate to the organized apparatus of power under the 
control and will of” Fujimori.1439 These massacres were considered as crimes against 
humanity.1440 It must be noted that the court also ordered Fujimori to pay reparations to the 
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victims of massacres and disappearances for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.1441 Burt 
thinks that Fujimori’s trial is significant as it was done in domestic tribunals which allowed 
greater local acceptance of the trial, and Peru showed its citizens that its justice system can 
prosecute even the most powerful.1442 Fujimori’s trial can be considered as a message to the 
people that everyone is equal before the law. 
In addition to Fujimori’s, more trials were conducted against the army officials and insurgents. 
Some high-ranking members of the state including three former army generals were also 
convicted and sentenced for murders and enforced disappearances.1443 Root remarks that these 
trials were mostly considered as successful1444 but the HRW considers that the trial process was 
not very successful as the vast majority of the perpetrators of the human rights abuses have not 
been put on trials as of 2017.1445 These kinds of debates are common in transitional contexts 
because the expectations from people of the transitional justice mechanisms are different and, 
as a result, their evaluations are different. It must be reiterated that human rights violations 
were not investigated acutely during the conflict in Peru, and perpetrators of these crimes 
enjoyed impunity as the judicial system often abetted them.1446 So, considering the pervasive 
impunity in the past, these trials can be considered as important steps to end impunity in Peru. 
Considering the post-conflict circumstances of the country is also important when it comes to 
analyse the transitional justice efforts. Laplante and Theidon draw attention to some difficulties 
of pursuing criminal justice in Peru. They note that after 20 years of civil war and authoritarian 
rule, there was not a fully functioning legal system in Peru and people did not have much trust 
in state institutions as these institutions failed to protect them during the conflict. In addition, 
people did not have adequate resources to pursue criminal justice. Even the human rights 
organisations lack these resources and they admit that they only file the most heinous 
perpetrators and the most symbolic cases.1447 There have been other problems regarding the 
trials: delays in trials due to legal technicalities which are often brought forward by defence 
lawyers, stalls in proceedings due to the lack of the cooperation of the armed forces, absence of 
a witness protection program and failure of some judges to abide by international 
jurisprudence.1448 Despite these disadvantageous circumstances, Peru’s trials could be regarded 
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as successful to some extent as the president and several high-ranking military officials were 
convicted.  
In the previous section, the importance of reparations was emphasised considering the 
socioeconomic circumstances of the victims, but this should not give an impression that trials 
are not important for victims in Peru. Laplante and Theidon’s research depicts that some sectors 
of society in Peru have been seeking prosecutions for a long time.1449 The authors note that in 
Chile and South Africa, victims still sought prosecutions in the long run after receiving 
reparations.1450 It is important to understand that some form of justice will be necessary for 
people. And although other mechanisms may also give victims a sense of satisfaction, trials are 
important to fight impunity.  
As indicated previously, the truth commission submitted its report not only to the president and 
the parliament but also to the National Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce. In addition, the CVR handed 
over the evidence regarding about 47 cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office to prompt trials 
and the investigations were commenced by the office.1451 Yet, the success of these investigations 
was very limited as the Ministry of Defence has been reluctant to provide information.1452 
Nevertheless, these efforts show that the commission also regarded trials with importance. 
3.2.d. Institutional reforms  
Institutional reforms are important for a sustainable peace and prevention of future abuses. The 
CVR designated various institutional reforms in its report as recommendations. It stated that 
“[t]he proposal for institutional reforms is aimed at modifying the conditions that led to and 
exacerbated the internal conflict.”1453 Before making the recommendations, the commission 
acknowledges that the absence of state presence in certain regions (mainly highlands), the 
state’s insufficient response to protect people from subversive organisations, and the judicial 
system’s failure of protecting the rights of the victims, had impacts on the course of events.1454 
In a way, people were left vulnerable against the subversive groups. The CVR notes that 
“subversion was unable to take root in places where there was a greater state presence and a 
more solid political and social fabric.”1455 In addition to the absence of state presence in various 
regions, Burt noted that the state institutions in general were damaged because of the 
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authoritarian rule and corruption.1456 The commission acknowledged the responsibility of the 
state and designated numerous recommendations to tackle these deficiencies and problems.  
Recommendations regarding institutional reforms were composed of: strengthening the 
presence of democratic authority; consolidating democratic institutions; the reform of the 
judicial system; and educational reform to foster democratic values. The first set of 
recommendations aimed at enhancing democracy in the country and empowering the 
previously marginalised people. The second set of recommendations aimed at reforming the 
security forces − the military and the police. The third set of recommendations focused on 
reforming the judicial system to ensure that the system conforms to the human rights. The last 
set of recommendations focused on educational reform because it can provide an environment 
for both students and adults which would enable them to restore their dignity and opportunities 
in life.1457  
These recommendations were put in practice by the following government actions. First of all, 
many members of the armed forces were dismissed because of their involvement in corruption, 
bribery and human rights abuses. Many of them, including high-ranking officials, were put in 
jail.1458 Likewise, more than 80 major generals and admirals were forced to retire by the 
government.1459 Arce notes that the public exposure of the corruption network made it easier 
to purge military leaders in Peru.1460 As these people were identified with a corruption network, 
their dismissals did not trigger reactions among the public. Additionally, after another document 
showing the army commanders and other high-ranking officials who had supported Fujimori’s 
self-coup, they were forced by the new transitional government to retire.1461 The vetting of the 
corrupt military officials should be considered as an important step to fight impunity as these 
officials had enjoyed impunity for 20 years. This promises that human rights violations will not 
be tolerated in the future.  
Reforms in the security sector are also significant to ensure that security forces will not enjoy 
impunity and they are under scrutiny of democratic government. It is noted that a commission 
was founded to design a military reform by the president Paniagua which would help to reform 
the corrupted army and military courts, and this commission published a report to make 
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recommendations. Following this report, the budget of the Defence Ministry was cut $424 
million, the number of high-ranking officers in the military was decreased, and military courts 
were transformed.1462 Yet, Root claims that the state was unable to make fundamental reforms 
to transform the civil-military relations in Peru, because the military was still powerful, and it 
has strong public support. She considers this as a disappointment for Peru.1463  
3.2.e. Amnesties  
Amnesties have always been controversial in transitional contexts. As explained in the first 
chapter, advocates claim that amnesties foster reconciliation and peace, whereas opponents 
think that they promote impunity. Hence, they are detrimental to post-conflict situations. It 
must be acknowledged that amnesties have often been used to escape from prosecutions in 
many countries. Fujimori also enacted several amnesty laws for security forces during his 
presidency.1464  
Although the Fujimori regime passed amnesty laws to protect security forces from trials for the 
human rights abuses they committed, the Inter-American Court decided that: “Self-amnesty 
laws lead to the defenselessness of victims and perpetuate impunity; therefore, they are 
manifestly incompatible with the aims and spirit of the Convention.”1465 The court also stated 
“that Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 are incompatible with the American Convention 
on Human Rights and, consequently, lack legal effect.”1466 The court made clear that self-
amnesty laws including Fujimori’s laws are not valid. The decision of the court was important as 
the victims were denied searching for justice because of these self-amnesty laws. After the 
Court’s decision, the Peruvian Supreme Court abrogated the self-amnesty law and this meant 
the human rights violations committed by the security forces could be investigated and 
prosecuted after a long time.1467 Repeated attempts have been made to enact amnesty laws for 
members of the security forces accused of human rights abuses in 20081468 and 20101469 but they 
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were revoked.1470 Yet, overthrowing amnesty laws does not mean that there is no impunity. 
During the transitional period, Peru did not grant an official amnesty to the perpetrators but the 
obstacles in the path of prosecutions led to a de facto impunity in the country apart from very 
few exceptions. These obstacles have been posed by the military and political actors.1471 To 
conclude, amnesties in the Peruvian context aimed to ensure impunity rather than contribute 
to reconciliation. Amnesties were explained in the first chapter in detail, and it can be said that 
they can be useful to promote reconciliation if applied carefully but this was not the case with 
Peru’s amnesties. 
3.3. ESCR and development 
After explaining the historical background of civil war and transitional justice process 
thoroughly, the socioeconomic dimension of the subject will be illustrated in this section. 
Focusing on this dimension is necessary in relation to the research question of the thesis. 
Violations of ESCR are often left un(der)addressed compared to violations of CPR. Yet, redressing 
ESCR violations is as important as redressing violations of CPR, as described in the second 
chapter. Therefore, this section will concentrate on the violations of socioeconomic rights and 
significance of redressing them in the Peruvian context. Waardt states that it is critical to 
understand the socioeconomic dimension to analyse the conflict in Peru as there had been 
structural injustices prior to the conflict and this reflected in the victim profiles. The most 
affected victims belonged to the most vulnerable segment of society.1472 
3.3.a. Historical background of ESCR 
Returning to the historical background of the socioeconomic disparities, Peruvian society had 
long been divided, and indigenous peoples who inhabited the rural areas had been ignored and 
marginalised by the state politically and socioeconomically. Barron explains that the 
marginalisation of the indigenous people dates to the colonial period. After invading the 
country, the Spanish relocated indigenous people, largely from farming to mining areas, and 
dismissed them from their most productive lands, moving them to least productive ones or to 
none. In addition to disrupting the economic system of the indigenous people, they were forced 
to pay heavy taxes for simply being indigenous which did not benefit them at all in return. Finally, 
the Spanish precluded indigenous people from formal education which prevented them from 
investing in their human capital.1473 Barron also notes that the effects of this marginalisation 
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continued after independence because landholding and literacy were requirements for voting 
in Peru and this left the majority of indigenous people politically powerless.1474 So, the 
marginalisation and exclusion of indigenous people had been a protracted phenomenon in Peru, 
and it could be inferred that these policies left indigenous people without agency. They were 
disenfranchised and impoverished. Unfortunately, the conflict exacerbated the circumstances 
of the already poor populations as they were the ones who were affected most by the conflict. 
The disparities between the indigenous and non-indigenous peoples still prevail in Peru, 
although the economy has been progressing after the end of the conflict.1475 
Therefore, the commissioners of the CVR remarked that the divisions in society, and the 
marginalisation and neglect of indigenous communities played a role in the conflict.1476 The final 
report explains that poverty was one of the sparking factors − rather than being the only factor 
− for the outbreak of the conflict. Moreover, just like poverty, inequality has had a significant 
importance in Peruvian society and this inequality was not limited to wealth. There was also 
unequal distribution of political and symbolic powers which left indigenous and poor 
populations voiceless and powerless. That was why the subversive organisations could attract 
these people by offering a discourse that promised them voice and agency.1477 Yet, it should be 
clarified that although indigenous people were marginalised, and they were the initial target of 
the PCP-SL, this was not an ethnic conflict. The commission states that there was no evidence to 
prove that this was an ethnic conflict.1478 This is because the PCP-SL’s recruitment did not rely 
on ethnicity, and the discourse of the PCP-SL was established on class lines as poor vs. rich rather 
than on ethnic differences.1479 In fact, less than a quarter of the captured guerrillas were of 
indigenous origin.1480  
Since the subversive groups were active in these poor communities, most of the damages of the 
conflict took place in these regions. The final report depicts that the vast majority of the deaths 
and forced disappearances took place in Ayacucho, Junín, Huánuco, Huancavelica and Apurímac 
which had been reported as the poorest departments of the country. The poorest departments 
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were the most vulnerable and affected parts of the country.1481 More than 40% of the deaths 
took place in Ayacucho, and 85% of them were reported in the five departments mentioned 
above.1482 The populations of these departments were already living in disadvantaged 
circumstances and the conflict exacerbated their lives. This was also the case in the Kurdish 
Question as depicted in the third chapter. The conflict mostly affected the Kurdish region which 
has been marginalised historically. The Kurdish region has been among the poorest parts of 
Turkey and the Kurds living in the region had already been struggling with socioeconomic 
problems prior to the conflict.  
Portocarrero conducted a research with women in Ayacucho and the findings of the research 
stand as an example of the socioeconomic abuses during the conflict. The Peruvian security 
forces and the insurgent groups violated ESCR of the people in Ayacucho by taking over their 
homes, lands and animals. They forced people to flee to the cities or to the mountains. The 
victims were dispossessed as their homes and their means of livelihood were taken away from 
them. This exacerbated the poverty of victims.1483 These activities of the security forces and 
insurgent groups clearly violated the right to housing, the right to an adequate standard of living 
and the right to work of these people as they lost their homes and means of livelihood. 
Furthermore, the powerful elites were criticised for being indifferent about the sufferings of 
these people because their negligence allowed the abuses to take place.1484 These people had 
been marginalised for a long time, and they did not have agency in the society to prevent/stop 
these massacres as they were left powerless. The conviction of Fujimori is significant in this 
regard, as it shows that the victims of the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres were 
considered as equal citizens. This conviction depicted that the victims were also human beings 
and killing them unlawfully constituted crimes against humanity. 
3.3.b. Socioeconomic consequences of the conflict  
The CVR’s final report explains that there were three types of consequences of the conflict: 
psychological, socio-political and economic. Psychological consequences occurred because the 
conflict damaged people’s identity, family and community. Socio-political consequences were 
about the deterioration of communal life and the breakdown of the democratic order in Peru. 
The economic consequences of the conflict were the loss of infrastructure and opportunities 
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and the devastation of the production capacity and resources.1485 Looking at socio-political and 
economic consequences of the conflict is important to understand the socioeconomic 
dimension of the conflict.  
The communities were affected by the conflict as individuals. The conflict damaged the social 
bonds which should have been providing support and protection to community members. The 
report describes that communal life was disrupted because of fear, and cultural events, 
traditions and festivals were largely abandoned because of the fear of attacks.1486 Portocarrero’s 
study depicts that the conflict had serious societal impacts as community ties and trust in others 
were destroyed. Indigenous people, especially, were marginalised for being considered as 
potential “terrorists”.1487  Violence has become a way of dealing with problems, and many 
people admitted that they suffer from aggressiveness.1488 It was noted that families would 
break-down when they lost family members, or they suffered other types of losses. Families fled 
to other places to survive but they were scattered, and it was difficult for them to adapt to new 
places.1489 So, addressing these problems is a must to achieve reconciliation. Healing traumas of 
the individuals, reconstruction of the community bonds and rebuilding trust are necessary to 
overcome these problems. 
Economic consequences of the conflict were disastrous for already impoverished populations.  
Men constituted 80% of the total deaths and disappearances during the conflict,1490 and this 
meant many families lost their primary source of income, and also meant many widows and 
orphans. The commission explained that the economy was severely deteriorated because of the 
conflict, particularly in Ayacucho and Huancavelica which were the most affected regions.1491 
Moreover, not only the people but the entire country’s economy was affected. Root notes that 
the country’s GDP decreased 12.3% in 1989 alone and salaries of white-collar and blue-collar 
workers decreased by 47.6% and 55% respectively between 1985 and 1989.1492 The funds which 
could be invested in the poor communities were allocated to the security sector and ordinary 
people had to bear the consequences.  
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3.3.c. Current socioeconomic problems 
Analysing the socioeconomic settings in post-conflict Peru can provide useful insights to 
understand the need of addressing socioeconomic abuses in the transitional process. This 
analysis can depict the important problems in the society so that they can be tackled through 
transitional justice mechanisms. First of all, the Peruvian economy has been growing rapidly 
since 2001 and it has become one of the largest economies in Latin America.1493 From 2004 to 
2015, there has been a significant decrease in poverty rates as moderate poverty was reduced 
from 58% to 22% and extreme poverty from 16% to 4%.1494 However, the rate of the decline in 
poverty was different for non-indigenous and indigenous populations (61% and 41%). Since the 
decline of poverty was smaller for indigenous people, the difference between the two groups 
regarding the poverty incidence was widened.1495 Gambetta analyses the 2003-2008 period and 
claims that poor households had not benefited from the fruits of the good economic 
performance equally due to the absence of efficient poverty reduction policies and social 
programs.1496 According to the World Bank’s data, moderate and extreme poverty are more 
extensive in the Andean and Amazonian regions where mainly indigenous people live, and rural 
areas have 80% of the extreme poor.1497 The poverty rates are higher in rural areas, yet this does 
not exclusively mean that indigenous people are poorer because they are concentrated in rural 
areas. The World Bank’s data reveals that there are disparities among indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples in urban areas as well. Indigenous populations, even when they reside in 
urban areas, live in more disadvantaged circumstances in terms of health, education, 
employment and living conditions compared to non-indigenous urban people. That is why 31% 
of indigenous households are poor whereas this rate is 18% for non-indigenous households.1498 
The World Bank data depicts that human development levels were different in urban and rural 
areas. Child mortality and malnutrition rates and education outcomes were worse in rural 
areas.1499 UNICEF’s data depicts that there is a dramatic difference in poverty rates between 
indigenous (78%) and non-indigenous (40%) children and adolescents. Non-indigenous children 
and adolescents have better access to health, education and opportunities, and they have better 
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living conditions compared to their indigenous peers.1500 According to UNICEF’s 2009 report, 
there is a considerable difference in children’s situation regarding education and health between 
rural and urban settings. Children in urban centres are more likely to have better education, 
nutrition and health services compared to their peers in rural areas.1501 The Andean and 
Amazonian regions, especially, where indigenous populations mainly live, have the least 
developed conditions for children in terms of education, health and nutrition.1502 In addition, 
the stunting rate is higher for indigenous children compared to non-indigenous ones, and this 
also impacts their cognitive development and learning outcomes, which are also worse than 
their non-indigenous peers.1503 Children who speak Quechua have lower school enrolment rates 
compared to Spanish-speaking children.1504 These differences could be interpreted as 
discrimination in the enjoyment of ESCR, particularly the right to an adequate standard of living 
(poverty directly affects the standard of living), the right to health and the right to education of 
the indigenous people. Although transitional justice is not interested in generating economic 
growth or improving education and health services (which should be concerns of development), 
discrimination in the enjoyment of ESCR and failing to ensure the minimum core obligations of 
socioeconomic rights could be seen as a violation of these rights, and transitional efforts must 
contribute to redressing these violations. Transitional justice can play a diagnosing role in this, 
and it can trigger the state to eliminate inequalities and redress these violations. 
The expenditure for education must be increased in Peru; otherwise, public schools in poor 
regions will provide a low-quality education which will not be able to equalise the opportunities 
of the children from different socioeconomic backgrounds.1505 Results of international tests 
depict that there are still significant inequalities in education among different regions.1506 Young 
indigenous people were the initial target of the PCP-SL as they had long been marginalised and 
disempowered. And the organisation was successful in radicalising and recruiting them.1507 
Addressing the poverty and development problems regarding children and adolescents is crucial 
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to prevent future conflicts and break intergenerational poverty; otherwise, poverty will be 
transmitted to future generations. Figueroa’s Sigma theory provides important insights about 
the relationship between inequality, education and poverty.  
According to the Sigma theory, inequalities in education, health, income and culture reproduce 
further inequalities for future generations. People who belong to marginalised and excluded 
groups in a society are born in a disadvantaged context in which their parents lack the necessary 
income to provide them enough nutrition, health care and education. The cognitive 
development of these people is not as good as their peers who belong to more advantaged 
groups. In addition to differences in their cognitive development, they receive a lower quality of 
education and health care. These also affect their capacities in investing their human capital. 
Moreover, if these marginalised groups speak their own language, they have a language barrier 
to survival in the market. They do not master the official language as others and this also sets 
them back.1508 To illustrate, Figueroa mentions a study conducted in Peru’s different regions 
which depicts that the degree of malnutrition negatively affects school performance.1509 There 
are other studies which also show that malnutrition has detrimental impacts on school 
performance.1510 Barron notes that children from poor families have less education, both in 
years and in quality whereas this is the opposite for children from wealthy families. So, he 
concludes: “Poor people tend to remain poor and rich people tend to become richer.”1511 In 
short, belonging to a poor household means there is a higher risk of malnutrition which affects 
school performance. In addition, these children are more likely to have less schooling years and 
poor quality in education which also affects their human capital and income. 
Although there are many problems to address to eliminate disparities in education, health and 
other social factors, there are also good examples showing that these problems can be solved. 
For instance, there has been progress in the learning outcomes of indigenous children between 
2012 and 2014 through the joint work of the government and UNICEF. An intercultural education 
plan was introduced which provided educational materials in indigenous languages and teachers 
who would be responsible for bilingual education. As a result, there have been significant rises 
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in indigenous language reading comprehension performances of children who belonged to 
different indigenous groups.1512 
In addition to disparities in health and education, there is also a considerable difference in access 
to basic infrastructure in different regions of Peru. As of 2013, 17% of households had access to 
four basic services (water, sanitation, telephone and electricity) simultaneously in chronically 
poor districts, whereas it was 75% in non-chronically poor districts.1513 64% of rural households 
have access to water, whereas the national average is 86%. Sanitation coverage is also different, 
as it is 44% in rural areas and 77% in national average.1514 It must be noted that there have been 
improvements in providing basic infrastructure and basic services, and the gap among different 
regions has been narrowed after the conflict by pro-poor policies.1515 Yet, it is suggested that 
there is still much to be done to eliminate the gap in access to these basic services and the 
inequalities in health, education and justice.1516 
To conclude, disparities among rural and urban regions, and indigenous and non-indigenous 
peoples must be eliminated. These inequalities had been one of the causes of the conflict, and 
they had been consequences of the conflict likewise. To redress the past, they need to be 
included in the transitional justice and development agenda of Peru.  
3.3.d. IDPs 
Internal displacement has been one of the important consequences of the conflict. The CVR’s 
final report remarks that displacement was widespread and massive, and it disrupted the daily 
lives of people, families and communities.1517 Displacement had many impacts on people’s lives: 
they lost their homes, lands and means of income; education of children was disrupted; and IDPs 
had to establish a life from scratch at their destinations.1518 There are different figures on 
internally displaced persons in Peru. Perez-Leon-Acevedo stated that the figure was between 
half to one million;1519 National Committee for the Displaced estimated 430,000;1520 and White 
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claimed that 600,000 people were displaced in the 1980s and 1990s because of the conflict.1521 
It was noted that the figures are unclear because relatively few IDPs were registered officially.1522 
It is suggested that the government needs to assist the IDPs economically through credits and 
income-generating projects.1523 Since most of the IDPs fled from rural areas where they engaged 
in agriculture, these people needed to make a living and their previous knowledge of agriculture 
did not help them to find jobs in cities. White asserts that IDPs have been dwelling in Lima and 
other cities in poor living conditions. They suffer from social, political, economic and cultural 
exclusion as they are not integrated into the society successfully. Moreover, they have been 
struggling to find jobs as 25% of them only spoke Quechua, 42% were illiterate, and 35% only 
had primary-level education.1524  
The CVR’s report explains that some of the IDPs returned to their homes after the conflict, yet 
many of the returnees had to leave their homes once again due to the socioeconomic problems 
and insufficient support of the state.1525 In addition to conflict-related displacements, some 
people have migrated to urban centres as there were no economic opportunities in the interior 
regions of Peru. And it is claimed that these people and IDPs will not go back to their hometowns 
unless the government provides economic opportunities and better education and health 
services.1526 The government needs to understand that unless the socioeconomic conditions 
change in the rural areas, the IDPs will not return.  
Segura explains that the Program for the Support of Resettlement (Spanish acronym PAR), as 
the first institution for IDPs, was established by the state to support the return of the IDPs in 
1993. However, the works of this institution received criticism from the public as the program 
assumed that all the IDPs were willing to return. In fact, many of the IDPs were willing to 
integrate in the new cities but they were unable to get support for this; and even for the 
returnees, the PAR did not fulfil its promises.1527 Moreover, there were NGOs, churches and 
other civil society organisations which worked with the IDPs to facilitate their return during the 
1980s and 1990s.1528 Although more than half of them could return to their homes in the 1990s, 
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many of them are still displaced.1529 The IDMC states that there are 59,000 conflict-related IDPs 
(in addition, 295,000 people were displaced in 2017 because of the natural disasters) in Peru as 
of 31st of December 2017,1530 but it was 150,000 in 2015 according to the same body.1531 There 
is a stark decline in IDP figures from 2015 to 2017, yet the reason for this decline is unclear.1532 
In addition, it must be noted that these are the IDPs who are registered officially. The real figure 
is probably higher as many of the victims were unable to make registry either because they were 
illiterate, or they were unable to travel to the registration centres.  
In 2004, Peru enacted a law concerning IDPs which forbids arbitrary displacement of people and 
defines the rights of IDPs.1533 The Peruvian Law Concerning Internal Displacement is designed to 
protect the rights of IDPs in Peru. The law prohibits discrimination against IDPs and obliges 
authorities to provide necessary assistance for them to either return to their homes or to 
resettle in another place in the country.1534 The law is important to redress the past forced 
displacements and prevent future ones.  
According to the PIR, the displaced communities and individuals were considered as the victims 
of the conflict and they would be eligible for reparations.1535 White pointed out that reparations 
must address the specific needs of the IDPs which are different from general needs of the 
public.1536 Considering the problems they faced, this is an important suggestion. Specific 
solutions must be brought forward for their specific problems. However, there were several 
obstacles to granting IDPs reparations. White explains that the lack of cooperation, trained staff 
and participation of the IDPs were significant challenges to the National Reparation Council. In 
addition, the IDPs were expected to prove their displacement with documents to complete the 
registration to get reparations. Yet, these people were unable to do so as they did not have 
identity cards, or they did not have a chance to get them during forced displacement.1537 
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Furthermore, the National Register for Displaced Persons and the General Directorate for the 
Displaced and a Culture of Peace were established in 2004 to register and address the problems 
of IDPs.1538  
Segura notes that 5668 collective beneficiaries, 20 groups of displaced persons, and 120,000 
individual beneficiaries were registered as victims of forced displacement by 2012, but the 
reparations program has not been implemented completely as it was initially planned. The focus 
was on collective reparations rather than individual reparations.1539 The collective reparations 
were criticised because their allocation was considered as unjust and the way they were applied 
was more akin to the state’s obligation of providing basic services rather than the reparation 
itself.1540 Although the state passed a law for internal displacement and the CVR recommended 
reparations to the IDPs, the implementation of these plans was limited. The IDMC expresses its 
concern that the state has not implemented durable solutions to the problem.1541 Perez-Leon-
Acevedo also notes that the IDPs still face economic and social challenges although the conflict 
ended years ago.1542 Particularly those in urban centres suffer from poverty, unemployment, 
poor access to health and education services, insufficient sanitation and housing, 
marginalisation and discrimination.1543   
Considering these socioeconomic consequences of the conflict, the state needs to address the 
problems of IDPs to achieve reconciliation. Implementing the reparations program properly can 
contribute to tackling the problems. These individuals and communities need the support of the 
government to overcome the difficulties resulting from the conflict. Although there were 
consultation processes before designing the reparations program, new channels should be 
found to evaluate the implementation process of the reparations to make them efficient.  
Conclusion 
East Timor and Peru have different contexts, but they share commonalities which are relevant 
to Turkey’s Kurdish Question. These countries are both post-conflict societies and their 
transitional justice processes were concerned with socioeconomic issues. So, when Turkey 
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settles the conflict (and becomes a post-conflict society) and decides to pursue transitional 
justice, it can examine the experiences of these countries to gain insights from their esperiences.  
East Timor and Peru have had structural injustices and ESCR violations (particularly forced 
displacement) as in Turkey. The CAVR and the CVR examined socioeconomic dimension of the 
conflict in different ways: while the former looked at the issue from a rights perspective and 
identified ESCR violations, the CVR considered the issue in a more generalistic way and did not 
talk about violations of ESCR. Although both commissions made recommendations regarding 
eliminating historical inequalities and tackling socioeconomic problems, the CAVR’s 
recommendations were more explicit regarding ESCR, whereas the CVR’s recommendations did 
not really refer to ESCR explicitly. Adopting an approach which explicitly identifies 
socioeconomic problems as “violations” of socioeconomic rights is critical because this gives 
victims a power to seek redress for their violated rights. Therefore, Turkey should adopt a similar 
approach to East Timor and identify violations of ESCR explicitly to ensure that these violations 
are effectively addressed. 
Trials have not necessarily been concerned with ESCR violations in East Timor and Peru. They 
often focused on CPR violations (killings, torture etc.) in both countries. As argued in the second 
chapter, there are arguments against the justiciability and enforcement of ESCR, and this 
certainly affected the transitional processes in these countries. Yet, there is no legal or moral 
basis for excluding ESCR from prosecutions, and Turkey should address ESCR violations when it 
pursues transitional justice.  
Reparations aimed to address ESCR violations and historical inequalities in East Timor and Peru. 
This was significant because victims in both countries prioritised reparations over other 
transitional mechanisms. This may not be the case in Turkey because socioeconomic conditions 
of victims could be considered as better compared to East Timorese and Peruvian victims. 
Moreover, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces is an identity-based one, 
and the acknowledgement of the repression and accountability for crimes may be more 
important for the Kurdish victims. Yet, this should not mean that reparations will not be 
necessary in Turkey’s future transitional process.  Turkey can learn from East Timor and Peru in 
the context of designing and implementing reparations, particularly to address forced 
displacement. Regarding forced displacement, both countries aimed to resettle IDPs in their 
former hometowns but many IDPs wanted to stay in the big cities due to employment and better 
socioeconomic opportunities. As mentioned in the third chapter, this is likely to be the case for 
the IDPs in Turkey. So, reparation programs in a future transitional process should take this into 
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account and find ways to meet the demands of the IDPs. It should also be noted that 
distinguishing collective reparations and development was an important issue in both countries 
as many criticised the fact that these reparations could easily be considered as development 
programs which are already a responsibility of states. Therefore, Turkey needs to distinguish 
collective reparations and development programs.  
Finally, Turkey needs to ensure the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. In East 
Timor and Peru, the implementation of reparations and other recommendations of the CAVR 
and the CVR has been slow, and this led to disappointment among victims and communities. 
Designing a follow-up institution to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the 
reparations, reforms and other recommendations will be significant in Turkey.   
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Chapter 5: Transitional Justice Mechanisms to be Implemented in the 
Kurdish Question 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is going to examine which transitional mechanisms would be possible and desirable 
to address the human rights violations, particularly ESCR violations, concerning the Kurdish 
Question in the light of the lessons learnt from Peru and East Timor’s transitional justice 
processes. It will do so by depicting which mechanisms can make what contribution to achieve 
peace and reconciliation in Turkey. The chapter will also analyse what is aimed for by the 
application of each mechanism and how these mechanisms should be designed and 
implemented. The importance of embracing a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach to 
the development of transitional justice mechanisms will also be elaborated. Before exploring 
these mechanisms, two points will be explained: why Turkey should confront its past and the 
significance of considering the local context and identifying the needs and expectations of 
victims and affected communities. 
2. An important decision: facing the past 
As argued in the first chapter, transitional states have a difficult choice regarding the past: to 
forget or to face the past. Forgetting the past used to be the trend to consolidate the new regime 
and peace, but this has started to change recently.1544 Although there is an increasing tendency 
among states to pursue transitional justice, remembering the past may not be a choice for some 
states. There are numerous factors which affect countries’ decision about pursuing transitional 
justice and dealing with their pasts. These include political, economic, historical, institutional 
and international factors.1545 It was explained that “the characteristics of the authoritarian 
regime”, “the type of transition”, the resources of the new regime, political will, timing of the 
abuses (distant past or recent) and international pressure may all make an impact on the 
decision of adopting transitional justice mechanisms.1546 For instance, if the predecessor regime 
has been in power for a long time and its abusive system has been institutionalised, it may be 
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more difficult to adopt retributive transitional justice mechanisms which would pose a risk of 
being prosecuted to the abusive regime. Likewise, lack of financial resources may prevent states 
from pursuing transitional justice.1547 Yet, the opposite can also be true in these circumstances. 
Extreme repression may trigger individuals, human rights groups and civil society to strive for 
transitional justice, as happened in Latin America.1548 Likewise, availability of financial resources 
may not always impact countries’ decision as some countries (Sierra Leone and Haiti) with weak 
economies adopted costly transitional justice mechanisms and some others with strong 
economies (Thailand, Iran) forgot the past and did not pursue transitional justice.1549 In short, 
there is no scientifically proven hypothesis on countries’ decisions about transitional justice.1550 
All post-conflict and post-authoritarian countries have different contexts and dynamics, and this 
makes it difficult to make predictions on the subject.  
2.1. Can Turkey pursue transitional justice? 
Considering that Turkey has the 18th biggest economy in the world as of 2018,1551 a lack of 
resources should not be a constraint for the country to pursue transitional justice. Olsen, Payne 
and Reiter classified Turkey as a rich country in their research.1552 Turkey is advantageous as it 
has an established democracy and functioning state institutions with a well-developed judicial 
system (despite their shortcomings) compared to many transitional countries. Some transitional 
countries like East Timor, Cambodia and Sierra Leone did not have a strong rule of law, state 
institutions and established democracy and they were vulnerable to international pressures, 
whereas Argentina, Northern Ireland and South Africa could design their own transitional 
processes.1553  Turkey is likely to be less dependent on international actors’ resources due to its 
economy and institutional capacity. This enables the country to resist external actors’ 
intervention in its transitional process. However, the international actors’ involvement should 
not be demonised as their involvement can contribute to these processes. Even self-reliant 
states which designed their own paths in transitional justice had international involvement to 
some extent (indirect/minimalist or facilitative) as in Northern Ireland and Argentina.1554 
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Although international actors may have a role as a mediator which could be helpful, Turkey 
would be able to design and implement its own transitional process. Even though these points 
suggest that Turkey can pursue transitional justice regarding its financial and institutional 
capacity, it must be justified why Turkey must pursue transitional justice. 
As the first chapter depicted, there is no empirical evidence for the generally accepted claims of 
transitional justice. The available evidence depicts that transitional justice mechanisms have 
little or no impact on reconciliation, democracy and rule of law.1555 Moreover, as argued in detail 
in the first chapter, revealing the truth may not be desirable for some societies and the 
government needs to make an in-depth analysis of the circumstances (political, social and 
economic) and demands (of victims and public) to see what is possible and desirable for Turkey. 
This should be done so in an inclusive way and the demands of the victims, the Kurdish people 
in general, the Turkish people and other minorities should be analysed to make a decision on 
whether Turkey should pursue transitional justice.   
2.2. Preparing people for the process 
Political and societal concerns may have a discouraging impact on the government (or future 
governments) to adopt transitional justice mechanisms in Turkey as there is a strong opposition 
to the PKK among the public. For instance, although the majority of people (57%) supported the 
peace process (which ended in 2015) in Turkey, a considerable number of people (47%) believed 
that the peace process meant making concessions to the PKK.1556 As mentioned in the third 
chapter, many of the Turkish people identify the Kurds with the PKK and still believe that the 
PKK wants to establish an independent state, even though the PKK transformed its aim from 
founding an independent state to an autonomous region in Turkey. Moreover, there are also 
negative sentiments among the Kurdish people towards the Turkish people as some consider 
“Turks as barbarians”.1557 Even if the conflict is settled in the future and it is decided to pursue a 
transitional justice process in Turkey, if the government fails to pave the way for this process, 
there might be a backlash from the public.  
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Community level tensions in big cities are also critical and need to be eliminated as unaddressed 
grievances may exacerbate the individual and community level relationships. In the former 
peace process, the government was criticised for not pursuing a participatory approach as 
“NGOs outside of the Kurdish National Movement, other political parties, important leaders 
from different opinion groups and independent intellectuals in the region were not included in 
the process.”1558 The inclusion of different actors is critical as both the Kurdish side and the 
Turkish side are not homogenous. It is noted that there are intra-group differences in demands 
among Kurds as in other groups such as Alevis and Armenians in Turkey.1559 For instance, the 
demands of the secular Kurds and religious Kurds may differ, and all these groups must be 
included in the process. In fact, the JDP government took some steps to persuade the public. For 
instance, it established a committee named “Wise Persons Committee”1560 (Akil Insanlar Heyeti 
in Turkish) which held meetings with the public all over the country.1561 Although it was an 
important initiative, the committee was criticised for various reasons including the limited 
number of women (12 out of 63 members), the appointment of its members and its limited time 
and mandate.1562 Moreover, the JDP’s peace process was criticised for being ambiguous as the 
government was not successful in explaining the process to people, civil society and other 
political actors.1563 A new peace and transitional process must take appropriate measures to 
inform people, civil society and political actors about the process and ensure their participation 
and support. Therefore, the government needs to persuade the public, political actors and civil 
society for a future transitional process. 
Several scholars remarked that the government needs to prepare the public for peace as the 
state and media framed the PKK and the Kurdish actors as an enemy for decades.1564 It is stated 
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that “[a] serious obstacle to peace perceived by the Kurdish people is that the Turks seem to be 
totally unaware of the pain and the violations of the rights of Kurds in the Kurdish regions, 
according to the reports of the Wise Persons Delegation.”1565  For instance, in Colombia, the 
urban population was less supportive of the peace accord compared to the rural population 
which has been severely affected by the conflict. It was asserted that the support for the peace 
accord was the highest in the most affected regions.1566 A similar pattern to Colombia was 
observed in Turkey. The support for the previous peace process was much stronger among the 
Kurds (86%) compared to the Turks (52%).1567 Likewise, the support for the peace process was 
significantly higher in cities which were affected by the conflict (86%), compared to the others 
(54%).1568  So, the government has an important role to prepare people for a future transitional 
justice process, and this must be done so in an inclusive and participatory way. For instance, 
there are many civil society organisations and research institutions which have been concerned 
with the Kurdish Question for years such as Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 
(Turkish acronym, TESEV), the Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed 
(Turkish acronym, MAZLUMDER), the Human Rights Association (Turkish acronym, IHD), the 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Turkish acronym, TIHV) and so on. The government must 
cooperate with these organisations to get a better grasp of the dynamics in the society and 
benefit from the knowledge that these organisations have produced for decades. 
Although it is not easy to find out people’s motives for not supporting the peace accord in 
Colombia, the reason may be that the peace was not as significant to them as it is for the rural 
population since the urban population was not affected by the conflict as much as the rural 
population. The Colombian government has been criticised for not preparing people for the 
peace process properly. As the process was not explained well, people were not given enough 
time to understand the details, and false accusations (produced by spoilers of peace) were not 
eliminated efficiently.1569 Gomez-Suarez depicts the need for preparing people for peace by 
explaining the peace process well in transitional contexts and calls this “peace process 
pedagogy”.1570 In Colombia, the public was highly sceptical about the negotiations with the 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish acronym FARC), but the government still 
conducted meetings (first in secrecy then openly) to end the conflict.1571 A similar instance can 
happen in pursuing transitional justice or specifically in implementing a transitional justice 
mechanism. In Peru and East Timor, some people were sceptical about granting reparations to 
specific groups such as members of the Shining Path and the integration supporters. Yet, this 
did not prevent the governments from granting reparations to these groups. Therefore, the 
public’s scepticism should not prevent Turkey from pursuing transitional justice, rather, the 
public and other actors should be motivated and mobilised for the peace.  
Roth explains how naming and shaming can be used by international human rights organisations 
to make pressure on governments by persuading the public with three elements: a violation of 
a right, a violator of this right and a remedy which can be implemented to redress the 
violation.1572 Persuading the public about the need to redress the violations is critical. For 
instance, Goes explains that the general public had very limited interest in facing the violent past 
in Brazil. She remarks that even most educated people consider the past violations as “a 
necessary evil”.1573 This is also crucial in Turkey. A similar naming and shaming approach can be 
used for promoting a solution to the Kurdish Question. People should be persuaded that there 
have been myriad human rights violations committed against the Kurdish people, these 
violations were committed by the PKK and the Turkish security forces, and there are remedies 
which could be implemented to redress these violations and achieve peace. A truth commission 
can be useful to explain these points to people because the clarity of these points is important. 
Roth claims that it is more difficult to clarify these points for ESCR violations compared to CPR 
violations.1574 Yet, the second chapter clarified that the vagueness, the aspiration and the 
justiciability arguments regarding ESCR stem from false assumptions. Therefore, ESCR violations 
can also be depicted to people clearly. Roth claims that “the nature of the violation, violator, 
and remedy is clearest when it is possible to identify arbitrary or discriminatory governmental 
conduct that causes or substantially contributes to an ESC rights violation.”1575 Considering the 
perception of discrimination among the Kurdish people, this can also be demonstrated to the 
public to ensure that they realise the perceptions of the Kurds. 
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2.3. Why should Turkey pursue transitional justice? 
Given these points, this research suggests that Turkey must pursue transitional justice due to 
various reasons. First, unless there is a considerable risk of renewed conflict, Turkey must face 
its past as there is a moral duty to the victims and survivors. Considering the exclusion, 
marginalisation and negative sentiments against the Kurdish people, their sufferings must be 
acknowledged, and their honour must be restored. Thoms and others claim that even though 
there is not sufficient evidence which depicts that transitional justice mechanisms have positive 
impacts, “moral and legal rationales exist for pursuing TJ policies.”1576 Therefore, pursuing 
transitional justice in Turkey can be promising. It is pointed out that if a state is going to choose 
to forget the past over facing the past, this must be based on a social consensus rather than the 
decision of political elites.1577 
Second, socioeconomic problems of the region, particularly the problems of the Kurdish IDPs, 
require a full-fledged solution to which a successful transitional process can make a huge 
contribution. It is remarked that  
Kurds in the rest of Turkey do not form an underclass. There are opportunities for 
them to succeed within the Turkish economy. In the Southeast however, economic 
underdevelopment means economic opportunities are constrained. This combined 
with the effects of 20-plus years conflict has created a sense of hopelessness among 
many in the region.1578 
 This hopelessness must be eliminated, and it can be done so “through skills-building, individual 
reconciliation, and helping individuals cope with past trauma.”1579 Mani emphasises the 
importance of distributive justice in transitional contexts and notes that: “I propose, therefore, 
a two-fold approach, whereby first past economic (and political) inequalities are redressed 
through a backward-looking economic strategy focused on equity, before forward-looking 
policies of generalized economic growth and development for the society at large are 
implemented.”1580 Even settling the conflict can make a positive impact on the economy as 
observed during the previous peace process. Kose noted that: “Within this process [which 
collapsed in 2015], tourism and other economic activities also prospered from the effect of this 
positive atmosphere.”1581  
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Another reason for Turkey to pursue transitional justice is about conflict prevention.  Many 
scholars and practitioners agree that a failure in addressing the root causes will leave transitional 
justice efforts incomplete. The violations of ESCR are significant in the Kurdish Question as 
explained in the third chapter. Both CPR and ESCR violations must be addressed to have a full-
fledged solution and to ensure sustainable peace and reconciliation in Turkey. Considering that 
conflicts emerge due to many complex reasons, and evidence regarding the triggering effect of 
poverty and inequalities on the emergence of conflict is contradictive in the literature, it is 
difficult to say that there will be no conflict in the future if the root causes of the conflict are 
dismantled. Yet, the risk of renewed violence can be reduced by eliminating the causes which 
produced violence or contributed to the emergence of violence.  
The socioeconomic roots of the conflict argument is tricky in the context of the Kurdish Question 
as the state adopted a discourse stating that the Kurdish unrest is based on under-development 
of the region.  The government must address the socioeconomic dimension of the Kurdish 
Question carefully to avoid readopting the same problematic discourse. The state must 
acknowledge the oppression and the political dimension of the problems first, then recognise 
that socioeconomic problems are among the root causes of the conflict.  A future transitional 
justice process in Turkey needs to address both ESCR abuses which were deliberately committed 
during the conflict and structural violence which is among the root causes of the conflict. 
It is difficult to identify how much of today’s poverty and inequalities in health, education and 
other development indicators come from the oppression of the Kurdish people and the conflict. 
Yet, in every scenario, the government needs to deal with these problems, and transitional 
justice can be an important tool for this. Transitional justice mechanisms can help in diagnosing 
these socioeconomic problems and open a path for development to eliminate poverty and 
historical inequalities. Even though Turkey did not marginalise the Kurdish region deliberately, 
it still has a duty to ensure its development. Moreover, it must redress the damages and losses 
Kurds suffered due to its failure in protecting them from violence. So, while transitional justice 
mechanisms redress ESCR violations directly, it can contribute to elimination of poverty and 
other socioeconomic inequalities indirectly. For instance, remedying the problems of IDPs is 
critical and the solution needs to “increase security, reconstruct infrastructure, generate 
employment opportunities, and strengthen equitably accessible social services.”1582 Celik 
asserted that states have several responsibilities regarding IDPs:  
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a) establishment of prevention mechanisms for conflict-induced displacements; 
b) the need to provide assistance during and after the emergency; c) protection 
of individual rights (the right to life, the right to property, etc.) during the forced 
movement; d) safe and voluntary return of the IDPs; and e) the overall 
improvement and strengthening of state institutions to guarantee and protect 
these rights.1583 
So, Turkey needs to address the problems arising from forced displacement and other human 
rights violations in the context of the Kurdish Question. Yet, it is important to distinguish the 
roles of transitional justice and development. Transitional justice will not concern generating 
employment and eliminating poverty as these are development’s concerns. Even so, transitional 
justice can buttress development by pinpointing these problems in a historical context (by a 
truth commission) and highlighting the significance of tackling these problems. 
3. Considering the local 
As argued in the first chapter, transitional justice has been criticised for being legalistic and 
distant from victims and affected communities as its mechanisms are often designed and 
implemented by non-local actors who do not engage with people and society to identify their 
needs.1584 Likewise, it has been criticised for becoming an industry with experts, standardised 
programs and tools.1585 It is acknowledged that there is no magic formula in transitional justice 
which would work in all transitional contexts with different cultures and experiences, and 
attention to the importance of locality has been increasing recently.1586 Robins and Wilson 
claimed that “[m]any disappointments of transitional justice arise from the failure of 
institutionalised, procedural mechanisms that resonate with the goals of liberal statebuilding 
but not with the priorities of those affected by conflict.”1587 Understanding local contexts and 
identifying the needs of people are crucial for a successful transition process, as transitional 
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contexts are extremely complex with different dynamics and realities.1588 It is noted that 
“accountability measures should be sensitive to local contexts and must be driven by and 
respond to local demands and needs.”1589 Every transitional context requires “politically and 
culturally rooted responses.”1590 Likewise, transitional justice must be victim-centred as the 
needs and priorities of affected people and communities must be taken into consideration for a 
successful transition.1591  
3.1. What is actually local and why is locality critical for transitional justice? 
As noted above, the popularity of locality is increasing but there is an ambiguity about what 
locality really is. Sharp notes that “despite the acknowledged centrality of the local, concepts 
like local ownership remain vague and poorly understood, being marshaled in different ways by 
different actors for different ends, often being associated more with aspirational rhetoric than 
concrete policy reality.”1592 For instance, Lundy questions “if state-based efforts can be regarded 
as local, home-grown or even bottom-up, or whether these terms apply only to initiatives that 
operate outside the structures of the state and are rooted in ‘the community.’”1593 So, what does 
constitute the “local”? Does it have to be outside of the state? If so, should the state facilitate 
these local organisations, or should it refrain from any kind of intervention in the process?  If it 
must be rooted in communities, what kind of organisation are we looking for? Considering some 
NGOs are formed and managed by political elites and have no close relationship with the 
affected communities whatsoever, do they count as “local” as well? These questions require 
answers to identify locality because as Lundy rightly states “different meanings attached to 
concepts will produce different practices, outcomes and possibilities. If concepts such as home-
grown, local and bottom-up transitional justice are not clearly defined, they could be co-opted, 
misappropriated, manipulated and abused.”1594 
Several scholars remarked that transitional justice would be local if local people have agency 
and ownership throughout the development of the mechanisms and the processes are 
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consistent with the local context, culture and realities.1595 It is also suggested that marginalised 
people must be at the centre of knowledge production as there is a “need for a new transitional 
justice research paradigm to facilitate democratized knowledge production capable of 
challenging external, prescriptive understandings of appropriate responses to violence while 
accounting for the role and influence of existing power relations.”1596 In general, 
“[d]emocratisation of the transitional justice process, which results in local ownership and 
capacity building, is more likely to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding.”1597 In a nutshell, 
locals must be empowered and have authority and agency to have a successful transitional 
process which responds to the local context. They must be subjects rather than objects. 
Considering the local context is critical to prevent transitional justice efforts from making 
adverse impacts in post-conflict contexts. In general, it should not be assumed that applying 
transitional justice mechanisms will always lead to democratic and peaceful societies. Mihr and 
McAuliffe argue that transitional justice mechanisms may also contribute to consolidating 
autocratic and oppressive regimes as they are tools which can be used by actors to further their 
agenda (both democratic and oppressive).1598 Likewise, Haider wrote: “Transitional justice can 
inadvertently exacerbate conflict if it increases social tensions or divisions between groups.”1599 
So, transitional justice mechanisms may have negative impacts in transitional societies and this 
can happen both intentionally or unintentionally. For instance, political elites may exploit the 
mechanisms to retain their power or the mechanisms could be applied in a way which puts an 
ethnic or religious group into a more advantaged position compared to others due to poor 
design of the process. Considering that the most common form of conflict has changed from 
inter-state to intra-state, there is often severe competition among societal groups (ethnic, 
religious or tribal) in these contexts.1600 Exploring the role of group dynamics in intergroup 
conflicts and exploring how societal beliefs, perceptions and goals affect conflict situations are 
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beyond the scope of this chapter.1601 Yet, it must be underscored that transitional justice 
practitioners (local, national or international) need to adopt the “do no harm” principle to avoid 
inflicting unintended harm.1602 Haider suggests that transitional justice must embrace a conflict 
sensitivity approach,1603 and to do so, transitional justice practitioners need to be careful not to 
“inadvertently replicate or amplify existing tensions”, “introduce resources which become the 
focus of a struggle for control” or “challenge power and vested interests” without examining 
their consequences. Instead, they must ensure “local participation and inclusiveness”, 
“incorporating local traditions” and “social cohesion”.1604   
Local communities must be empowered to achieve social reconstruction, which is often 
necessary in post-conflict situations as social fabric is damaged considerably.1605 Local and 
traditional practices should be integrated into transitional justice processes to ensure the local 
ownership of the process − as happened in East Timor. As explained in detail in the fourth 
chapter, the CRP was based on a traditional practice and although it received criticisms, it made 
a considerable contribution to the transitional process. It aimed to promote reconciliation in 
communities by reintegrating perpetrators of less serious crimes into their communities. 
Therefore, local approaches should also be developed in Turkey. 
3.2. What do locals want and how do they analyse the concepts of transitional justice? 
It was noted that transitional justice literature prioritised examining institutional determinants 
of the mechanisms and often ignored public opinion pertaining to the field.1606 Even though 
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victims are often at the centre of the arguments, locals include both victims and non-victims. So, 
transitional justice actors need to analyse both the demands and expectations of victims and 
the public opinion. There are various determinants which affect the individuals’ and the public’s 
opinion. For instance, Aguilar et al.’s research depicts that age, religiosity, ideology and 
victimisation (and intergenerational trauma) had impacts on the Spanish people’s opinion 
regarding transitional justice mechanisms.1607 There are likely to be different determinants for 
different contexts. Consultation with the public can provide governments direction, as 
happened in Afghanistan. In 2004, a nationwide consultation was conducted in Afghanistan to 
examine people’s views about justice and a report was published after the process. Then, the 
government acted on the report’s findings.1608 This could be an efficient way for Turkey as well. 
Public opinion and victims’ expectations vary from one country to another as contexts and 
realities often differ greatly. Moreover, Vinck and Pham reiterate that “while consulting the 
population is an important step in designing and implementing programs, other stakeholders 
must be consulted, and lessons learned from other countries must be integrated.”1609 
Truth, reconciliation and justice are important concepts in transitional justice, and there are 
numerous (at times contesting) definitions of them. Although it is nearly impossible to have 
universal definitions of these concepts, the specific context and local definitions and 
understandings of these important concepts need to be understood to have a successful 
transitional process. Martin conducted research in Sierra Leone and her findings suggest that 
“many Sierra Leoneans were able to find peace and justice by regaining a sense of normality.”1610 
However, this may not be the case for other transitional states; people in different contexts may 
not find peace and justice in merely regaining a sense of normality. Regarding the Kurdish 
Question, what victims and society understand from truth, reconciliation and justice must be 
analysed, and mechanisms should be designed according to these understandings. Transitional 
justice practitioners must avoid imposing preconceived perceptions of these concepts on victims 
and affected communities. For instance, “[i]f reconciliation in its present interpretation is 
brought to a post-conflict society as a ready-made social vision, it deprives the population of the 
possibility to decide how and under what conditions a new society and a new social order are to 
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be established.”1611 So, the determinants and the public opinion must be analysed in every 
transitional context.  
3.3. Women and youth as locals 
Although this research does not focus on women and youth specifically, it still advocates 
addressing their specific problems in the Kurdish Question. It is argued that the gender aspect 
of transitional justice should not be confined to sexual crimes as there are other problems 
concerning women in transitional societies such as marginalisation and exclusion of women.1612 
For instance, “approximately 75-80 per cent of the displaced are women and children. Women 
suffer differently during conflict and displacement and have particular needs.”1613 Moreover, 
Rubio-Marin wrote:  
the accounts of women’s experiences in conflict show that, even when women are 
subject to the same violations as men, their pre-existing socioeconomic and legal 
status, as well as the cultural meanings around the construction of the male and 
the female in patriarchal societies, may imply that the ensuing harms for men and 
women are not the same.1614 
Therefore, these gender specific harms must be addressed in transitional societies. 
In the Kurdish Question, the Kurdish women IDPs require gender-sensitive measures to address 
their problems. The participation of women was limited in the previous peace process, although 
the importance of this participation has been emphasised throughout the process. In general, 
the previous peace process was not successful in focusing on the specific groups (such as women 
and youth) which need special attention.1615 Like the Kurdish women, the Kurdish youth also 
requires specific measures. As depicted in the third chapter, the Kurdish youth have been 
frustrated and more prone to radical forms of ethno-nationalism compared to older 
generations. It is noted that they are alienated and marginalised by the Turkish population and 
this form their identities.1616 So, the problems of the Kurdish women and youth must be 
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understood well, and transitional justice measures must be designed to respond to these 
specific issues.  
3.4. Limitations of locality 
There are several limitations of locality in pursuing transitional justice. Leebaw remarks on a 
dilemma of transitional justice institutions regarding the locality: “they seek to respond to local 
practices in order to be perceived as legitimate, yet they also seek to challenge and transform 
the basis of political legitimacy by rejecting traditions and practices implicated in systematic 
political violence.”1617 So, local approaches and practices are important in transitional processes 
but it should be remembered that the local traditions and power structures may have played a 
role in past abuses. In the Kurdish Question, the role of traditions and social structures in the 
conflict requires an in-depth analysis. The promotion of locality, participation and 
empowerment should not reinforce the traditions and power dynamics which enabled or 
contributed to violence. Turkey needs to find locally relevant mechanisms and processes which 
do not reproduce problematic circumstances. 
Local and international actors often interpret the conflict and the aims of transitional justice 
differently, and this may cause problems in transitional contexts. Moreover, “local practices and 
solutions can also lead to stark clashes with international human rights standards.”1618 There 
have been such contestations in the transitional process of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
which hindered and slowed down the transitional justice efforts.1619 Likewise, HRW was against 
the peace accord in Colombia.1620 Therefore, Sharp writes that “finding the right balance 
between global and local agency, priorities, practices, and values stands out as one of the key 
policy challenges of 21st century transitional justice.”1621 Furthermore, governments and elites 
may exploit participatory approaches to pursue their own benefits and further their agendas.1622 
They may use transitional justice mechanisms “as a means of jockeying for gain, furthering 
partisan political agendas, and attempting to re-impose pre-conflict power structures that may 
be discriminatory or otherwise not consistent with international human rights standards.'”1623 
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Lastly, we often talk about understanding the demands of people and meeting their needs in 
transitional justice, but identifying those needs and demands is a complex issue. For instance, 
regarding truth-telling, Rotondi and Eisikovits ask important questions on how to understand 
that there is a consensus for putting the past behind and not pursuing transitional justice. They 
ask whether a decision of political elites be enough, or would it need a broad consensus? If so, 
what kind of majority (simple or super-majority) would count?1624 There are no simple answers 
to these questions. Therefore, every transitional justice effort should ask these questions and 
find appropriate answers which fit in the context. 
4. Adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach  
Pursuing transitional justice itself is important, but the way it is pursued is important too. The 
approaches adopted by transitional justice actors would have a considerable impact on the 
outcomes of the transitional justice efforts. Olsen, Payne and Reiter identify four approaches in 
transitional justice regarding the application of mechanisms: the maximalist approach which 
defends the application of trials focusing on accountability and rule of law; the minimalist 
approach advocates for amnesties claiming that strictly pursuing accountability may jeopardise 
transitions, and peace and stability is more important; the moderate approach supports truth 
commissions as the best option since it still holds perpetrators accountable but is less 
destabilising compared to trials; finally, the holistic approach suggests that instead of choosing 
one single mechanism, different combinations of mechanisms should be adopted according to 
the context to ensure different kinds of problems are addressed through appropriate 
mechanisms.1625 This study advocates for a holistic approach considering the complex issues of 
transitional societies.  The International Center for Transitional Justice admits that: “After two 
decades of practice, experience suggests that to be effective transitional justice should include 
several measures that complement one another. For no single measure is as effective on its own 
as when combined with the others.”1626 
Although transitional justice has been dominated by legalism and trials (and accountability) are 
often put in the centre of the field, Turkey should not follow the same path and should instead 
adopt a holistic approach. As explained in the previous chapters, post-authoritarian and post-
conflict societies have complex and multidimensional problems which require different 
perspectives and approaches beyond legalism. It is pointed out that legal justice (which is 
pursued through trials and truth commissions) is only one constituent of post-conflict redress. 
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It must be complemented “with rebuilding infrastructure, psycho-social programs, economic 
development, political reform, etc.”1627 These require the cooperation of a wide set of disciplines 
including “anthropology, cultural studies, development studies, economics, education, ethics, 
history, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology and theology.”1628 The 
complementarity of the mechanisms was explained in the first chapter. As an example of 
complementarity, Celikkan writes that reparations would be seen as “blood money” by the 
victims, if they are not accompanied by other mechanisms which ensure recognition of the 
wrongdoings and justice.1629 So, multiple mechanisms must be joined through the cooperation 
of diverse disciplines. 
Regarding the holistic and localised approaches of transitional justice Annan said: “Approaches 
focusing only on one or another institution, or ignoring civil society or victims, will not be 
effective.”1630 So, a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach is critical for a successful 
transitional process. Participation is also related to the grassroots approach because meaningful 
participation is often not achieved if transitional processes are conducted by external actors.1631 
Orr suggests that even the most vulnerable local members need to be empowered and to 
participate in the processes, and they should be trained by international actors and given critical 
roles.1632 This could mean “developing the social and political legitimacy of transitional justice 
mechanisms.”1633 
The state should not adopt a top-down and one-size-fits-all approach in the Kurdish Question, 
instead, it must engage with communities and victims to identify their needs and demands. The 
form of participation is critical though. It must be a meaningful participation in which locals are 
actively involved in decision-making, design, planning, management and implementation 
processes, and they find the appropriate solutions to their problems with transitional justice 
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practitioners.1634 Yet, the dominance of international actors in transitional justice processes has 
a negative impact on local ownership and participation.1635 As explained in the fourth chapter, 
there have been some efforts to ensure the participation of locals in East Timor’s transitional 
process, but this was symbolic. International actors have been in charge of decision-making and 
management of the mechanisms.1636 Imposing top-down mechanisms to transitional societies 
without consulting and engaging with locals is likely to face resistance from these societies.1637 
For instance, the UN imposed a retributive approach in East Timor’s transition although the local 
leadership prioritised reconciliation and development. Yet, the leadership resisted this approach 
by granting apologies and conducting local practices.1638 Likewise, the South African TRC was 
criticised for adopting a top-down reconciliation approach which fell short of promoting 
reconciliation at the local and community levels.1639 
On the other hand, Engstrom argued that participation can be tricky as there are different 
groups in transitional societies (such as different victim groups, perpetrators, communities and 
people who are not directly affected) and their interests may conflict with each other. It is a 
complex task to determine what “public interest” is.1640 Therefore, participation should be 
balanced between victims (and among different victim groups) and non-victims to respond to 
the demands of everyone, rather than meeting the expectations of victims exclusively. As 
depicted in the second chapter’s section 3.4.b, development can contribute to transitional 
justice processes by sharing its experience in participatory and grassroots approaches. Yet, it 
should be kept in mind that this will not be an easy task in Turkey considering the potential 
challenges: who is going to be incorporated in the processes as locals? The victims only or the 
people in the region in general? Although the Kurdish region is predominantly inhabited by the 
Kurds, there are also non-Kurdish populations. So, to what extent will the Turkish people and 
other non-Kurdish minorities have a say in the process as locals? The demands and expectations 
of these groups need to be balanced in a constructive way. 
As explained in the third chapter, the PKK dominates the Kurdish political sphere, but transitional 
justice process should not let other Kurdish political actors and constituencies, who do not 
support the PKK, be silenced during the process. They must participate in the development of 
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the process, as well as the victims of the PKK. Yet, the JDP government has been criticised for 
neglecting the voices of different groups in the Kurdish Question (particularly Kurdish Muslims 
who do not support the PKK) and it is noted that “there have been few official attempts to bring 
Turkish and Kurdish civil-society organizations to work toward a long-lasting peace, despite the 
acknowledgment that a successful peace-building process will require grassroots input from 
both Turkish and Kurdish groups.”1641 Therefore, the engagement of the victims (particularly the 
Kurdish IDPs) and other local citizens is vital in a potential transitional justice process. Since the 
Kurdish Question is complex, there are different groups (victim and non-victim, Turkish and 
Kurdish, etc.) whose voices need to be heard. For instance, if the final report of the truth 
commission is going to recommend a measure to address the problems of the Kurdish IDPs in 
urban centres, these IDPs must participate in the process and they must have a say in this 
measure as happened in East Timor. As explained in the fourth chapter’s section 2.3.d, the East 
Timorese government consulted with the IDPs through dialogue initiatives and visits to IDP 
camps to find a solution to their problems. Moreover, when the state establishes a follow-up 
process to follow these recommendations, the locals must also be a part of this process. If the 
participation of the locals is not ensured, the measures are not likely to be successful.  
5. Designing the mechanisms 
Designing the mechanisms is an arduous exercise in transitional societies. Even though the “do 
everything, engage everyone”1642 attitude is promoted, choosing appropriate mechanisms and 
designing a process which will include necessary actors is critical. Transitional contexts are 
complex and full of dilemmas (moral and political) which are not easily solved, and it is often 
impossible to meet the demands of “all affected parties”.1643 The goals of a transitional process 
may conflict with each other as in the conflict between short-term goals which prioritise stability 
and long-term goals which concern reconciliation.1644 Therefore, they must be set attentively 
and coherently. This also affects the design of the mechanisms. Impacts of different mechanisms 
and approaches must be examined by transitional justice actors according to the local context 
and realities.1645 It was noted that the important question in transitional justice is: “what is most 
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beneficial to the people whose lives have been disrupted or even destroyed by the perpetrators 
of violence?”1646 
As noted above, a holistic approach is promising in transitional contexts. Yet, even though 
transitional justice mechanisms can be adopted complementarily, there might be conflicts 
among them. It is noted that: “A complementarity of means does not emerge organically: 
effective cooperation requires greater strategic coordination in both the short and long 
term.”1647 Friedman and Jillions suggest “an oversight mechanism” which can “orchestrate and 
manage the tensions between the various transitional justice mechanisms.”1648 Moreover, 
important concepts of the field (reconciliation, justice, peace and truth) must be identified 
according to the contexts. Since the goals of every transitional justice process are linked to these 
concepts, identifying them first is crucial. For instance, finding the truth is among the goals of 
truth commissions. Yet, which truth will be found in this commission, a forensic or a historical 
truth? So, even though it is difficult to find definitions which would represent different 
perceptions of individuals, groups and communities, a common ground must be found upon 
which to base the transitional process. This can be done through (not limited to) public surveys, 
consultation mechanisms, meetings and workshops with all the actors. Furthermore, Fletcher 
and others emphasise that the transitional justice process should not be considered as a clear-
cut process. Even if a country designs and implements a set of mechanisms, there might always 
be alternatives, and people may advocate for the alternatives even after long years. This was 
the case for numerous countries such as Chile, Brazil, Spain, Argentina and South Africa. 
Moreover, the needs of people, political commitment and support may also change in time.1649  
As mentioned earlier, the local context has a huge impact on determining and designing the 
processes since every country has different dynamics, realities and types of resources (financial 
and institutional). Clark and Palmer remarked that: “Who implements transitional justice 
processes, what needs they respond to, and how particular interventions are ultimately 
understood by affected populations, are critical in determining the legitimacy and efficacy of 
transitional responses.”1650 For instance, politics often have a significant influence on transitional 
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justice processes because decisions on the mechanisms (such as which mechanisms are going 
to be adopted and how they are going to operate) are often political decisions.1651 Likewise, the 
availability of resources to allocate for the process has a significant impact on these decisions. 
Transitional justice mechanisms must be designed realistically to avoid overburdening them.1652 
Even the mandate of a tribunal or a truth commission would affect the costs as a broader 
mandate would mean greater costs.1653 So, their objectives and mandates must be clear to avoid 
disappointments. 
Considering that this research focuses on ESCR violations and other socioeconomic problems 
(such as root causes and structural violence), it concerns finding the most appropriate 
mechanisms to address these issues. Fletcher and others remarked that trials and truth 
commissions have not been successful in addressing structural violence and socioeconomic 
inequalities which led/contributed to violence. They argue that addressing root causes of 
violence (socioeconomic inequalities) and achieving structural change must be a priority in 
transitional processes. Without doing so, accountability and impunity do not mean “dealing with 
the past.”1654 Yet, this study suggests that each transitional justice mechanism can contribute to 
addressing socioeconomic issues in different ways. Therefore, Turkey should embrace a holistic 
approach and adopt a set of mechanisms to have a successful transitional justice process. 
Given the complex nature of the current status quo in Turkey, it will be arduous to design a 
possible application of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, incorporating lessons learnt into 
transitional efforts can be useful in exploring the promises and pitfalls of mechanisms. All 
transitional countries have different histories, realities, characteristics and dynamics. These 
differences make it difficult to compare different countries as there are numerous determinants 
and factors which influence transitional processes. Yet, looking at other examples is critical to 
learn lessons from other countries. Comparison and consultation could be beneficial to learn 
lessons from other experiences. For instance, in Ireland, a program, “Healing Through 
Remembering”, was initiated after a consultation process which included Dr. Alex Boraine (the 
Deputy Chair of the South African TRC).1655 So, lessons learnt (particularly from East Timor and 
Peru) will be incorporated into the current discourse.  
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Nickson and Braithwaite emphasise that “a wide gap between hopes and expectations is 
particularly endemic to transitional justice.”1656 It is impossible to prosecute all the perpetrators 
in transitional states and this causes disappointment among victims and affected populations. 
Nickson and Braithwaite suggest that embracing a broadened, deepened and lengthened justice 
conception (which includes restorative, religious and traditional forms of justice) could 
contribute to closing the gap between what people expect regarding justice and what 
transitional justice can deliver.1657 Therefore, adopting different transitional justice toolkits can 
be promising to deliver more justice. Finally, it must be acknowledged that “[t]ransitional justice 
will always be an imperfect, messy process involving hard decisions about which goals and 
whose priorities to focus on.”1658 Keeping this in mind and considering limitations, this section is 
going to look at five transitional justice mechanisms and analyse how can they contribute to 
addressing ESCR violations and historical inequalities in the light of the experiences of East Timor 
and Peru. 
5.1. Trials 
Although there have been contrasting views on trials in transitional justice literature and 
practice since the emergence of the field, trials have been adopted by many transitional state in 
different forms (national, international and hybrid courts). They are often seen as the “primary 
response” to mass violence in transitional justice literature.1659 Regarding ESCR abuses and 
socioeconomic wrongs, the justiciability of ESCR has long been debated. Yet, as depicted in the 
second chapter, ESCR violations are justiciable just like CPR abuses. In the Kurdish Question, 
there have been numerous human rights violations (both CPR and ESCR violations) which could 
be addressed in courts.  
East Timor and Peru can provide important insights for Turkey’s choice. Since East Timor had 
been colonised by Portugal for hundreds of years and occupied by Indonesia for more than two 
decades, the country did not have a functioning judicial system during its transition. Due to lack 
of trained judges and lawyers, and the absence of legal infrastructure and financial resources, 
East Timor was not able to prosecute the perpetrators without international support.1660 The UN 
established various mechanisms (special panels, hybrid tribunals and units) to prosecute the 
                                                          
1656 Nickson, R. and Braithwaite, J. (2014) Deeper, broader, longer transitional justice, European Journal 
of Criminology, Vol.11, No.4, p.445. 
1657 Nickson and Braithwaite, Deeper, broader, longer transitional justice, pp.445-463. 
1658 Friedman and Jillions, The Pitfalls and Politics of Holistic Justice, p.148. 
1659 Fletcher et al., Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice, p.166. 
1660 Kingston, Balancing justice and reconciliation, pp.273-276.; Cumes, Conflict and International 
Intervention, p.286. 
237 
 
perpetrators of serious crimes, yet these crimes were limited to direct and individual crimes; 
socioeconomic wrongs and structural injustices were not addressed in these trials.1661 
Considering that the vast majority of deaths in East Timor took place due to socioeconomic 
wrongs including starvation and illness,1662 trials should have dealt with ESCR abuses as well. 
This has not been the case because the UN designed a very limited mandate which excluded 
socioeconomic wrongs.   
In Peru, the context was different. Even though there were shortcomings, Peru had a functioning 
judicial system during its transition, and the country chose to prosecute perpetrators in its 
domestic courts which enabled local acceptance of the trials.1663 The most responsible 
perpetrators such as Fujimori (former president of Peru) and various high-ranking officials were 
convicted for human rights abuses which has been a great success for the country.1664 Yet, the 
trials are still criticised for not prosecuting the majority of perpetrators by some human rights 
organisations such as the HRW.1665 Similar to East Timor, there was a lack of political will, 
particularly from the Ministry of Defence which shared very limited information for the trials.1666 
It is noted that “prosecuting state sponsored crimes is more difficult than prosecuting individual 
crimes because the evidences are often incomplete or unavailable.”1667 Therefore, political will 
is critical for a successful prosecution process. Turkey, like Peru, has an established and 
functioning judicial system despite its shortcomings, and it can prosecute perpetrators in 
domestic courts. There is no reason to establish an international court to try the perpetrators 
concerning the Kurdish Question. Considering that trials generally fail to deliver justice (as they 
often try only a few perpetrators and give light sentences) despite their enormous budgets, it is 
not appropriate for Turkey to adopt international tribunals.  
East Timor and Peru witnessed gross violations of ESCR, but these crimes were not brought to 
trials in either country. On the other hand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia heard criminal cases 
concerning forced displacement (or other human rights violations which caused 
displacement).1668 ESCR violations (such as forced displacement and famine) may constitute 
serious crimes (war crimes and crimes against humanity) as explained in the second chapter, 
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and Turkey must not ignore ESCR abuses as other countries often did. Even though Turkey did 
not initiate a transitional justice process, there have been some efforts which could be 
considered as steps taken to address the past wrongdoings. For instance, a few trials (Temizoz 
and Others, Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (Turkish acronym JITEM), The Trial 
of the Musa Anter Murder, etc.) began in the 2000s to face the wrongdoings of the past, 
particularly enforced disappearance and extra-judicial killings cases. Although these trials had 
serious shortcomings, they contributed, even a little, to unearthing the truth about the past.1669 
Woefully, the perpetrators (especially state officials) of human rights violations committed 
against the Kurds largely enjoy impunity in Turkey.1670  
It is more difficult and precarious to prosecute perpetrators when there is still support for the 
predecessor regime among the public and they do not consider the past wrongs as “wrongs”.1671 
Considering the Turkish context, as many people still identify the Kurds with the PKK, the Kurdish 
victims may be viewed as “terrorists”. Moreover, there has always been strong support for the 
military in Turkey and prosecuting the military officials may cause a backlash in the country.1672 
Orentlicher writes that “societies that are unable to mount prosecutions (or, as the case of 
Argentina suggests, to sustain them) during the early years of their democratic transition may 
have greater political space to do so with the passage of time.”1673 This may also be the case in 
Turkey. It does not seem realistic to expect that perpetrators of human rights violations (both 
CPR and ESCR) will be prosecuted properly in the near future. Even if the conflict is settled and 
transitional process begins at some point, it will probably take time to expect trials due to the 
public support for the army. Yet, in time, the public can be informed about the abuses, the 
oppression and the sufferings that the Kurds have endured. After that, trials can be considered 
in Turkey. To conclude, considering the high cost and limited success of international trials, 
Turkey can and should prosecute perpetrators in national courts, even if it happens with the 
passage of time. 
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5.2. Truth Commissions  
Although the right to truth has not been recognised in the Constitution of Turkey and in national 
legislation,1674 a truth commission can be useful in tackling the Kurdish Question. Celikkan 
suggested that “formation of an independent history commission in Turkey, discussing 
particularly the inequalities, discrimination and historical demands concerning the Kurdish Issue 
must be taken as being fundamental.”1675 This section is going to explore the prospect of a truth 
commission in Turkey. 
5.2.a. Contribution to healing of individuals and societies 
As the first chapter conceptualised truth commissions, there are so many goals attributed to 
them, and vigorous debates continue to enrich the field on whether they can achieve these goals 
or not.  There are manifold ways of truth-telling and considering them all the same would be 
oversimplification of these processes. Truth-telling can contribute healing under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the truth commission in Peru provided victims psychological 
support before, during and after the process to prevent re-traumatisation.1676 However, the CTF 
did not do so, and did not even inform people about the process.1677 Likewise, the South African 
victims participated in the truth-telling process when they were against the amnesties which 
were still granted against their wishes.1678 Therefore, design, planning and implementation of a 
truth commission would be decisive on its impacts. Daly noted: “Few truth commissions or allied 
institutions have the resources to ensure that the truth heals rather than hurts.”1679 To ensure 
that their participation will not harm them, victims must be informed properly about the 
mechanisms before they participate.  
As explained previously, violence causes trauma at different levels (such as individual and 
societal) in transitional societies and it is often transferred to future generations.1680 This was 
also the case in the Kurdish Question as young generations (in addition their own experiences 
and sufferings) grew up listening to stories of violations which were committed against their 
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parents.1681 Therefore, these traumas need to be healed to achieve reconciliation and prevent 
renewed violence in Turkey. Revealing the truth has a different meaning in enforced 
disappearance cases (since it helps with closure),1682 and it would also be significant in the 
Kurdish Question as there are large number of disappeared persons in Turkey. Lastly, potential 
challenges of truth-telling must be considered before designing the process. The government 
needs to take necessary steps to include other political parties, different actors from the Kurdish 
political movement and civil society to ensure that there is adequate support for the process. 
Likewise, a future truth-telling process must include the violations of the PKK as well to ease a 
potential backlash from the Turkish public. 
5.2.b. Setting a true account of history 
As the first chapter explained, repressive regimes often distort narratives of the past and hide 
the truth from people through media and state institutions.1683 It is important to recover the 
official history to prevent future conflicts as distorted narratives may produce chauvinistic 
ideologies which may be exploited by political groups to generate violence.1684 These are 
significant matters in Turkey, as the Turkish state has constructed a negative discourse on the 
Kurdish people since the early years of the Turkish Republic.1685 Although this discourse has gone 
through some changes from the 1920s to today, the state always narrated the problems from 
its point of view and suppressed other narratives.1686 Likewise, the Turkish media and academia 
have largely adopted the state’s discourse due to suppression and identified the Kurdish 
Question with economic backwardness and terrorism until the 2000s.1687 In short, the narrative 
on the Kurdish Question has been dominated by the state, and narratives and truths of the Kurds 
have not been heard and recognised by the public. The violations they have been subjected to 
and the sufferings they endured remain largely unknown to the Turkish people. Public opinion 
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on the Kurdish Question has been shaped by this negative discourse.1688 So, establishing a truth 
commission and disseminating the information about violations may contribute to the process 
by raising public awareness and enabling people to empathise with the victims, as happened in 
Peru.1689  
The conflict has exacerbated the anti-Kurdish discourse, and some community-level tensions 
occurred between the Kurds and the Turks in some Western cities as the third chapter 
elaborated.1690 These negative perceptions must be defused to secure a future peace and 
transitional process. Unearthing the truth can help challenge the official narrative which 
portrayed the Kurds in a negative way, but this must be done carefully. Although revealing the 
truth is important, forging one version of history through truth-telling mechanisms can be 
problematic.1691 For instance, the CAVR was criticised for creating one version of truth (from the 
FRETILIN’s perspective) and suppressing the others.1692 Therefore, instead of setting one account 
of history on the Kurdish Question, various truth-telling initiatives and memory projects should 
be developed at different levels (like community-level and national-level) in Turkey. These 
different initiatives may also enrich each other. Yet, it must be borne in mind that a truth 
commission can be more effective, since it is an official body, in convincing the public that the 
rights of the Kurdish people have been violated.1693 Therefore, establishing a truth commission 
is more significant compared to other memory initiatives.  
5.2.c. Addressing ESCR violations and root causes of the conflict 
As the second chapter depicted, truth commissions can make a substantial contribution to peace 
and reconciliation by addressing ESCR violations, diagnosing root causes of the conflicts, 
identifying circumstances which promoted or allowed violations to take place, and making 
recommendations for tackling these issues. Especially, forced displacement must be addressed 
in truth commissions as happened in Guatemala, Liberia and East Timor.1694 The Guatemalan 
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Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) was considered as successful in terms of addressing 
forced displacement because the investigators of the commission “hiked into remote areas of 
the country to interview thousands of civilians who were displaced by the war.”1695 The Peruvian 
and East Timorese truth commissions also looked at the context and root causes of the conflicts 
as demonstrated in detail in the previous chapter.1696 Although the Kurdish Question is primarily 
an ethno-political conflict, socioeconomic issues played an important role.1697 The oppression 
on the identity and culture of the Kurdish people, the economic marginalisation of the Kurdish 
region and the significance of socioeconomic problems and ESCR abuses in the Kurdish Question 
were explained in the third chapter. A truth commission can make a great contribution to 
Turkey’s future peace process by making an in-depth analysis of these issues and depict their 
roles in the Kurdish Question.  
The conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK inflicted great damages to individuals, 
communities and the region. The truth commission should examine how the victims have been 
affected from these. Since the perception of discrimination is quite strong and this is one of the 
strong reasons for ethno-nationalism for the Kurdish people,1698 addressing these issues is vital 
for achieving peace and reconciliation. As the third chapter’s section 2.4 explained, the 
socioeconomic problems are more significant regarding the Kurdish youth who are frustrated 
with poverty and unemployment, and they are more inclined to joining the PKK.1699 So, the truth 
commission must focus on this issue and recommend ways in which these problems can be 
eliminated, and the Kurdish youth can be prevented from engaging in violence.  
Lastly, the third chapter’s section 3.2 made an in-depth analysis of forced migration in the 
Kurdish Question as it has been one of the most wide-spread human rights violations in the 
conflict. The forced migration caused other socioeconomic problems such as unemployment, 
poverty, health and education problems for the Kurds. Therefore, forced migration requires a 
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special emphasis in the solution of the Kurdish Question. Although transitional justice does not 
concern eliminating these socioeconomic problems directly (creating employment or building 
houses and hospitals), a truth commission can still contribute to tackling these problems by 
diagnosing the problems and their causes. So that the state can plan a program to solve these 
issues. To conclude, socioeconomic problems and ESCR abuses should not be considered as a 
historical background or context only; they require deliberate attention and remedies in the 
transitional process.  
5.2.d. Formation and mandate of the truth commission  
As the first chapter illustrated, the formation and mandate of a truth commission is decisive for 
its success.  These processes should develop in an extensive consultation with public, civil society 
and political actors. It is important to identify what people understand from “truth” in 
establishing truth commissions, otherwise there might be a discrepancy between victims’ and 
the commission’s understandings of truth, as happened in East Timor.1700 
The time frame that the commission will look at, the aims it will pursue and the approach it will 
adopt must be identified by a consultation process to ensure that it will meet the demands of 
people and be accepted by the victims and the society. Firstly, the mandate of the commission 
should be determined. As explained in the previous chapter, some truth commissions (such as 
East Timor and Peru) include ESCR violations and broader socioeconomic issues in their 
mandates to analyse. Turkey should also set a mandate which includes examining the root 
causes of the conflict, structural violence and ESCR abuses. The public and victims must be 
informed about these matters, otherwise they may get disappointed with the outcomes.  
Considering the oppression of the Kurds since the 1920s, determining the time frame is likely to 
be a critical issue in the Kurdish Question. Therefore, the time frame must be determined after 
a consultation process with victims, political actors and civil society. Moreover, the transitional 
process in general, and the truth commission in particular, need to take a balanced approach 
between the individual and collective good (and demands) as they may conflict with each other. 
This approach must be shaped through a consultation process as a top-down decision may face 
criticism and resistance from people.  
The aims of the commission must also be identified modestly and clearly through a consultation 
process. Managing the expectations realistically and acknowledging the limitations are 
significant in this regard. Therefore, the needs and demands of the Kurdish people and the wider 
public must be understood well to design a realistic mandate for the commission. Even the 
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language matters when establishing a transitional justice mechanism, as too ambitious phrases 
such as “achieving reconciliation” or “tackling the Kurdish Question” can be problematic. For 
instance, the South African TRC promised to achieve “full reconciliation” but this has not been 
the case, and Desmond Tutu admitted that the commission should have promised to “promote 
reconciliation” as the former was not realistic.1701 Even if achieving a full-fledged reconciliation 
through transitional justice mechanisms is not realistic and attainable, this should not prevent 
transitional states from pursuing reconciliation.1702 
The approach of the commission must be determined according to the context as well. For 
instance, the CAVR focused on social justice rather than legal justice as it did not act like a trial 
(by looking at individual cases); instead, it considered victims collectively.1703 Considering victims 
in a collective manner could be efficient in the Kurdish Question too as there are large numbers 
of victims and the lifespan of the conflict and oppression is quite long. Yet, this does not mean 
that the commission should not document individual human rights violations. As noted earlier, 
truth commissions’ documentation of abuses is important both for the process (for instance, it 
could be beneficial for identifying the victims for reparations) and for future generations. Finally, 
the commission should adopt the “do no harm” principle and avoid anything which may damage 
victims and the society. For instance, victims who participate in the commission should not be 
forced to forgive the perpetrators, as this may lead to new traumas.1704 Lastly, the operating 
time of the commission should not be too short as truth commissions often require additional 
time (as happened in East Timor) due to their work-load. Likewise, preparing victims for 
participation may require time as “the most traumatized victims often take longest to be ready 
to participate in transitional justice.”1705 
5.2.e. Commissioners and staff 
The appointment of commissioners is a critical point as they have a major impact on the 
commission’s work. They should be appointed through an extensive consultation process, 
otherwise the victims and public may not accept the commission. For instance, the CTF was 
criticised for this, as the appointment of its commissioners and the selection of witnesses were 
made without any consultation with the public, victims and civil society.1706 Moreover, 
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appointing commissioners from different backgrounds is important as post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict contexts are complex and multidimensional, and this requires different 
perspectives to be employed. In Peru, the commissioners were from different backgrounds 
including academics, journalists and religious leaders.1707 Yet, they were criticised as almost all 
of them were far from representing the affected population in terms of culture and language.1708  
So, when Turkey establishes a truth commission, it must appoint commissioners from different 
backgrounds in terms of profession, ethnicity, gender and language. For instance, 
commissioners must include women and Kurdish speakers. Moreover, the commission should 
recruit and train local people who are from the Kurdish region and familiar with the context and 
the Kurdish culture. Recruiting locals can also be beneficial to increase the commission’s 
legitimacy and local ownership, as happened in East Timor (even though it was mostly 
symbolic).1709 As mentioned previously, the commission must employ a wide-range of staff from 
different professions such as social workers, psychologists, information-systems specialists and 
interpreters. 
5.2.f. Structure and settings 
The structure of a truth commission may vary in different contexts as can be seen in the 
examples of East Timor and Peru. Turkey should also design its commission according to the 
context in the most appropriate way. Yet, it must be noted that de-centralisation of the 
commission is important to ensure that victims in remote parts of the country should be able to 
engage in the work of the commission. Although there have been deficits, East Timor and Peru 
made an effort to achieve this by forming regional offices, appointing regional commissioners 
and staff, and holding regional hearings.1710 Yet, in East Timor, victims often experienced 
difficulties when they participated in the hearings because they were not comfortable in talking 
to foreigners in an unfamiliar setting.1711 The environment and protection are important for the 
witnesses and victims. In Rwanda, Tutsi victims had to testify surrounded by former enemies 
who are the majority in the country.1712 Different settings may be more appropriate for different 
crimes in order to prevent re-traumatisation of victims who participate. Unlike the CAVR, the 
CVR designed the settings of hearings carefully to prevent re-traumatisation, where victims were 
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provided a safe and comfortable environment to share their stories.1713 As the fourth chapter’s 
section 3.2.a explains in detail, the feedback of the victims was generally positive due to the 
design of the settings in Peru’s truth-telling process. Therefore, Turkey should recruit locals for 
the commission and they should participate in the proceedings, especially when cultural 
differences or language can be a problem for the victims. Moreover, the settings of the hearings 
must be designed sensitively to prevent re-traumatisation and to enable victims a cathartic 
experience. This could contribute to the prevention of re-traumatisation.      
5.2.g. Operation 
The CAVR operated in several languages and its report was translated to these languages to 
disseminate its findings to everyone.1714 Unlike the CAVR, the CVR and the CTF were not well-
equipped regarding different languages as they lacked interpreters and did not publish the final 
report in the languages of the victims.1715 This is also important in the Kurdish Question as some 
Kurdish people cannot speak Turkish, or they may be more comfortable in expressing 
themselves in their mother tongue. Therefore, the truth commission should operate in both 
Turkish and Kurdish (and other relevant) languages, and its final report must be published in 
these languages to make it available to everyone.  
Conducting thematic hearings, projects and workshops can be useful to address the needs and 
demands of specific groups such as women, youth and IDPs. East Timor and Peru adopted this 
method and they produced promising outcomes as explained in the fourth chapter.1716 
Moreover, the CAVR conducted specific workshops and meetings for communities to identify 
the community-level impacts of the conflict and the needs of these communities.1717 Turkey 
should also adopt this approach and pay specific attention to more vulnerable groups (women, 
youth and IDPs) and communities. Moreover, hearings were broadcasted in East Timor and Peru 
to ensure that testimonies of the victims were heard by the public.1718 Turkey should also 
consider this to ensure that the stories of the victims are heard by the public. Finally, truth 
commissions need to give proper recommendations avoiding rhetorical statements and slogans 
since they have experts on the matters they look into. The recommendations should be 
applicable to the context. 
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5.2.h. Follow-up measures 
Recommendations of truth commissions are often left unimplemented as many transitional 
states do not establish follow-up processes for implementation.1719 This is a serious problem in 
transitional states because truth commissions should not be seen as an end in themselves. 
Unfortunately, this was the case in East Timor.1720 Yet, after five years, East Timor established 
an institute (Institute for Memory) to promote and monitor the recommendations of the truth 
commissions (the CAVR and the CTF).1721  Recommendations of truth commissions are important 
and need to be implemented. Turkey must avoid this mistake and design follow-up processes 
when it establishes a truth commission. Failure in implementing the recommendations also 
affects victims as they get disappointed when there is no consequence. They may think that 
their sufferings are simply used by the commission for its purposes rather than helping the 
victims.1722 
To conclude, although the benefits and success of truth commissions are still debated, the 
research which has been done so far depicts that they are not harmful.1723 Unless there is a valid 
reason for not establishing a truth commission, such as people’s opposition or the possibility of 
doing harm, there is a moral duty to remember towards the victims and truth commissions 
should be implemented. Yet it must be borne in mind that the truth is often not easily 
acknowledged by the public and elites in transitional societies.1724  This may also be true for the 
Kurdish Question since the Turkish state discourse (which promoted negative sentiments against 
the Kurds) has been quite strong among the public, and it will probably take time to change this 
narrative.  
5.3. Reparations 
The first chapter explained reparations in detail and illustrated that they are victim-centred 
because they (particularly material reparations) have tangible impacts on victims’ lives. 
Therefore, victims prioritised reparations over other mechanisms in many transitional contexts 
including East Timor and Peru.1725 They take many different forms including material 
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compensation, public apologies, restitution, monuments and psychological assistance. Although 
there are non-financial reparations such as apologies, they often require large financial 
resources, and this makes them less popular among transitional states.1726 Economically and 
democratically strong countries tend to grant reparations more compared to countries which 
have weak democracies and economies.1727 Turkey has signed various international treaties 
which recognised the right to a remedy and reparation.1728 Considering that its economy and 
democracy are strong (despite the deficits) compared to many transitional states, the Turkish 
government can and must implement reparations in the Kurdish Question. 
Political violence and conflict have a wide-range of negative impacts in transitional societies 
both tangible (killings, torture and destruction of buildings) and intangible (damages to societies, 
socioeconomic institutions and family relations; increasing fear and trauma; decline in trust) 
which disrupt the functioning of societies.1729 To repair the societal problems and achieve social 
reconstruction, the root causes of the problems must be understood and eliminated. This 
requires engaging with communities and examining their needs and aspirations.1730 Numerous 
workshops were conducted in East Timor and Peru to identify the needs and demands of people 
before designing reparation programs.1731 The CVR clearly remarked that reparations should 
address socioeconomic and structural injustices in the country.1732 Likewise, the CAVR 
recommended wide-ranging reparations (material and symbolic) at national, community and 
individual levels to remedy the past wrongs. Since there was a large number of victims (almost 
all citizens), the commission decided to grant reparations to the most vulnerable. These included 
medical and psychological support, memorialisation efforts, exhumations and material support 
which was in the form of provision of services in health and education.1733 Woefully, transitional 
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states often have a limited capacity for addressing the demands of all victims. This makes 
identifying victims an arduous task. 
5.3.a. Identifying victims 
As depicted in the previous chapters, identifying “the victim” is often difficult (also political). For 
instance, in East Timor, the commission made an objective definition and did not consider 
people’s political affiliations.1734 It was similar in Peru as the CVR only considered the violation 
as a condition and did not look at the political affiliations of the victim or the perpetrator.1735 
However, defining victims is often contentious as public or political elites often think various 
groups do not deserve reparations as happened in Peru and East Timor. This is likely to happen 
in Turkey due to negative sentiments against the Kurds among the public. Currently, the state 
identifies martyrs (members of the security forces who lost their lives due to the conflict) and 
war veterans as victims of the conflict and gives priority to them (including their families) in 
education and employment as a form of reparation in Turkey.1736 Civilian victims must also be 
identified as victims in the Kurdish Question. There may be negative discourses against granting 
reparations to victims of the conflict, but this should be overcome by a well-designed reparation 
program. As mentioned above, the public should be prepared for the process. So, they can be 
supportive of the mechanisms.   
Transitional states must avoid establishing a hierarchy among victims as happened in East Timor 
where veterans received significant benefits from the state and other victim groups were 
ignored.1737 It also happened in Peru and Sierra Leone which caused resentment and “social 
envy” among victims.1738 Turkey also needs to be careful when it applies a reparation program 
to avoid fuelling new resentments among people. The victims of ESCR abuses should not be 
excluded from reparation programs as happened in East Timor. Even though the CAVR 
addressed ESCR abuses, the victims of these violations were not granted reparations, unlike 
victims of CPR abuses. Only a small number of ESCR victims received reparations on the basis of 
vulnerability (such as widows).1739 East Timor identified some victims as the most vulnerable and 
prioritised them in granting reparations. So, Turkey must include the victims of ESCR violations, 
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particularly the Kurdish IDPs, when it designs a reparation program. Though, it must be borne in 
mind that identifying the victims will be difficult in Turkey considering the long lifespan of the 
conflict. It has been almost four decades since the conflict has started and the number of victims 
continues to grow. The large number of victims will be a significant challenge, both institutional 
and financial, despite the resources of Turkey. 
5.3.b. Individual and community reparations 
Both individual and community reparations are applied in transitional contexts as explained in 
the first chapter. Individual reparations are significant for victims because they mean that the 
state acknowledges and repairs their sufferings. They may have multiple forms in different 
contexts. Reparations have a major importance in the Kurdish Question as they have the 
potential to redress myriad ESCR violations. Individual reparations can be a significant measure 
to redress the violations arising from forced displacement. “The enactment of the Compensation 
Law in 2004 is without doubt the most significant step taken to date towards addressing the 
problem of internal displacement in Turkey.”1740 This law, its implementation and its 
shortcomings are analysed in the third chapter. This law can be a good starting point for the 
government to remedy the problems of the Kurdish IDPs. Likewise, the RVRP’s shortcomings are 
explained in the third chapter. The RVRP must be improved and other mechanisms should be 
created to address the problems of the IDPs. 
Restitution, a form of reparation, has become an important component in transitional justice 
processes, and it is particularly significant in forced displacement cases. Numerous transitional 
countries (like Guatemala, Bosnia and South Africa) adopted this measure which aimed to return 
homes, properties and lands to the victims.1741 In Bosnia, for instance, restitution helped one 
million people (half of the displaced people) return to their homes.1742 Regarding the large 
number of Kurdish IDPs, restitution of homes, properties and lands of these people can be a 
promising measure in the Kurdish Question. Yet, as Williams noted, it should not be conditioned 
on return.1743 The state must provide necessary conditions for ensuring the return of the IDPs, 
but it should not force them to return. Bradley notes “[a]dvocates of transitional justice and 
reconciliation must be clear and modest in their expectations, avoiding the idealisation of return 
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as a manifestation of reconciliation.”1744 There are several studies which examine the necessary 
conditions.1745 Although this study will not analyse these conditions, it must be remarked that 
the government must analyse the context and find out necessary conditions which can remedy 
the problems of the Kurdish IDPs. As explained in the previous chapters, proving a verification 
of lost homes and properties has been a problem in East Timor’s transitional process and 
Turkey’s compensation law. Mooney remarked that: “Lack of documentation is a common 
characteristic among the internally displaced as documentation frequently is lost or confiscated 
during flight.”1746 Therefore, the government must find the ways in which the Kurdish IDPs will 
not be stripped from their right to remedy due to lack of documents and proof. Engaging with 
the process should be simple and free. At the individual level, psychological support can be 
provided to contribute to the healing of victims.1747 Victims of both CPR and ESCR abuses should 
be provided psychological support to overcome their traumas. Indeed, the reparations program 
should be designed after a consultation process with victims, so that it can respond to their 
needs and expectations. 
Contemporary conflicts often inflict serious damages on communities because people are often 
terrorised indiscriminately.1748 Therefore, community level reparations are important to restore 
the societal relationships. Though, it is asserted that transitional justice has limited capacity to 
transform societies which are rife with identity-related divisions, marginalisation and 
exclusion.1749 Since transitional justice tends to prioritise direct and high-profile abuses such as 
killings and disappearances, these societal problems, which may be among root causes of violent 
conflict, are often ignored completely or given little attention in transitional processes.1750 Yet 
there is an extending literature on how transitional justice can contribute to transforming 
divided societies.1751 It was noted that strong and negative emotions (such as hostility, distrust, 
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hatred, fear and anger) play a key role in intergroup conflicts and they need to be addressed to 
heal societies.1752 Conflicting parties often adopt discourses which dehumanise and delegitimise 
the other group.1753 Woefully, “distrust and fear do not automatically disappear with ceasefires 
or the signing of peace agreements.”1754 Therefore these troubling discourses must be 
eliminated. New communication channels must be established between conflicting parties, and 
societies must be reconstructed. It can be done through “[c]oexistence initiatives such as 
intergroup projects and associations aimed at achieving shared goals, dialogue facilitation, and 
media campaigns”.1755 In the Kurdish Question, these initiatives can be promising to eliminate 
societal tensions between the Kurds and the Turks. As communities are affected by violence in 
various ways, they need specific measures in post-conflict states.1756 These measures must be 
designed and implemented with the affected communities to ensure the acceptance of them. 
Collective reparations may play an important role in addressing structural injustices.1757 
KONDA’s survey depicts that “the Kurdish are more likely to feel depressed regardless of 
economic class, and the Kurdish in the lower income groups present even a higher tendency for 
depression.”1758 Considering the development deficits, structural violence and socioeconomic 
problems in the Kurdish region, community level reparations can contribute to eliminating them. 
Affected communities (including its members, leaders and civil society from the region) must 
have agency in finding the ways in which these problems can be eliminated. Achieving 
development in the region, creating employment opportunities and enhancing the provision of 
health, education and infrastructure could be useful in transforming the society and eliminating 
the root causes of the conflict. As depicted in previous chapters, collective reparations and 
development projects are sometimes considered substitutes for each other. Both in East Timor 
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and Peru, governments employed development projects and considered that they would serve 
as collective reparations. Yet, they are different because the state must acknowledge 
responsibility for the past wrongs and recognise the victims in reparations. Turkey must 
implement collective reparations and development projects distinctively to avoid this mistake. 
Lastly, tensions may occur between individuals and societies as the latter may want the state to 
prioritise collective good whereas the former wants the state to pursue individuals’ claims. 
Therefore, the transitional justice practitioners should balance their needs and demands. 
5.3.c. Material and symbolic reparations 
As explained in the first chapter, material reparations can take many different forms including 
restitution of homes and properties, provision of rehabilitation (physical and psychological) and 
monetary payments. They vary according to the context. For instance, in Brazil, the government 
implemented a variety of reparations to redress past crimes including one-time payments, life-
long wages and enabling victims (who were political dissidents) to complete their university 
education which was disrupted under the military regime.1759 The fourth chapter depicted that 
the CVR and the CAVR recommended both material and symbolic reparations, yet both 
governments were reluctant to implement them properly. Even though some IDPs and most 
vulnerable groups received material support in East Timor, it was very limited. Likewise, the 
Peruvian government was criticised for the shortcomings in the implementation process of its 
reparations, even though its reparation plan was considered as one of the best reparation plans 
in the world. So, in the context of reparations, the implementation becomes more critical. 
Turkey should form follow-up measures when it designs its reparation program. 
The first chapter depicted that there are various symbolic reparations including apologies, 
memorialisation, exhumation and reburials, public ceremonies and rewriting the history books. 
As in material reparations, they also took multiple forms in different contexts. In Peru, the state 
officially apologised to the victims1760 but this was not the case in East Timor as the main 
perpetrator of abuses was Indonesia and it did not deliver an apology. Even though material 
reparations have more tangible impacts on victims, Gibson’s research in South Africa depicts 
that less-costly mechanisms (sincere apologies) are as important as costly ones 
(compensations).1761 Yet, issuing an official apology is not independent from the context. For 
instance, the military has been powerful in Brazil and even though the state established a truth 
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commission and granted reparations to victims, it did not issue an official apology due to the 
military’s pressure.1762 An official apology could be useful in the Kurdish Question as the state 
denied their sufferings for decades. Considering the suffering they endured, the IDPs also 
deserve an official apology from the state.1763 Yet, considering the social and political realities 
(the negative perceptions against the Kurds, the strong support for the military etc.), this is not 
likely to happen easily. Truth-telling, memorialisation and other similar efforts can be employed 
to pave the way for offering an official apology.  
As in other mechanisms, the implementation of symbolic reparations is critical. Symbolic 
reparations must be balanced and decentralised, otherwise the stories of some victims may be 
ignored or forgotten. Turkey also needs a balanced and decentralised approach to symbolic 
reparations. In addition to apologies, memorialisation, exhumation and reburials should be 
adopted in the Kurdish Question. Moreover, the Turkish historiography must be rewritten from 
a more balanced perspective of the historical truths, and this should be done by “an 
independent commission composed of diverse sections of the public and historians from 
Turkish, Kurdish and other groups in society”. 1764 In addition to official memorialising efforts, 
local and traditional practices must be facilitated. Incorporating both the Kurdish and the Turkish 
actors in these practices can be promising for their acceptance by the public. 
To conclude, Turkey should not aim to restore status quo ante indubitably because the pre-
violence socioeconomic conditions have been unjust and among the root causes of the conflict. 
Therefore, reparations should aim to contribute to the elimination of these injustices rather than 
restoring status quo ante. Lastly, the Peruvian state acknowledged full responsibility for all the 
reparations regardless of who committed the violations. This approach should be adopted in 
Turkey as well. The state should grant reparations to the victims of both the state’s security 
forces and the PKK. The state has responsibility even for the crimes committed by the PKK as it 
has an obligation to protect its citizens from the PKK’s violations. Therefore, victims of the PKK 
must also be granted reparations. 
5.4. Institutional Reforms 
The first chapter’s section 4.4 described institutional reforms (including vetting, security sector 
reform and legislative reform) which are designed to reform state structures to prevent future 
violations. Transitional governments must introduce reforms regarding institutions and civil 
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servants that committed violations or allowed them to take place.1765 Moreover, public officials, 
particularly security sector personnel, must be trained about human rights.1766 These reforms 
must be context-specific as each context has its own dynamics and problems. East Timor had 
very limited capacity in terms of state institutions and civil servants, yet the CAVR and the CTF 
recommended many institutional reforms to eliminate circumstances which allowed abuses to 
take place.1767 In the case of East Timor, the government established many institutions from 
scratch rather than reforming corrupted institutions. The CVR, on the other hand, acknowledged 
the state’s responsibility in abuses and the deficiencies of state institutions. As depicted in the 
fourth chapter’s section 3.2.d, the CVR recommended various institutional reforms including 
democratic reform, security sector reform, judicial reform and educational reform.1768  
The Turkish context is more similar to the Peruvian one as Turkey has well-established 
institutions and needs to reform them rather than building new ones from scratch. Firstly, 
Turkey needs to acknowledge its responsibility in crimes. The legal framework, governance and 
state institutions enabled violations to take place in the Kurdish region. The state took several 
steps in acknowledging the responsibility and redressing its wrongs, but they have been so 
modest and inadequate considering the large-scale abuses of both CPR and ESCR. As the third 
chapter mentioned, there have been some attempts at democratic and judicial reforms to 
alleviate the oppression of the Kurdish people and prevent future abuses. Likewise, the 
government developed several plans and projects to redress its past violations such as forced 
displacements. However, they have been far from fully addressing the past wrongs. Turkey 
needs to initiate a full-fledged program to achieve both democratic and legal reforms to ensure 
that violations will not take place in the future. As explained previously, truth commissions play 
an important role in recommending institutional reforms as they diagnose the problems during 
their inquiry. 
Vetting is one of the key institutional reforms in transitional states, but it must be applied to the 
specific public employees who committed crimes rather than removing people from public 
offices due to their political affiliations. States may exploit vetting to eliminate their rivals, 
therefore, this mechanism must be applied carefully, and vetted individuals must be given a 
right to defend themselves.1769 Vetting was not a significant mechanism in East Timor because 
abusive state officials were mostly from Indonesia and they left East Timor after independence. 
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However, Peru took important steps to implement the recommendations of the CVR as many of 
the security sector officials (including high-ranking members of the army) were vetted, 
prosecuted, jailed or forced to retire.1770 Security sector reform is also critical and it must 
accompany the vetting process to ensure that security forces and institutions will not commit 
and tolerate human rights abuses again. Analysing the context and identifying the problems is 
important for security sector reform to prevent future abuses.1771 In addition, Peru formed a 
follow-up commission to implement security sector reform, and despite its shortcomings, the 
government took important steps to implement this commission’s plan.1772   
As mentioned in the third chapter, the Turkish security forces are responsible from many human 
rights abuses such as enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and forced displacement. 
These individuals must be removed from public employment to prevent recurrence of abuses 
and to reinstil trust in state institutions, particularly in security forces. Vetting human rights 
abusers from the state may make a significant contribution regarding forced displacement cases, 
as many of the Kurdish IDPs stated that the village guards, who have been involved in crimes 
and human rights violations, are an important impediment to their return. Yet, vetting must be 
applied in a way which does not lead to new human rights violations. In addition to vetting, the 
Turkish state must reform its appointment to office procedures and examine the candidates’ 
human rights records, particularly “in those institutions that gave way to human rights 
violations.”1773 Moreover, as mentioned in the first chapter’s section 4.4, resource constraints 
may be an impediment to vetting for some states (as training new staff for vetted positions 
requires resources), but this is not likely to be a problem for Turkey due to its financial and 
institutional capacity. 
The third chapter depicted that the identity, culture and language of the Kurds have been 
oppressed and they demand the lifting of this oppression. Even though the JDP government took 
some steps to alleviate this, these are far from meeting the demands of the Kurds. Therefore, 
the government must adopt institutional reforms to eliminate this oppression. Celikkan stated 
that the state needs to reform some articles of the laws (including the Election Law, Law on 
Political Parties, Basic Law of National Education, and the Criminal Law) which give rise to abuses 
and “a legal arrangement is needed for teaching in the mother tongue.”1774 It must be kept in 
mind that public opinion may change in time even on thorny issues. For instance, while a great 
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majority of the Kurds want the provision of education in Kurdish, a considerable majority of the 
population (65%) was against education in Kurdish in 2006.1775 Yet, this has changed 
considerably as a more recent survey conducted in 2016 by KONDA (a prominent research and 
consultancy company in Turkey) depicts that 55% of the population do not oppose education in 
the Kurdish language.1776 Gurses remarked that “genuine democratic reforms seem to be the 
only way out of bloodshed and conflict” in Turkey.1777 So, the government must introduce 
institutional reforms to realise the identity and rights (both CPR and ESCR) of the Kurdish people.  
As mentioned earlier, Turkey has considerably low levels of social trust, and Kurdish people have 
severely limited levels of trust in the Turkish state. Remembering the past and redressing the 
past grievances may help to improve these negative conditions in the country. Trust can be 
increased through institutional reforms. It is crucial for achieving development as well. To 
conclude, the government needs to adopt measures to reform the institutions, personnel and 
practice to prevent future abuses and to reinstil trust in the state.  
5.5. Amnesties  
The first chapter explained amnesties in detail and depicted that they are highly contentious in 
transitional justice. Amnesties are often criticised for weakening accountability and furthering 
impunity. It is explained that forgiveness belongs to the victims and states must not strip the 
right of forgiveness from victims by granting amnesty to perpetrators.1778 Considering the 
criticisms, there is a dilemma in their application. Although granting amnesty may cause 
psychological harm to victims, it is “an integral part of peace agreements” and amnesties are 
widely implemented.1779 Proponents of amnesties advocate them by claiming that well-designed 
amnesties can contribute to justice and prevent future crimes. Engstrom asserted that: 
“Amnesties, for instance, when appropriately designed, can constitute a legitimate form of 
accountability.”1780 Although in some cases they are implemented to escape from prosecutions, 
amnesties may be granted for various reasons such as prioritising harmony and unity over 
individual justice, lack of financial resources or demobilisation of combatants.1781  
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As in implementation of other mechanisms, the context is critical for amnesties. For instance, 
amnesties can be supported by public and civil society organisations as happened in Brazil − 
although they wanted amnesty for political prisoners and exiles, not for the military forces.1782 
If amnesties can be designed properly to benefit transitional processes, they may contribute to 
justice, peace and reconciliation. Mallinder noted that there are several criteria which are 
necessary for designing an efficient amnesty: “democratic legitimacy”, “a genuine desire to 
promote peace and reconciliation”, “limited in scope”, “conditional” and “accompanied by 
reparations”.1783 These criteria can be a useful starting point to design amnesties in a transitional 
context. In addition, the experiences in East Timor and Peru can provide insights for Turkey.  
In East Timor, amnesty was not a significant mechanism since an overwhelming majority of 
perpetrators were Indonesians and they enjoy impunity in Indonesia. Even though a majority of 
people were against granting amnesties for gross human rights violations, the East Timorese 
government still granted several amnesties to perpetrators (including the ones who committed 
serious crimes like crimes against humanity).1784 In Peru, several amnesty laws were passed by 
the regime to ensure the members of the security forces who committed violations would not 
be prosecuted. Yet, the decisions of the Inter-American Court and the Peruvian Supreme Court 
abrogated these laws.1785 The amnesties in Peru and East Timor aimed to escape accountability 
rather than contribute to reconciliation, and it is impossible to advocate these types of 
amnesties. Turkey must avoid adopting this kind of amnesty. Unconditional and blanket 
amnesties which are designed to overcome accountability would be detrimental to peace and 
reconciliation. Considering that the alternative to granting amnesties is often de facto impunity 
(“where the vast bulk of perpetrators are untouched by any legal process”)1786, Turkey must 
consider adopting amnesties in the Kurdish Question. Yet, they should be designed carefully to 
ensure that they comply with the criteria stated above. Especially, the government must ensure 
that they are conditional and limited, and there is public and political support for them. 
Considering that amnesties should not be granted to the perpetrators of serious crimes, some 
ESCR abuses (forced displacement and famine) would not fit in the scope of amnesties. Yet, 
amnesties can be granted for low-level perpetrators who committed ESCR violations. If they are 
accompanied by other transitional justice mechanisms, they can contribute to the process.    
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6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter explored the prospect of pursuing transitional justice in Turkey for tackling the 
Kurdish Question with a specific focus on ESCR violations and considered which transitional 
justice mechanisms could be employed in a future transitional process. It answered the 
questions “Can Turkey pursue transitional justice?” and “Why should Turkey pursue transitional 
justice?”.  Then, the chapter pointed out the significance of considering the local context and 
adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach to transitional justice efforts. The 
chapter concluded by analysing the application of five mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, 
reparations, institutional reforms and amnesties) in the Kurdish Question in the light of lessons 
learnt from East Timor and Peru. 
As in most conflicts in the world, the Kurdish Question is multidimensional, and the solution 
needs to be multidimensional as well. It cannot be tackled by socioeconomic or political means 
alone. Yet, as explained throughout the thesis, addressing ESCR violations is a must in the 
Kurdish Question to have a full-fledged solution. Eliminating the root causes of conflict is also 
crucial to ensure sustainable peace and reconciliation in Turkey. In addition, the state’s 
commitment to transitional justice is critical for its success.1787 Therefore, the Turkish 
government must commit itself to solve the Kurdish Question. Transitional justice processes 
must be designed, planned and implemented carefully. The commitment of the government 
must also manifest itself in preparing people for the process. Getting the support of wider 
populations is critical in Turkey to prevent a potential backlash during the process. Lastly, it must 
be understood that people are not always rational and even if transitional justice mechanisms 
are applied successfully, they may not produce the expected results such as preventing future 
violence, as Colvin noted “Individuals and groups do not act in universal or predictable 
patterns.”1788 So, the problems faced during the transitional process should not discourage the 
government from pursuing transitional justice. 
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Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
This study has attempted to look at the possibility of pursuing transitional justice in Turkey to 
tackle the Kurdish Question with the aim of finding the appropriate mechanisms and approaches 
to address ESCR violations, historical inequalities and root causes of the conflict. Socioeconomic 
problems are central to the Kurdish Question and forced displacement has been one of the most 
wide-spread human rights violations in Turkey. This study aims to contribute to future peace 
and transitional justice processes in Turkey by depicting the significance of addressing 
socioeconomic issues. Moreover, considering that Turkey has a strong economy, democracy and 
well-established institutions compared to most transitional states, it has the potential to enrich 
the transitional justice field by applying a wide-range of transitional justice mechanisms due to 
its financial and institutional capacity. This study has made an in-depth analysis of East Timor 
and Peru’s transitional processes as these countries did not neglect ESCR violations and 
addressed socioeconomic issues during their transitional justice efforts. By looking at their 
experiences and incorporating the lessons learnt from these countries (and others), Turkey can 
design and implement transitional mechanisms which are relevant to the local needs and 
realities. This should be done through a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach to ensure 
the efficiency of mechanisms and guaranteeing their acceptance by the locals.  
Adopting a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach is critical in Turkey as in other 
transitional contexts. It has been well-documented that the success of top-down and one-size-
fits-all transitional mechanisms, which are applied by external actors (who are far from the local 
context and affected populations), have been limited in transitional contexts. Every transitional 
state has its own culture, dynamics and realities. Their problems are complex, and they require 
context-specific solutions to be successful. Therefore, transitional states must adopt 
participatory and grassroots approaches to ensure they achieve the goals of transitional justice. 
Locals must have agency in these processes and they should be part of decision-making, design, 
management and implementation processes. Moreover, adopting a holistic approach is crucial 
as well, considering the complexity of the problems which need to be addressed. Given the 
complex nature and the long life-span of the conflict and oppression, the Kurdish Question 
requires a complex and carefully designed solution. This can be achieved by a transitional justice 
process which is applied thorough a participatory, holistic and grassroots approach. 
The Kurdish Question is complicated as it is a political problem based on identity-related 
oppression, and yet, socioeconomic issues are significant and need to be addressed for a 
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successful solution. The Turkish state discourse makes it more complicated as it has portrayed 
the Kurdish Question as a terrorism problem which was based on socioeconomic problems and 
underdevelopment of the Kurdish region. The Kurdish people and political actors have long 
objected to this discourse by demanding political, lingual and cultural rights. So, there is a 
dilemma for a future transitional process. The process needs to clarify the true nature of the 
conflict (political and identity-related), but it must also admit that addressing socioeconomic 
problems and ESCR violations is an absolute must. As the previous chapters made a detailed 
analysis, addressing root causes of the conflict, structural violence and ESCR violations are 
crucial in transitional contexts. Although they are often neglected, addressing these issues is 
critical for a sustainable peace. They are also critical in the Kurdish Question as depicted in the 
third chapter. For instance, the Kurdish youth, who have been frustrated with unemployment 
and poverty (mainly resulting from the conflict), are more prone to joining the PKK and adopting 
more radical means against the state’s oppression. A future solution has to tackle the problems 
of the Kurdish youth to ensure sustainable peace.  
Analysing the experiences of East Timor and Peru (and various other countries) shows that 
pursuing transitional justice is an extremely arduous task considering there are multiple actors 
(victims, affected communities, donors, international actors and politicians) to be satisfied; 
various interests of these actors (such as individual accountability and community reparations) 
to be balanced; and limited resources to be allocated to transitional justice mechanisms (and 
other post-conflict efforts such as DDR and development programs). Considering these 
complexities, transitional justice efforts require political will, careful design and cooperation of 
different actors (donors, local and global agents, state institutions and different segments of 
affected societies etc.) for producing positive results. Moreover, potential risks, such as renewal 
of violence and disappointment of victims, must be analysed well to avoid them. Being realistic 
on what can be achieved is also critical for a successful transitional justice process. Finally, given 
the differences in transitional contexts in terms of culture, traditions and dynamics, the notions 
of transitional justice (truth, reconciliation and memory) should not be formulated narrowly, 
and transitional justice practitioners must be open to consider new and traditional practices 
(such as nahe biti in East Timor) which may have a potential to contribute to transitional justice 
processes. To conclude, this study proposes that Turkey should adopt trials, truth commissions, 
reparations, institutional reforms and amnesties in a holistic approach to address the 
wrongdoings of the past. They can all play different roles in solving the Kurdish Question and 
contribute to addressing the socioeconomic issues.  
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2. Policy Recommendations  
The following recommendations remark some of the most important points (by no means 
exhaustive) which must be taken into consideration by the state, transitional justice actors 
(internal and external), NGOs and civil society: 
1. The local context must be understood well. The historical background and root 
causes of the conflict must be analysed attentively. The needs and demands of the 
victims, affected communities and the public must be identified to design a process 
which responds to them properly. 
2. The participation of local actors must be ensured in a meaningful way. They 
should be empowered and be subjects in the process. They must participate in every 
stage of the design, management and implementation processes of the mechanisms. In 
addition, the participation of local and external actors must be balanced well. 
3. The public must be prepared for the peace and transitional process carefully. 
Different segments of the society must be brought together to eliminate prejudices. 
Workshops, meetings, dialogue groups should be designed to achieve this. Moreover, 
necessary measures must be taken to avoid the interruption of spoilers and exploitation 
of political actors.  
4. Socioeconomic issues must not be neglected, and they must be given adequate 
attention in the process. This must be done in a way which clearly acknowledges that 
the Kurdish Question is a political problem arising from identity-based claims.  
5. Specific focus must be placed on women, youth and IDPs (and other relevant 
victim groups) as these are vulnerable groups in the Kurdish Question. 
6. The transitional process should not be dominated by a legalistic perspective, 
different disciplines and perspectives should be welcomed to find innovative solutions 
to the problems.  
7. Transitional justice efforts must be connected to peacebuilding and 
development efforts, and they should be coordinated to avoid possible tensions and 
competitions among these fields. 
8. The transitional process must be de-centralised to reach all the victims to avoid 
implementing mechanisms which are distant from affected people and communities. 
9. The transitional process should not be considered as a clear-cut process which 
has a short time limit. In addition, mechanisms should not be seen as ends in 
themselves. The society and institutions (which enabled violence) must be transformed 
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and this requires time. Therefore, follow-up measures should be taken to ensure this 
transformation and prevent future violence. 
10. Transitional justice actors (both external and internal) must avoid imposing their 
perceptions (regarding concepts, aims and objectives of transitional justice) on locals. 
11. The “do no harm” principle must be embraced to ensure that transitional justice 
efforts will not inflict further harms. Likewise, the process should be conflict sensitive to 
prevent exacerbating the conflict and tensions. 
12. The government should seek the cooperation of international transitional 
justice experts and learn from the experiences of different countries. 
3. Contribution 
As explained in the introduction chapter, this thesis makes an original contribution to 
transitional justice literature in various ways. Firstly, this is the first study to consider the Kurdish 
Question through transitional justice lens in depth as a doctoral thesis. Moreover, this is the first 
and the only study which concerns the Kurdish Question and specifically focuses on ESCR abuses, 
structural violence and root causes of the conflict in the context of transitional justice. This 
research substantially develops the existing studies which suggested that the Kurdish Question 
can be considered in the context of transitional justice. It does so by making a comparative 
analysis of the transitional justice processes of East Timor and Peru and analysing five 
transitional justice mechanisms by incorporating lessons learnt from these two countries’ 
experiences. Secondly, this study contributes to the field by examining the prospect of pursuing 
transitional justice in Turkey, a country which has significant financial and institutional resources 
to allocate to transitional justice efforts. Given that many countries which emerged from the 
conflict lack necessary resources, Turkey can be an important example due to its financial and 
institutional capacity. Thirdly, the Kurdish Question is a significant example for the literature as 
it is inherently a political problem, yet socioeconomic issues are critical for its solution. This 
shows the importance of addressing ESCR abuses, structural violence and root causes of the 
conflict, even for political problems. Finally, this research makes a significant contribution to the 
comparative literature on ESCR and transitional justice. 
4. Limitations of the study and future research 
This study is based on secondary data analysis rather than a field research, and it should be 
acknowledged that there are likely to be gaps in the data and analysis. The study aims to 
highlight important considerations in pursuing transitional justice in Turkey. Yet, it does not 
draw a roadmap for a future transitional process. In addition to the limited scope of this study, 
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such a roadmap must be drawn through a consultation with relevant agents including victims, 
locals, civil society, political parties and transitional justice experts. Likewise, it does not identify 
the needs and expectations of the Kurdish people. This should be done so through large-scale 
surveys and measures by the government and other relevant actors.  Another limitation has 
been the ongoing conflict in Turkey. When this study was commenced, there was an ongoing 
peace process, yet, the ceasefire was broken, and the peace process collapsed in 2015. Woefully, 
the conflict continues, and new human rights violations are being committed. Since they are 
continuous, this study has not much focused on the ongoing developments. Lastly, identifying 
the perceptions of relevant actors (victims, affected communities, civil society organisations, 
politicians and policy makers) was not possible due to not conducting a field research. Yet, it is 
quite important that this study lays the foundation for the application of transitional justice in 
the Kurdish Question. 
This study focused on socioeconomic issues and ESCR violations, but some implications are also 
realised for CPR violations and broader issues. Future research can be conducted on CPR 
violations and political issues. Although the nexus between transitional justice and development 
is explained briefly in the second chapter, further research can be undertaken to make an in-
depth analysis of this nexus in the Kurdish Question. Lastly, this study did not explore the local 
and traditional reconciliation and dispute mechanisms in Turkey’s context. For instance, as 
stated in the third chapter, Islam has been a unifying element between the Kurds and the Turks, 
exploring Islamic traditions which promote reconciliation can be examined in future studies and 
develops this study. So, future studies can look at these mechanisms and make an in-depth 
analysis of them to see how these mechanisms can contribute to the solution of the Kurdish 
Question.  
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Abbreviations 
Amnesty International       : AI 
Civil and Political Rights       : CPR 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights     : ESCR 
Human Rights Watch       : HRW 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre     : IDMC 
International Center for Transitional Justice    : ICTJ 
Partiya Welatparezen Demokrat      : PWD 
Security Sector Reform       : SSR 
The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor Leste   : FALINTIL 
The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste  : CAVR 
The Commission of Truth and Friendship     : CTF 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights   : CESCR 
The Community Reconciliation Program     : CRP 
The Comprehensive Reparations Plan      : PIR 
The Democratic Party        : DP 
The Department for International Development    : DFID 
The European Union        : EU 
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey     : TBMM 
The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification    : CEH 
The High Level Multisectoral Commission     : CMAN 
The Indonesian Human Rights Court      : IHRC 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights   : ICCPR 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights : ICESCR 
The Justice and Development Party      : JDP 
The Kurdistan Workers' Party      : PKK 
The National Recovery Strategy       : NRS 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization      : NATO 
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The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights : OHCHR 
The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR     : OP-ICESCR 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  : OECD 
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission    : CVR 
The Program for the Support of Resettlement     : PAR 
The Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project    : RVRP 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia     : FARC 
The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor    : FRETILIN 
The Serious Crimes Investigations Team     : SCIT 
The Serious Crimes Process       : SCP 
The Serious Crimes Unit       : SCU 
The Shining Path (the Communist Party of Peru)    : PCP-SL 
The Social Aid and Solidarity Foundation     : SYDV 
The Southeast Anatolia Project       : GAP 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes      : SPSC 
The State of Emergency       : OHAL 
The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency   : SIDA 
The Term of Reference        : TOR 
The Timorese Democratic Union      : UDT 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission    : TRC 
The United Nations       : UN 
The United Nations Children's Fund      : UNICEF 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights    : UDHR 
The United Nations Development Programme     : UNDP 
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor  : UNTAET 
The World Bank        : WB 
Transitional Justice       : TJ  
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement      : MRTA  
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